Towards Auctioning

Name: Towards Auctioning | Present and Future Challenges to Competition Law
Brand: Kluwer Law International
Price: 176.99 EUR
Availability: OnlineOnly

Present and Future Challenges to Competition Law

Stefan Weishaar(Autor*in)

Kluwer Law International (Verlag)

Erschienen am 24. November 2009

268 Seiten

E-Book

PDF mit Adobe-DRM

Systemvoraussetzungen

978-90-411-4940-4 (ISBN)

176,99 €inkl. 7% MwSt.

Systemvoraussetzungen

für PDF mit Adobe-DRM

E-Book Einzellizenz

Als Download verfügbar

Beschreibung

Emissions trading systems have come to the fore as the most economically
efficient mechanisms that can be employed to bring about an optimal greenhouse
gas reduction goal. Even though much has been written about the advantages and
disadvantages of these systems, one element of crucial importance - emission
allowance allocation - has not been considered in adequate depth until the
present study. Such an analysis takes on increased importance as it seems
likely that market-based auctioning will become the default allocation method
throughout the EU under a proposed amendment to the Emissions Trading System
(ETS) established by Directive 2003/87/EC.

Taking a law and economics approach - that is, using a combined perspective of
industrial economics and legal analysis - this important book examines the
potential for anticompetitive distortion that may result from auctioning
emission allowances. Among the issues investigated in depth are the following:

-
whether the current setup of the EU ETS fosters allocative efficiency or
whether this allocative efficiency is hindered by legal impediments or
constraints;

-
whether EU competition law can serve to remedy anticompetitive effects
stemming from Member State actions taken pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC;

-
which allocation formats are most desirable from an allocative efficiency and
environmental effectiveness point of view;

-
the importance of initial allocation and adjustment of out-of-equilibrium
situations under the amended ETS;

-
whether auctioning allowances serves the attainment of market equilibrium even
in the continuing presence of 'polluter havens';

-
the effect of the ECJ's so-called 'joint application jurisprudence' on the
ETS; and

-
the allocation of allowances from a state aid perspective.

The book provides both a coherent typology of emission allowance allocation
mechanisms and the main characteristics of the present emissions trading
system, setting the gained insights into a broader perspective. It examines
how various assignment mechanisms deal with issues such as price
determination, allocative efficiency and environmental effectiveness. It
considers how market-based allocation mechanisms compare with administrative
allocation mechanisms, particularly those based on the widely applied
grandfathering method. And perhaps most important - and of especial value to
practitioners and policymakers - it identifies the auction design challenges
that must be addressed by the Commission in its implementing regulation due by
30 June 2010.

Weitere Details

Weitere Ausgaben

Inhalt

Cover
Half Title Page
Editorial Board
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Table of Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction
1 BACKGROUND
2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND OUTLINE OF THE STUDY
Chapter 2 Economic Foundations
1 INTRODUCTION
2 INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL WELFARE, EFFICIENCY AND THE RELEVANCE OF INITIAL ALLOCATION
3 BASIC ECONOMIC INTUITION FOR ABATEMENT AND EMISSION TRADING
3.1 WHY ABATEMENT?
3.2 WHY EMISSION TRADING?
3.3 WHAT IS THE PROBLEM OF INITIAL ALLOCATION?
3.3.1 Why Do We Need Prices?
3.3.2 Allocation
3.3.3 Environmental Considerations
4 OVERVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
4.2 OVERVIEW
4.3 ECONOMIC MODELS
4.3.1 A Simple Static Monopoly Model
4.3.2 Abuse
4.3.3 Cartels
4.3.4 Merger and Acquisition
5 SUMMARY
Chapter 3 Allocative Efficiency: A Static and Dynamic Perspective
1 INTRODUCTION
2 EMISSION TRADING SYSTEMS
3 STATIC CLOSED ECONOMY
3.1 STATIC CLOSED ECONOMY MODEL
3.2 COMPARISON OF ALLOCATION MECHANISMS AND ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY
3.2.1 Auctions as an Allocation Mechanism
3.2.1.1 Auction Formats
3.2.1.2 Multiunit Auctions
3.2.2 Administrative Allocation Mechanisms
3.2.2.1 Financial Administrative Allocation Mechanisms
3.2.2.2 Free Administrative Allocation Mechanisms
3.2.2.2.1 Grandfathering
3.2.2.2.2 Relative Standard Base Mechanisms
3.3. ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS
3.4 SUMMARY
4 DYNAMIC OPEN ECONOMIC SETTING
4.1 THE DYNAMIC OPEN ECONOMY
4.2 COMPARISON OF ALLOCATION MECHANISMS AND ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY
4.2.1 Auctions as an Allocation Mechanism
4.2.2 Administrative Allocation Mechanism
4.2.2.1 Financial Administrative Allocation Mechanisms
4.2.2.2 Free Administrative Allocation Mechanisms
4.2.2.2.1 Grandfathering
4.2.2.2.2 Relative Standard Base Mechanisms
4.3 ENVIRONMENTAL ASPECTS
4.3.1 Dynamic Interaction of Firms and the Environment
4.3.1.1 Outsourcing Abatement
4.3.1.2 Outsourcing of Production through Movements of Factors of Production
4.3.1.3 Substitute Domestic Goods for Imported Goods
4.3.2 Initial Allocation Mechanisms and the Environment
4.3.2.1 Auctions
4.3.2.2 Administrative Allocation Mechanisms
4.3.2.2.1 Financial Administrative Allocation Mechanisms
4.3.2.2.2 Free Administrative Allocation Mechanisms
4.3.2.2.2.1 Grandfathering
4.3.2.2.2.2 Relative standard base mechanisms
4.4 SUMMARY
5 CONCLUSION
Chapter 4 Compatibility of Allocation Formats and Directive 2003/87/EC
1 INTRODUCTION
2 ALLOCATION FORMATS UNDER DIRECTIVE 2003/87/EC
3 AUCTIONS
4 GRANDFATHERING
5 PSR
6 THE EU ETS AMENDMENT
7 CONCLUSION
Chapter 5 EU Emissions Trading System and Articles 81 and 82
1 INTRODUCTION
2 ECONOMIC PROBLEM
2.1 BARRIERS TO ENTRY
2.2 ENTRENCHED MARKET SHARES
3 LEGAL ANALYSIS
3.1 DEVELOPMENT OF THE JURISPRUDENCE
3.2 JOINED APPLICATION JURISPRUDENCE TODAY UNDER ARTICLE 81
3.2.1 Analysis: The EU ETS and Article 81 EC Treaty
3.3 JOINED APPLICATION JURISPRUDENCE TODAY UNDER ARTICLE 82
3.3.1 Application
3.4 APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLES 82 AND 86 EC TREATY AGAINST STATE MEASURES
3.4.1 Application
4 ECONOMIC APPRAISAL AND SUMMARY
5 JOINT APPLICATION POST 2012?
Chapter 6 EU Emissions Trading System and State Aid
1 INTRODUCTION
2 EUROPEAN STATE AID REGULATION APPLICABLE TO EMISSION TRADING SYSTEMS
2.1 THE EXISTENCE OF STATE AID: ARTICLE 87(1)
2.1.1 Transfer of a Benefit or an Advantage (Notion of Aid)
2.1.2 Aid Favouring a Certain Undertaking over Others (Selectivity Principle)
2.1.3 Granted by the State or through State Resources
2.1.4 It Should be an Undertaking or . . . Production
2.1.5 Distorts or Threatens to Distort Competition
2.1.6 Community Dimension: Aid Which is Capable of Affecting Trade between Member States
2.2 DEROGATIONS OF ARTICLE 87(1)
2.2.1 Article 87(3)(b)
2.2.2 Article 87(3)(c)
3 STATE AID ASSESSMENT OF FREE ALLOCATION MECHANISMS
3.1 STATE AID ASSESSMENT OF GRANDFATHERING
3.1.1 Transfer of a Benefit or an Advantage (Notion of Aid)
3.1.2 Aid Favouring a Certain Undertaking over others (Selectivity Principle)
3.1.3 Granted by the State or through State Resources
3.1.3.1 By the State
3.1.3.2 Through Member State Resources
3.1.4 It Should be an Undertaking or . . . Production
3.1.5 Distorts or Threatens to Distort Competition
3.1.5.1 Firstly, Competitive Distortions
3.1.5.1.1 Between Incumbent and New Entering Firms
3.1.5.1.2 Trading Sectors and Non-trading Sectors
3.1.5.1.3 Anticompetitive Distortions between Competing Firms of the Same Member State
3.1.5.1.4 Between Trading Sectors
3.1.5.2 Secondly, Does It Exceed the de minimis Threshold?
3.1.6 Community Dimension: Aid Which is Capable of Affecting Trade between Member States
3.1.6.1 Compatible with the Common Market
3.2 STATE AID ASSESSMENT OF A PSR SYSTEM
3.2.1 Transfer of a Benefit or an Advantage (Notion of Aid)
3.2.2 Aid Favouring a Certain Undertaking over Others (Selectivity Principle)
3.2.3 Granted by the State or through State Resources
3.2.3.1 By the State
3.2.3.2 Through State Resources
3.2.4 It Should be an Undertaking or . . . Production
3.2.5 Distorts or Threatens to Distort Competition
3.2.5.1 Firstly, Is There Distortion?
3.2.5.1.1 Between Incumbent and New Entering Firms
3.2.5.1.2 Trading Sectors and Non-trading Sectors
3.2.5.1.3 Anticompetitive Distortions between Competing Firms of the Same Member State
3.2.5.1.4 Between Trading Sectors
3.2.5.2 Secondly, Does It Exceed the de minimis Threshold?
3.2.6 Community Dimension: Aid Which is Capable of Affecting Trade between Member States
3.2.6.1 Compatible with the Common Market
3.3 CONCLUSION
4 AUCTIONING UNDER THE EU ETS AMENDMENT
4.1 AUCTIONS AND COMMISSION INVOLVEMENT
4.2 AUCTIONS IN THE THIRD TRADING PHASE
4.2.1 Transfer of a Benefit or an Advantage (Notion of Aid)
4.2.2 Aid Favouring a Certain Undertaking over Others (Selectivity Principle)
4.2.3 Granted by the State or through State Resources
4.2.3.1 By the State
4.2.3.2 Through Member State Resources
4.2.4 It Should be an Undertaking or . . . Production
4.2.5 Distorts or Threatens to Distort Competition
4.2.5.1 Between Incumbent and New Entering Firms
4.2.5.2 Trading Sectors and Non-trading Sectors
4.2.5.3 Anticompetitive Distortions between Competing Firms of the Same Member State
4.2.5.4 Between Trading Sectors
4.2.5.5 Does It Exceed the de minimis Threshold?
4.2.6 Community Dimension: Aid Which is Capable of Affecting Trade between Member States
5 STATE AID AND DISTORTIONS OF COMPETITION
Chapter 7 Auction Design Challenges
1 INTRODUCTION
2 BUNDLING
3 TIMING
4 MARKET STRUCTURE AND TRANSPARENCY
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
Chapter 8 Final Conclusion
Bibliography
List of Cases
Index
Back Cover

Systemvoraussetzungen

Als PDF speichern Als Link merken