Dream, Death, and the Self

Name: Dream, Death, and the Self
Brand: Princeton University Press
Price: 61.99 EUR
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J. J. Valberg(Autor*in)

Princeton University Press

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Erschienen am 26. Juni 2018

520 Seiten

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Inhalt

Cover
Title Page
Copyright Page
Contents
Preface
INTRODUCTION: Philosophical Discovery and Philosophical Puzzles
Int.1 Discovering What We Already Know
Int.2 The Socratic Conception of Philosophical Discovery
Int.3 Wittgenstein: Insidership and Philosophical Discovery
Int.4 Philosophical Discovery and Resistance
Int.5 The Presumptuousness of a Claim to Philosophical Discovery
Int.6 Conceptual Analysis and the Communal Horizon
Int.7 The Personal Horizon
Int.8 Philosophical Anticipations of the Personal Horizon
Int.9 Two Types of Philosophical Puzzle
Int.10 The Extraphilosophical Puzzles
PART ONE: Dream
THE MEANING OF THE DREAM HYPOTHESIS
1. The Dream Hypothesis and the Argument from Internality
1.1 Our Purpose in Raising the Dream Hypothesis
1.2 That the Dream/Reality Contrast Is Extrinsic to the Subject Matter of the Dream Hypothesis
1.3 The Argument from Internality
1.4 Dream and the Law of Excluded Middle
1.5 The Dream Hypothesis and Space
1.6 The Dream Hypothesis and Time
1.7 The Dream Hypothesis and the World
2. The Dream Hypothesis: Identity and the First Person
2.1 A Puzzle about Identity
2.2 Representation and Identity
2.3 A Way out of the Puzzle
2.4 The Dream Hypothesis and the First-Person Singular
2.5 The Subject versus the Dreamer of a Dream
The Positional Conception of the Self
2.6 Emerging from a Dream and the First Person
3. The Confusion of Standpoint
3.1 Dreams and the Infinity of Time
3.2 Time and the Confusion of Standpoint
3.3 Descartes and the Dream Hypothesis
3.4 Dream Skepticism versus Memory Skepticism
3.5 Real-Life Uncertainty about the Dream Hypothesis
4. The Subject Matter of the Dream Hypothesis
4.1 Is the Argument from Internality Valid?
4.2 The Subject Matter of the Dream Hypothesis and Grammatical Illusion
4.3 Alternative Formulations of the Dream Hypothesis
4.4 Reality
4.5 What Is the Subject Matter of the Dream Hypothesis?
4.6 The Horizonal versus Phenomenal Conception of Mind
DREAM SKEPTICISM
5. The Dream Hypothesis and the Skeptical Challenge
5.1 The Skeptical Argument
5.2 The Usual Argument for Dream Skepticism
Immanent versus Transcendent Dream Skepticism
5.3 The Uniqueness of Transcendent Dream Skepticism
5.4 Dream Skepticism and the External World
5.5 Nozick on the Tank Hypothesis
6. Responding to Dream Skepticism
6.1 Is the Dream Hypothesis a Pseudo Hypothesis?
6.2 Whether It Would Matter if THIS Were a Dream
6.3 The General Form of My Response to the Dream Hypothesis
6.4 I Am with Others: Metaphysical Equality and the Claim to Preeminence
6.5 The Commitment to (O)
6.6 Raising the Dream Hypothesis in Conversation: Forcing a Withdrawal to the First Person
6.7 Withdrawing to the First Person and the Horizonal Use of the First Person
6.8 Why It Is Rationally Impossible to Believe the Dream Hypothesis
6.9 The Space of Horizons
6.10 Other Minds
6.11 Skepticism and Solipsism
PART TWO: Death
THE MEANING OF DEATH
7. I Will Die
7.1 Dream and Death
Discovering the Meaning of Death
7.2 Being Disturbed by the Prospect of Death
7.3 That the Prospect of Death Holds Up Something Not Just Awful but Incomprehensible
Death and Self-Deception
7.4 Reacting to the Prospect of Death: A Text
7.5 Philosophical Reflection and Real-Life Disturbance
8. The Subject Matter and "Mineness" of My Death
8.1 The Prospect of Death
8.2 I Will Cease to Be
8.3 Death and the Stream of Mental States
8.4 The World and the Subject Matter of Death
8.5 The "Mineness" of My Death and the Horizonal Use of the First Person
DEATH AND SOLIPSISM
9. Solipsism
9.1 My Horizon and the Horizon
9.2 The Solipsism of Wittgenstein's Tractatus
9.3 Solipsism and Self-Consciousness
9.4 Kripke on the Solipsism of the Tractatus
9.5 Negativism
10. Death and the Truth of Solipsism
10.1 Solipsism and My Life with Others
10.2 Relativized Solipsism
10.3 Solipsism and the Meaning of Death
10.4 Qualifying the NOTHINGNESS of Death
11. The Awfulness and Incomprehensibility of Death
11.1 The Awfulness of Death
11.2 The Two Forms of the Impossibility of Death
11.3 The Temporal Impossibility of Death
11.4 Consciousness and Causation
11.5 The Solipsistic Impossibility of Death
11.6 The "Aloneness" of the Dying Subject
11.7 The Puzzles of Death and the Causation of Consciousness
PART THREE: The Self
POSSIBILITY AND THE SELF
12. Imagination and the Cartesian Self
12.1 What Is "the Self"?
12.2 The Cartesian Argument
12.3 Imagination and Proof
12.4 Exhibiting Possibilities in Imagination
12.5 Imagination and Experiential Possibility
12.6 Experiential Possibilities and Possibilities of Essence
12.7 The Paralogism of Imagination
12.8 The Cartesian Reply
13. Metaphysical Possibility and the Self
13.1 Metaphysical Possibility
13.2 Metaphysical Possibility and the Self
13.3 The Logic of the Self
13.4 Naturalizing the Self
THE POSITIONAL CONCEPTION OF THE SELF
14. Preliminary Reflections on the Positional Conception of the Self
14.1 Nagel's Puzzle about "Being Me"
14.2 Individual Essence: Frege on Our "Particular and Primitive" Mode of Self-Presentation
14.3 My Body and Me (the Human Being That I Am)
14.4 The Multiplicity of the Phenomenology of the Subject Position
14.5 The Standing/Operative Ambiguity
14.6 Causal Centrality
14.7 Causation and the Phenomenology of the Subject Position
14.8 Orientational Centrality
14.9 The Sense in Which the Positional and Horizonal Conceptions of the Self Are "Always in Play"
15. The Phenomenology of the Subject Position
15.1 Perceptual Centrality: The Visual and Tactual Appearing of My Body
15.2 Perceptual Centrality: The Visual Appearing of Myself
15.3 Perceptual Centrality: Views of Myself
15.4 Centrality of Feeling: Figuring as the Space of Feeling
15.5 The Centrality of Feeling: The Sense in Which the Space of Feeling (My Body-Space) Is a "Space"
15.6 Centrality of Feeling: The Ontological Dependence of My Body-Space on My Body
15.7 Volitional Centrality: Acting/Will and the Phenomenology of the Subject Position
15.8 Volitional Centrality: The Phenomenology of Will
15.9 Volitional Centrality: The "Mineness" of My Actions
15.10 Volitional Centrality: Phenomenology and Causality
THE FIRST PERSON
16. The Uses of the First Person
16.1 Introduction
16.2 The Referential Use of the First Person
16.3 Reference and the Use of "I" as Subject/Object
16.4 "I Am Thinking . . . /I See . . ."
16.5 The Positional Use of the First Person
16.6 The Horizonal Use of the First Person
17. What Makes First-Person Reference First Personal?
17.1 The Meaning of the Question We Are Asking
17.2 Following the Rule for the Use of "I"
17.3 Inner First-Person Reference
17.4 Attitudes de Se
17.5 First-Person Reference and the Positional Conception of the Self
17.6 The First Person and Emptiness at the Center
TIME AND THE SELF
18. Temporalizing the Self
18.1 Introduction
18.2 Tense and the Phenomenology of the Subject Position
18.3 The Tense Asymmetry in the Phenomenology of the Subject Position
18.4 Tense and the Horizonal Self
19. The Problem of Personal Identity
19.1 The Special Philosophical Problem of Personal Identity: The Problem of First-Person Identity
19.2 Imagining Myself Persisting through a Change of Human Beings (Bodies)
19.3 Locke's View of Personal Identity
19.4 Persistence and the Horizon
19.5 Remembering
The Past-Self Ambiguity
19.6 Possibility, Personal Identity, and Naturalizing the Self
20. Time and the Horizon
20.1 The Oneness of the Horizon
20.2 Skepticism about the Oneness over Time of My Horizon
20.3 Kant's Third Paralogism: The Self "in Time" and the Self That "Time Is In"
21. My Past
21.1 The Availability in Memory of Past Events
21.2 The Argument from Pastness
21.3 Being Open to the Availability of the Past
21.4 Memory Images
21.5 Letting the Past Be Past
21.6 Moving from Inside to Outside the Sphere of Phenomenological Reflection
21.7 The Puzzle of Memory and the Puzzle of Experience
21.8 The Puzzle of Memory and the Problems of First-Person Identity
22. My Future
22.1 My Future versus the Future
22.2 My Future and My Brain: Jumping over Death
22.3 Parfit on My Future Self
22.4 Nozick's "Closest Continuer" Theory
23. My Future: The Puzzle of Division
23.1 Personal Identity and Possibility (Review)
23.2 The Possibility of Division
23.3 Parfit on Division
23.4 Other Responses to the Puzzle of Division: Nozick and Lewis
23.5 The Puzzle of Division and the Identity-Framework
23.6 Horizonal Doubling versus Splits within the Horizon
23.7 The Impossibility of Horizonal Doubling
23.8 The Unity of Consciousness
23.9 The Puzzle of Division
24. Conclusion: The Extraphilosophical Puzzles
24.1 The Extra- versus Purely Philosophical Puzzles
24.2 The Puzzle of Division as an Extraphilosophical Puzzle
24.3 The Puzzle of Division and the Puzzle of the Causation of Consciousness
24.4 Our Causal Entrapment in the World
24.5 The Extraphilosophical Puzzles and the Horizonal Subject Matter
Bibliography
Index

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