Self

Name: Self | Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance
Brand: OUP Oxford
Price: 33.49 EUR
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Naturalism, Consciousness, and the First-Person Stance

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OUP Oxford (Verlag)

1. Auflage

Erschienen am 26. April 2012

387 Seiten

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Inhalt

Cover
Contents
Note on Diacritics and Pronunciation
Key Philosophers Discussed
Introduction
Part I. Naturalism and the Self
Historical Prelude: Varieties of Naturalism
Naturalism: Raw and Rich
Two Varieties of Hard Naturalism
Three Varieties of Liberal Naturalism
1 Conceptions of Self: An Analytical Taxonomy
Two Distinctions about 'Having'
Buddhist and Real Self Views
Tornado and Flame Views
2 Experiment, Imagination, and the Self
Methodological Naturalism
The Cogito: Augustine, Ibn Sina, Prabhacandra
Naturalism and the First-Person Stance
Part II. Mind and Body
3 Emergence
Emergence: The Core Issues
Carvaka Naturalism
Epiphenomenalism
Supervenience
4 Transformation
Causation and Mind
Downward Causation as Assistive Causation
The Emergence of Consciousness
5 Persistence
Carvaka Naturalism Redescribed
Is the Self Physical?
A Persistence Argument Against Animalism
6 The Self as Bodily
The Strong First-Person Requirement
Is Bodily Transfer Possible?
The Embodied Self
Core Self as Bodily Presence
Part III. Immersion and Subjectivity
7 The Composition of Consciousness
A Trope Metaphysics of Mind
Macro and Micro
The Elements of Content
Pudgala: Flame or Stream?
8 Self-Consciousness
Two Concepts of Self-Consciousness
Phenomenal Mineness and Mental Files
The Immersed Self
The Use of 'I' as a Metaphor
A Descriptive Metaphysics of the Self
9 Reflexivism
Aspects of Content
First-Person Access to the Subjectivity of One's Past Experience
The Reflexivity of the First-Person Stance
Provisional Objections
10 Sentience
Sensation and Thought
Quality Space: The Structure of Phenomenal Appearance
Location and Binding
Quasi-Objects
Does Object Perception Involve an Error?
I-Thoughts and Quasi-Subjects
11 Other Minds
An Overview of the Argument
The Refutation of Other Streams of Consciousness
Reflexivism Entails Conceptual Solipsism
The Composition of Self-Consciousness
Part IV. Participation and the First-Person Stance
12 The Mind-Body Problem
Minimal Physicalism: An Ownership View
Supervenience Again
Why Mental Properties are not Properties of the Body
Ownership and Exemplification
13 Attention, Monitoring, and the Unconscious Mind
Free Will
Autonomy
Three Sorts of 'Cause': Efficient, Individual, and Feature
The Underself
14 The Emotions
What Is an Emotion?
A Theory of Pleasure
Emotions and Agency
Emotion and the Participant Self
15 Unity
The Self as Genuine Subject
Cross-Temporal Identities
Binding
Tracking
The Conception of Oneself as Oneself
Oneself and One's Conception of Oneself
16 The Distinctness of Selves
Many Selves
Rootedness: Against Bare Particularism and Mere Difference
First-Person Realism
Conclusion: A Theory of Self
Bibliography
Index
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q
R
S
T
U
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