Vertical Natural Gas Transportation Capacity, Upstream Commodity Contracts and EU Competition Law

Name: Vertical Natural Gas Transportation Capacity, Upstream Commodity Contracts and EU Competition Law
Brand: Kluwer Law International
Price: 170.99 EUR
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Kim Talus(Autor*in)

Kluwer Law International (Verlag)

Erschienen am 27. Mai 2011

338 Seiten

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Inhalt

Cover
Half Title Page
Editorial Board
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
Preface and Acknowledgements
Foreword
Introduction
I.1. OBJECTIVE OF THIS STUDY
I.2. EU ENERGY LAW: DIFFERENCES IN NATURAL GAS AND ELECTRICITY
I.3. KEY DEFINITIONS
I.4. STRUCTURE
Chapter 1 EU Natural Gas Markets and Long-Term Contracting: An Overview of Economic and Political Aspects
1.1. NATURAL GAS SUPPLY TO EU: CONTRACTUAL AND POLITICAL FACTORS
1.2. LONG-TERM CONTRACTS IN NATURAL GAS MARKETS
1.2.1. LONG-TERM TAKE-OR-PAY CONTRACTS IN EUROPE
1.2.2. CURRENT MARKET IMPERFECTIONS
1.3. LEGAL RELATIONS WITH KEY NATURAL GAS-SUPPLYING COUNTRIES
1.3.1. RUSSIA
1.3.1.1. Bilateral Cooperation
1.3.1.2. The Energy Charter Treaty
1.3.2. ALGERIA
1.3.3. NORWAY
1.3.4. CASPIAN REGION
1.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Chapter 2 Security of Supply in the European Union
2.1. INTRODUCTION
2.2. EU ENERGY SECURITY DISCUSSION IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM
2.3. ENERGY SECURITY IN THE CONTEXT OF EU ENERGY POLICY OBJECTIVES
2.3.1. COMPETITIVENESS AND SECURITY OF SUPPLY
2.3.2. SUSTAINABILITY AND SECURITY OF SUPPLY
2.4. ELEMENTS OF SECURITY OF SUPPLY
2.5. DEFINITIONS OF SECURITY OF SUPPLY
2.6. SECURITY OF SUPPLY IN THE CASE LAW OF THE ECJ
2.7. THREATS TO THE EU SECURITY OF SUPPLY
2.7.1. EXTERNAL SECURITY OF SUPPLY: INSECURITY OF GAS SOURCES
2.7.1.1. Reserve Depletion
2.7.1.2. Investment in Gas Fields
2.7.1.3. Insufficient Diversification
2.7.2. INTERNAL SECURITY OF SUPPLY: SUFFICIENT INVESTMENT
2.8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Chapter 3 Key EU Gas Market Regulation Relating to Long-Term Contracting
3.1. INTRODUCTION
3.2. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GENERAL COMPETITION LAWS AND SECTOR-SPECIFIC ENERGY REGULATION
3.2.1. THE RELATIONSHIP: POSSIBLE APPROACHES
3.2.2. THE CASE LAW
3.2.3. APPLICATION OF THE TWO REGIMES
3.3. THIRD-PARTY ACCESS TO GAS PIPELINES: THE GENERAL REGULATORY REGIME
3.3.1. REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR TPA
3.3.1.1. TPA in the Natural Gas Market Directives: From Negotiation to Regulation
3.3.1.2. The Access Regulation
3.3.1.2.1. Regulated Tariffs
3.3.1.2.2. Principles of Capacity Allocation Mechanisms and Congestion Management Procedures
3.3.1.3. Continuing Relevance of Article 32(1)
3.3.2. ACCESS REGIMES AND MERCHANT INFRASTRUCTURE
3.3.2.1. An Overview of the Conditions
3.4. UNBUNDLING
3.4.1. INTRODUCTION
3.4.2. STATUS QUO: FROM ACCOUNT UNBUNDLING TO LEGAL UNBUNDLING AND BEYOND
3.4.3. UNBUNDLING IN THE THIRD LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE
3.4.4. THE THIRD COUNTRY CLAUSE
3.5. LONG-TERM COMMODITY CONTRACTS AND SECTOR-SPECIFIC REGULATION
3.5.1. TAKE-OR-PAY AGREEMENTS
3.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Chapter 4 The Application of EU Competition Law in Natural Gas Markets: Background and Developments
4.1. INTRODUCTION
4.2. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
4.2.1. WHY ARE CERTAIN VERTICAL RESTRAINTS PROHIBITED WHILE OTHERS ARE PERMITTED?
4.2.1.1. Negative Effects of Vertical Agreements
4.2.1.2. Positive Effects of Vertical Agreements
4.3. THE APPLICATION OF EU LAW TO VERTICAL AGREEMENTS
4.4. ARTICLE 102 TFEU: SOME GENERAL REMARKS
4.4.1. ESTABLISHING DOMINANCE
4.4.2. ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION
4.5. DEFINING EU NATURAL GAS MARKETS UNDER EU COMPETITION LAW
4.5.1. RELEVANT PRODUCT MARKETS
4.5.1.1. Upstream Markets
4.5.1.2. Downstream Markets
4.5.1.2.1. Infrastructure Markets
4.5.1.2.2. Sales
4.5.2. THE RELEVANT GEOGRAPHICAL MARKET
4.6. PREVIOUS COMPETITION LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE ENERGY SECTOR
4.6.1. INTRODUCTION
4.6.2. THE EARLY CASE LAW
4.6.3. THE CASE LAW OF THE NEW MILLENNIUM
4.6.4. LONG-TERM SUPPLY CONTRACTS AND DOWNSTREAM NATURAL GAS MARKETS
4.6.4.1. The Cases
4.6.4.2. Long-Term Downstream Contracts: Volume, Duration and More
4.6.5. DESTINATION CLAUSES: FIRST CRACK AT THE UPSTREAM SUPPLY CONTRACTS
4.6.5.1. Commission Practice
4.6.5.1.1. Gazprom/ENI
4.6.5.1.2. GDF/ENI - GDF/ENEL
4.6.5.1.3. Sonatrach
4.6.5.2. Approach in Sonatrach v. Approach in GDF/ENI/ENEL
4.6.5.3. Commission Practice: The Destination Clause Saga and the E.ON/Ruhrgas Case
4.6.6. OWNERSHIP UNBUNDLING THROUGH COMPETITION LAW
4.7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Chapter 5 Compatibility of Vertical Natural Gas Transportation Capacity, Commodity Contracts and EU Competition Law
5.1. LONG-TERM UPSTREAM NATURAL GAS COMMODITY CONTRACTS
5.1.1. INTRODUCTION
5.1.2. LONG-TERM CONTRACTS: VIEWS FROM THE MARKET PLAYERS
5.1.3. THE EFFECT OF LONG-TERM CONTRACTS ON EU ENERGY MARKETS
5.1.4. THE ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION
5.1.5. THE EVOLVING NATURE OF EU ENERGY MARKETS
5.2. LONG-TERM NATURAL GAS TRANSPORTATION CAPACITY AND EU COMPETITION LAW
5.2.1. REFUSAL TO DEAL: AN INTRODUCTION
5.2.2. THE ESSENTIAL FACILITY DOCTRINE: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
5.2.3. REFUSAL TO DEAL: ACCESS TO NATURAL GAS PIPELINES
5.2.3.1. An Overview of the Case Law
5.2.3.2. The Essential Facilities Doctrine and Access to Pipelines
5.2.3.3. Construction under Special Rights and TPA-Friendly Interpretation of Article 102 TFEU
5.2.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS ON ARTICLE 102(B) TFEU AND ESSENTIAL FACILITIES
5.3. DISCRIMINATION IN THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE 102 TFEU
5.3.1. CASE C-17/03, VEMW AND OTHERS
5.3.1.1. The Facts of the Case
5.3.1.2. Main Arguments Presented to ECJ
5.3.1.3. The Advocate General's Opinion
5.3.1.4. The ECJ's Judgment
5.3.2. INTERPRETATION OF THE JUDGMENT
5.3.3. CONCLUDING REMARKS ON ARTICLE 102(C) TFEU
5.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Chapter 6 Security of Supply as Objective Justification
6.1. INTRODUCTION
6.2. ARTICLE 101 TFEU AND THE RULE OF REASON DOCTRINE
6.3. NON-ECONOMIC GAINS IN EU COMPETITION LAW: ARTICLES 101(3) AND '102(3)' TFEU
6.4. THE SECURITY OF SUPPLY ARGUMENT UNDER ARTICLE 101(3) TFEU
6.4.1. SECURITY OF SUPPLY AS A QUANTIFIABLE ECONOMIC BENEFIT
6.4.2. SECURITY OF SUPPLY AS A NON-ECONOMIC OR NON-QUANTIFIABLE BENEFIT
6.4.2.1. Non-economic Gains in EU Competition Law: Environmental Benefits as the Example
6.4.2.2. Security of Supply: Non-economic Gains and the Problem of Counterfactual - The Case Law
6.4.3. HOW SHOULD SECURITY OF SUPPLY BE CONSIDERED UNDER ARTICLE 101(3) TFEU? WHAT IS THE RIGHT POLICY CHOICE?
6.5. BRIEF REMARKS ON LONG-TERM CAPACITY CONTRACTS AND THE SECURITY OF SUPPLY ARGUMENT UNDER ARTICLE 101(3) TFEU
6.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Conclusions
Bibliography
Index
Back Cover

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