International Judicial Control of Environmental Protection

Name: International Judicial Control of Environmental Protection | Standard Setting, Compliance Control and the Development of International Environmental Law by the International Judiciary
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Standard Setting, Compliance Control and the Development of International Environmental Law by the International Judiciary

Yasuhiro Shigeta(Autor*in)

Kluwer Law International (Verlag)

Erschienen am 28. Mai 2010

440 Seiten

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Inhalt

Cover
Half Title Page
Editorial Board
Title Page
Copyright Page
Summary of Contents
Table of Contents
Preface
Foreword
Acknowledgement
List of Abbreviations
Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SUBJECT
1.2. METHODOLOGY AND STRUCTURE
1.3. MAIN PROPOSITIONS
Chapter 2 Preparatory Considerations
2.1. NECESSITY AND PERMISSIBILITY OF FUNCTIONS NOT WITHIN THE ORIGINAL CONTEMPLATION OF THE PROCEDURE
2.2. SOME CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS
2.2.1. STANDARD SETTING
2.2.2. COMPLIANCE CONTROL
2.2.3. LAW DEVELOPMENT
2.2.4. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL, JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL PROCEDURES
2.2.4.1. Arbitral, Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Nature
2.2.4.2. International Character
2.2.4.3. Scope of the Procedures Covered by this Book
2.3. THE OVERALL ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: 'JUDICIAL CONTROL' INTEGRATING STANDARD SETTING AND LAW DEVELOPMENT
2.3.1. THE ORIGIN OF THE CONCEPT OF 'JUDICIAL CONTROL'
2.3.2. A PROPOSED MODEL OF 'JUDICIAL CONTROL'
2.4. ANGLES OF THE ANALYSIS
2.4.1. INTER-STATE RELATIONS VERSUS STATE-INDIVIDUAL RELATIONS
2.4.2. 'SOFT' CONTROL VERSUS 'HARD' CONTROL
Chapter 3 Standard Setting
3.1. STANDARD SETTING IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
3.2. STANDARD SETTING FOR THE CONSERVATION OF MARINE LIVING RESOURCES: THROUGH THE PRACTICE OF THE ICJ, THE ITLOS AND ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS
3.2.1. INTRODUCTION
3.2.2. THE PRACTICE OF ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS
3.2.2.1. 1893 Fur-Seals Case (UK/US)
3.2.2.2. 1910 Atlantic Fisheries Case (UK/US)
3.2.2.3. 1986 Filleting Case (Canada/France)
3.2.3. THE PRACTICE OF THE ICJ
3.2.3.1. 1974 Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases (UK v. Iceland
FRG v. Iceland)
3.2.3.2. 1998 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Spain v. Canada)
3.2.4. THE PRACTICE OF THE ITLOS AND AN ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL UNDER THE UNCLOS
3.2.4.1. 1999/2000 Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (Australia and New Zealand v. Japan)
3.2.4.2. Currently Docketed Swordfish Case (Chile/EC)
3.2.5. THE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY'S CONTRIBUTION TO SETTING ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS
3.2.5.1. Standard Setting by the International Judiciary Itself
3.2.5.2. Assistance for Standard Setting by the Parities
3.2.5.3. Clarification of the Requirements for Valid Domestic Standard Setting
3.2.6. A COMPARISON BETWEEN COMPROMIS APPLICATION AND UNILATERAL APPLICATION
3.2.6.1. The Difference of the Influence
3.2.6.2. Methods to Overcome the Difficulties in Setting Standards
3.2.7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
3.3. TOWARDS ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARD SETTING AS CONCILIATORY LAW-MAKING BETWEEN THE PARTIES: LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE ICJ MARITIME DELIMITATION CASES
3.3.1. INTRODUCTION: THE EXPECTED CONCILIATORY ROLE OF THE ICJ
3.3.2. METHODS IN WHICH THE ICJ ENGAGES IN CONCILIATORY LAW-MAKING IN MARITIME DELIMITATION
3.3.2.1. Obedience to the Parties' Common Views
3.3.2.2. Adoption of Each Party's Views
3.3.2.3. Elaboration of the Court's Own Views Equitably Adjusting the Parties' Interests
3.3.3. CONCLUDING REMARKS
3.4. SETTING MINIMUM AND VAGUE ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS AND MORE: THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS JUDICIARY'S CHALLENGE TO STATE SOVEREIGNTY
3.4.1. INTRODUCTION
3.4.2. THE INDIVIDUAL-ORIENTED JUDICIARY'S PRACTICE TO PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS AGAINST ENVIRONMENTAL DESTRUCTION
3.4.2.1. Human Rights Committee (HRC) of the ICCPR
3.4.2.2. European Human Rights Commission and Court
3.4.2.2.1. Noise
3.4.2.2.2. Pollution
3.4.2.2.3. Nuclear Risk
3.4.2.2.4. Nature Conservation
3.4.2.2.5. 2001/2003 Hatton and Others v. UK
3.4.3. SETTING MINIMUM AND VAGUE ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS: THE INDIVIDUAL-ORIENTED JUDICIARY
3.4.3.1. Coverage of Harm
3.4.3.1.1. Health Effects
3.4.3.1.2. Property Value's Depreciation
3.4.3.1.3. Amenity Deterioration
3.4.3.1.4. Degradation of the Environment Per Se
3.4.3.2. The 'Victim' Requirement
3.4.3.3. State Discretion
3.4.3.4. Factors Leading to Minimum and Vague Environmental Standards
3.4.3.4.1. Anthropocentricity of the Human Rights Concept
3.4.3.4.2. Absence of an Environmental Provision
3.4.3.4.3. Scientific Uncertainty and Non-Specificity of Environmental Harm
3.4.3.4.4. State Sovereignty
3.4.4. SETTING HIGHER AND MORE PRECISE ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS? THE POPULATION-ORIENTED JUDICIARY
3.4.4.1. The Population-Oriented Judiciary's Practice to Protect Human Rights against Environmental Destruction
3.4.4.1.1. Inter-American Human Rights Commission and Court
3.4.4.1.2. African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights
3.4.4.1.3. Summing-Up
3.4.4.2. Decrease of the Factors Leading to Minimum and Vague Environmental Standards
3.4.4.3. Potential Factors Enabling Higher and More Precise Environmental Standards
3.4.4.3.1. The Communal Approach
3.4.4.3.2. Active Reference to Outer-Regime Law
3.4.5. REFERENCE TO OUTER-REGIME LAW AS A WAY TO SET HIGHER AND MORE PRECISE ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS
3.4.5.1. Reference to Outer-Regime Law Binding on the Accused State
3.4.5.2. Reference to Outer-Regime Law Not Binding on the Accused State
3.4.5.3. EU Environmental Law as Referable Outer-Regime Law
3.4.6. THE RECENT TREND OF THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS JUDICIARY'S PRACTICE
3.4.6.1. An Overview of Recent Cases
3.4.6.1.1. The Individual-Oriented Judiciary's Cases
3.4.6.1.1.1. Human Rights Committee (HRC) of the ICCPR
3.4.6.1.1.2. European Court of Human Rights
3.4.6.1.2. The Population-Oriented Judiciary's Cases: Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights
3.4.6.2. An Assessment
3.4.7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Chapter 4 Compliance Control
4.1. COMPLIANCE CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
4.2. THE MONTREAL NCP'S 'SOFT' CONTROL: EVALUATION THROUGH THE PRACTICE
4.2.1. INTRODUCTION
4.2.2. A SURVEY OF THE PROCEDURE
4.2.3. AN EXAMINATION OF THE PRACTICE OF THE PROCEDURE
4.2.3.1. Voluntary Submissions
4.2.3.2. Secretariat Submissions
4.2.4. EVALUATION OF THE NATURE OF THE PROCEDURE
4.2.4.1. Evidence for a 'Soft' Nature
4.2.4.2. A Potential Tendency towards a 'Hard' Nature
4.2.4.3. A Demand for a 'Legal' Nature
4.2.5. A NEW TREND OF THE RECENT PRACTICE: FINDING 'POTENTIAL NON-COMPLIANCE'
4.2.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
4.3. THE ECJ'S 'HARD' CONTROL OVER COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: ITS PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS
4.3.1. INTRODUCTION
4.3.2. EXISTENCE OF THE ECJ'S PROCEDURALLY 'HARD' CONTROL
4.3.2.1. A Survey of ECJ Procedures
4.3.2.1.1. Opinion Procedure
4.3.2.1.2. Contentious Procedures
4.3.2.2. An Assessment
4.3.3. EXISTENCE OF THE ECJ'S SUBSTANTIVELY 'HARD' CONTROL: WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON NATURE CONSERVATION AND HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT
4.3.3.1. Preliminary Considerations
4.3.3.1.1. The ECJ's Basic Stance on Control over Compliance with International Law
4.3.3.1.2. The ECJ's Substantively 'Soft' Control: For the GATT/WTO Agreements
4.3.3.2. Modalities of the ECJ's Substantively 'Hard' Control
4.3.3.2.1. Main Issues in Nature Conservation and Hazardous Waste Management
4.3.3.2.2. Implicit Enforcement of International Environmental Law
4.3.3.2.3. Explicit Enforcement of International Environmental Law
4.3.3.2.3.1. Using International Environmental Law as a Benchmark of EC Law Violation
4.3.3.2.3.2. Recognizing 'Direct Applicability' of Environmental Treaties
4.3.3.2.3.3. Some Considerations
4.3.3.3. Doubts about the ECJ's Substantively 'Hard' Control
4.3.4. FACTORS ENABLING THE ECJ'S 'HARD' CONTROL
4.3.4.1. Factors Enabling Procedurally 'Hard' Control
4.3.4.1.1. Presence of the Commission's Pre-Litigation Procedure
4.3.4.1.2. Existence of Active Applicants: the Commission and Private Parties
4.3.4.1.3. Well-Arranged Mechanisms for Promoting Second-Order Compliance
4.3.4.2. Factors Enabling Substantively 'Hard' Control
4.3.4.2.1. Possible Justification by Environmental Treaties
4.3.4.2.2. Irreparability and Transboundary Effect of the Harm
4.3.4.2.3. Necessity for Establishing a Common Market
4.3.5. LIMITS OF THE ECJ'S 'HARD' CONTROL
4.3.5.1. Limits of Procedurally 'Hard' Control
4.3.5.1.1. Infrequent Utilization of Inter-State Infringement Proceedings
4.3.5.1.2. Respect for the Member States' Discretion
4.3.5.2. Limits of Substantively 'Hard' Control
4.3.5.2.1. Respect for the EC Institutions' Discretion
4.3.5.2.2. A Demand for Free Trade
4.3.6. TOWARDS SUBSTANTIVELY 'HARDER' CONTROL? THE ECJ'S ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF ITS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION ON THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT
4.3.6.1. Exclusive Jurisdiction as a Factor Leading to Substantively 'Harder' Control
4.3.6.2. Cases Related to the ECJ's Exclusive Jurisdiction
4.3.6.2.1. ECJ Mox Plant Case: Clarification of Preconditions for Exclusive Jurisdiction
4.3.6.2.2. Iron Rhine Arbitration: Resort to the Actes Clairs Doctrine and the CILFIT Test
4.3.6.3. Marine Environment as a Major Playground for the ECJ's Exclusive Jurisdiction
4.3.6.4. Exclusive Jurisdiction as an Obstacle to Substantively 'Harder' Control
4.3.6.5. Some Considerations
4.3.7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
4.4. FROM THE GATT JUDICIARY'S 'SOFT' CONTROL TO THE WTO JUDICIARY'S 'HARD' CONTROL OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE
4.4.1. INTRODUCTION
4.4.2. THE NATURE OF THE GATT/WTO JUDICIARY'S PROCEDURAL CONTROL
4.4.2.1. The GATT/WTO Judiciary as a Manager of Quasi-Judicial Procedures
4.4.2.2. The GATT Judiciary's Relatively 'Soft' Control versus the WTO Judiciary's Relatively 'Hard' Control in the Procedural Aspect
4.4.2.2.1. Institutional Settings
4.4.2.2.2. The Res Judicata Effect of a Ruling
4.4.3. A QUEST FOR THE NATURE OF THE GATT/WTO JUDICIARY'S SUBSTANTIVE CONTROL
4.4.3.1. The GATT Judiciary's Practice on Trade-Related Environmental Measures
4.4.3.1.1. 1981 US - Tuna Case
4.4.3.1.2. 1987 US - Petroleum Tax Case
4.4.3.1.3. 1987 Canada - Herring and Salmon Case
4.4.3.1.4. 1990 Thailand - Cigarettes Case
4.4.3.1.5. 1991 US - Tuna/Dolphin I Case
4.4.3.1.6. 1994 US - Tuna/Dolphin II Case
4.4.3.1.7. 1994 US - Automobile Taxes Case
4.4.3.2. The WTO Judiciary's Practice on Trade-Related Environmental Measures
4.4.3.2.1. 1996 US - Gasoline Case
4.4.3.2.2. 1997 EC - Hormones Case
4.4.3.2.3. 1998 US - Shrimp Case
4.4.3.2.4. 1998 Australia - Salmon Case
4.4.3.2.5. 1998 Japan - Agricultural Products II Case
4.4.3.2.6. 2001 EC - Asbestos Case
4.4.3.2.7. 2003 Japan - Apples Case
4.4.3.3. The WTO Judiciary's 'Hard' Control as Compared to the GATT Judiciary's 'Soft' Control: In the Substantive Aspect from the Environmental Perspective
4.4.3.3.1. Respect for Each Party's Environmental Autonomy
4.4.3.3.2. Consideration of Characteristics of Environmental Measures
4.4.3.3.3. Reference to Non-GATT/WTO Law
4.4.4. LIMIT OF THE WTO JUDICIARY'S SUBSTANTIVELY 'HARD' CONTROL OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ITS POSSIBLE BREAKTHROUGH
4.4.4.1. Limit: Occurrence of Unavoidable Conflict between GATT/WTO Law and Non-GATT/WTO Law
4.4.4.2. Possible Breakthrough: Application of Non-GATT/WTO Law
4.4.4.2.1. Arguments for and against the Application of Non-GATT/WTO Law
4.4.4.2.2. Proposals for the Prioritised Application of Non-GATT/WTO Law
4.4.5. OBSTACLES TO THE WTO JUDICIARY'S SUBSTANTIVELY 'HARD' CONTROL OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND WAYS FORWARD
4.4.5.1. 2006 EC - Biotech Products Case: Non-Reference to Non-GATT/WTO Law Not Binding on All Contracting Parties
4.4.5.1.1. Summary of the Case
4.4.5.1.2. Meaning of 'Applicable in the Relations between the Parties' in Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention
4.4.5.1.2.1. 'The Parties'
4.4.5.1.2.2. 'Applicable in the Relations between
4.4.5.1.3. Conditions for the Reference to Other Treaties Which Are Binding on the Parties in Question but to Which Not All the Parties to the Treaty Being Interpreted Adhere
4.4.5.1.4. Possibility of Referring to Treaties Not Binding on the Parties in Question and Non-Binding International Instruments
4.4.5.2. 2007 Brazil - Tyres Case: Insufficient Reference to Non-GATT/WTO Law Binding on the Disputing Parties But Not Binding on All the WTO Contracting Parties
4.4.5.2.1. Summary of the Case
4.4.5.2.2. The Panel's 'Effects of the Measure' Approach versus the AB's 'Objective of the Measure' Approach
4.4.5.2.3. The AB's Insufficient Reference to a MERCOSUR-Related Agreement
4.4.5.2.4. For Sufficient Reference to Non-GATT/WTO Law
4.4.6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Chapter 5 Law Development
5.1. LAW DEVELOPMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
5.2. THE OBLIGATION NOT TO CAUSE TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION HARM AS A COROLLARY OF TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY: FOCUSING ON THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT
5.2.1. INTRODUCTION
5.2.2. THE FACTS OF THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT
5.2.3. STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION HARM BY A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT
5.2.3.1. Arguments in the International Law Association (ILA)
5.2.3.2. Precedents before the Chernobyl Accident
5.2.3.3. Decisions of Domestic Courts on the Chernobyl Accident
5.2.3.4. Attitudes of States after the Chernobyl Accident
5.2.3.5. Short Remarks
5.2.4. TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY AS AN OBSTACLE TO CHARGE THE STATE WITH STATE RESPONSIBILITY
5.2.4.1. Absence of Due Diligence
5.2.4.2. Occurrence of Serious Harm
5.2.4.3. Short Remarks
5.2.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
5.3. THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUITABLE UTILIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES: A QUEST FOR ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE OBLIGATION NOT TO CAUSE TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION HARM
5.3.1. INTRODUCTION
5.3.2. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
5.3.2.1. The Essence of the No Pollution Harm Principle and the Equitable Utilization Principle
5.3.2.1.1. The Essence of the No Pollution Harm Principle: Prevention of Factual Harm
5.3.2.1.2. The Essence of the Equitable Utilization Principle: Balancing of Interests
5.3.2.2. The Relationship between the Equitable Utilization Principle and the No Pollution Harm Principle Highlighted
5.3.3. ARGUMENTS FOR THE 'RELAXATION' OF THE NO POLLUTION HARM PRINCIPLE BY THE EQUITABLE UTILIZATION PRINCIPLE
5.3.3.1. A Survey of Academic Views
5.3.3.2. The Background of the Arguments: Protection of the Interests of Upper Riparian Developing Countries as Beginning Users
5.3.4. DELIBERATIONS IN THE ILC AND THE OBSERVATIONS OF GOVERNMENTS
5.3.5. THE 1997 WATERCOURSES CONVENTION
5.3.5.1. Ex Ante Prevention of Harm (Article 7(1)): Rejection of 'Relaxation'
5.3.5.2. Ex Post Remedial Measures [Elimination or Mitigation of Harm and Discussion of Compensation] (Article 7(2))
5.3.5.2.1. The Situation Where 'Relaxation' Can Be Argued: Reduction of Continuous Pollution (Ex Post Prevention of Harm)
5.3.5.2.2. A Negative Attitude towards 'Relaxation'
5.3.5.3. Summing-Up
5.3.6. AN EXAMINATION OF SOME JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS AND STATE PRACTICE
5.3.7. THE 1997 ICJ GABCÍKOVO CASE
5.3.8. AN OVERALL APPRAISAL
5.3.9. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Chapter 6 Synthesis of the Analysis
6.1. A COMPREHENSIVE APPRAISAL
6.1.1. STANDARD SETTING
6.1.2. COMPLIANCE CONTROL
6.1.3. LAW DEVELOPMENT
6.2. REASSESSMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF 'JUDICIAL CONTROL'
6.2.1. APPROPRIATENESS OF THE PROPOSED MODEL OF 'JUDICIAL CONTROL
6.2.2. SCOPE OF 'JUDICIAL CONTROL'
6.2.2.1 Scope Personae
6.2.2.2. Scope Temporis
6.2.3. NECESSITY, EFFECTIVENESS AND LIMITS OF 'JUDICIAL CONTROL'
6.2.4. ACTUAL EFFECT OF STANDARD SETTING AND LAW DEVELOPMENT ON 'JUDICIAL CONTROL'
6.2.5. AN ESSENTIAL FEATURE OF 'JUDICIAL CONTROL': PERMEABILITY TO THE OUTER WORLD
6.2.6. CONFLICT BETWEEN 'JUDICIAL CONTROL' AND 'JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
6.3. TOWARDS MORE EFFECTIVE FUNCTIONING OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
6.3.1. REFORM RELATED TO THE PRIMARY RULE SYSTEM
6.3.1.1. Setting Lower Standards for Less Capable Non-Compliant Parties
6.3.1.2. Referring to (or Applying) Outer-Regime Law
6.3.2. REFORM RELATED TO THE COMPLIANCE INFORMATION SYSTEM
6.3.2.1. Collecting Information through on-the-Spot Investigation
6.3.2.2. Collecting Information from Private Third Parties
6.3.2.3. Disseminating Information to the Disputing Parties and Third Parties
6.3.3. REFORM RELATED TO THE NON-COMPLIANCE RESPONSE SYSTEM
6.3.3.1. Introducing Active Triggering Mechanisms in Inter-State Relations
6.3.3.2. Promoting Ruling Implementation
6.3.3.3. Selecting or Combining 'Soft'/'Hard' Control Mechanisms
6.4. ACHIEVEMENTS, LIMITS AND POSSIBLE GENERALIZATION
6.5. CONCLUSION: THE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY AS AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL GUARDIAN
Bibliography (Bold Letters for Citation)
Table of Cases (Bold Letters for Citation)
Table of International Instruments (Bold Letters for Citation)
Index
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