The Value of Living Well

Introduction Part One I. Aristotle on Ends I.1 Human life and agency I.2 Ends I.2.1 Ends as constraints I.2.2 Ends, reasons, and "for the sake of which" I.3 The Aristotelian framework I.4 Unhelpful friends I.5 Scanlon II. Challenges to the Structure II.1 No Ultimate End II.2 Long-chains views II.3 The looping model II.4 The real challenge to the Aristotelian framework II.5 Pseudo pluralism II.6 Political pluralism II.7 Telic pluralism II.8 What the failure of telic pluralism teaches us II.9 Relative monism III. Living Well III.1 Ancient argument about our Ultimate End III.2 Begin with agency III.2.1 Subordinating patiency III.3 First nature III.4 Second nature III.5 The VE proposal IV. Succeeding as Rational and Social Animals IV.1 The contribution of rationality IV.1.1 End-setting IV.1.2 Judgment in action IV.1.3 Training the passions IV.2 Sociality IV.2.1 Sociality and shared ends IV.2.2 Caring for others IV.2.3 The agent-relativity of welfare and care IV.2.4 Living well in community IV.3 Individual difference IV.4 Autonomy IV.5 Objections IV.5.1 Misconceptions IV.5.2 Virtue's commitments Part Two V. Constructivism V.1 Motivation for the approach V.2 Taxonomy: Constructivism and realism V.3 Recognitionalism: Evidence for and against V.3.1 Rational recognition V.3.2 Reversal of values and conditional value V.3.2.1 RV and CV in Plato V.3.2.2 RV and CV in the Stoics and Aristotle V.3.2.3 Constructivism in Aristotle: the Doctrine of the Mean V.3.3 VR reconsidered V.3.4 The constructed value of unconditional goods V.4 Practical rationality, agency and activity V.4.1 Background: realism V.4.2 Action guidance V.4.3 The failure of recognitionalism V.4.4 Naturalism V.5 Particularism and recognitionalism VI. General and Particular VI.1 The basic argument VI.2 The problem in Kant VI.2.1 The problem in Korsgaard VI.2.2 The problem in Herman VI.2.3 The problem in O'Neill VI.3 The problem for generalist Constructivism VI.4 Recognitionalist Particularism VII. Fitting Judgment VII.1 First-person, third-person VII.1.1 Case in point VII.2 Constructivism particularism -- an overview VII.3 Conditions of judgment VII.4 Fittingness VII.4.1 The fitting in Aristotle VII.4.2 The fitting in Samuel Clarke VII.4.3 The fitting in later theorists VII.5 Fittingness as a normative standard for judgment VII.5.1 The fittingness relation VII.5.2 What is fitted to conditions VII.5.3 Fittingness, the good life, and comparability VII.5.4 Examples VIII. Critical Assessment VIII.1 Evaluation, supervenience, and justification VIII.1.1 The nature of supervenience in detail VIII.1.2 Supervenience -- explanation VIII.1.3 Supervenience -- application VIII.2 Publicity VIII.3 The relation between standpoints VIII.4 Objectivity and subjectivity Part Three IX. Response--Dependent Value IX.1 Reasons, ends, and value IX.2 Early response--dependence accounts IX.2.1 McDowell IX.2.2 Wiggins IX.3 Value: Concept vs. Property IX.4 Response-dependent value IX.4.1 Responses IX.4.2 Subjects IX.4.3 Conditions X. Objections to Response-Dependent Value X.1 Subjects of the value relation X.2 Response--dependent value: backdrop for the problem X.3 Response--dependent value: the problem motivated X.4 Floating reference: a cautionary note X.5 Relativism XI. Other issues XI.1 The circularity XI.2 Cuneo on practical wisdom XI. 3 Hussain and Shah's dilemma XI.4 Euthyphro dilemmas XI.4.1 Shafer-Landau's dilemma XI.4.2 Timmons' dilemma XI.5 Timmons on moral symmetry XI.6 Moral psychology XII. Respect for Others XII.1 Expressions of the target idea XII.2 The problem in a cartoon XII.3 First step at solution XII.3.1 Constructing reasons for respect XII.3.2 Respect and rights XII.3.3 VE's analysis of claims XII.3.4 VE's analysis of other rights XII.3.5 Respect and living well XII.3.6 THe extent of respect XII.3.7 Two Kantian notes XII.4 Revisiting the concern XII.4.1 Wrong Attitudes XII.4.2 The two-level structure XII.4.3 Fit with ordinary practice