Rigid Designation and Theoretical Identities

Name: Rigid Designation and Theoretical Identities
Brand: OUP Oxford
Price: 100.99 EUR
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Joseph LaPorte(Autor*in)

OUP Oxford (Verlag)

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Erschienen am 17. November 2012

260 Seiten

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Inhalt

Cover
Table of Contents
1. Rigid Designators for Concrete Objects and for Properties
1. A Basic Characterization of Rigid Designators and Their Interest
1.1. Names, Ordinary Descriptions, and Identity Statements
1.2. Standard Clarifications from Kripke
1.3. Clarifications on Rigidity's Relationship to the Necessary A Posteriori
2. On the Significance of Rigidity for Identity Statements about Properties
2.1. Identity Statements with Just Names for Properties
2.2. Theoretical Identity Statements About Properties
3. Complications and Elaboration
3.1. What Stays the Same in the Rigid Designation of Properties?
3.2. The Agenda of Chapters to Come
2. On the Coherence of the Distinction
1. The Problem of Artificial-Property Designators
2. The Problem of Shadowing
2.1. A Parallel for Concrete-Object Designators
2.2. Responses to the Problem
3. A Confusion Between Rigidity and Meaning Constancy?
4. Conclusion
3. On Whether the Distinction Assigns to Rigidity the Right Role
1. Rigidity's Duty of Securing the Necessity that Characterizes Identity Statements Featuring Rigid Designators
2. Other Duties Attributed to Rigidity
2.1. Work Securing Essential-Property Attributions
2.2. Work Securing Externalism
2.3. Work Securing Aposteriority
2.4. Work Refuting Descriptivism
2.5. Work Securing Linguistic Stability
3. Conclusion
4. A Uniform Treatment of Property Designators as Singular Terms
1. Descriptions as Singular Terms
2. Avoiding Millian Dualism
2.1. Accommodating English Grammar: Uniform vs. Nonuniform Accounts
2.2. Patterns of Reasoning Formalized: Uniform vs. Nonuniform Accounts
3. Conclusion
5. Rigid Appliers
1. Rigidity for Mere Appliers
1.1. A Basic Account: Rigid and Nonrigid Designators for Predicables
1.2. Nominalist-Friendly Variations of the Basic Account
2. A Rival Account
2.1. Essential Application as Rigidity
2.2. Essential Application as a Component of Rigidity
2.3. Essential Application and Anti-Descriptivism
3. Conclusion
6. Rigidity-Associated Arguments in Support of Theoretical Identity Statements: on their Significance and the Cost of their Philosophical Resources
1. Significance
1.1. Are Theoretical Identity Statements Uninformative?
1.2. Is What is Designated What Matters, Not Designation?
1.3. Do Mechanisms that Secure Rigidity Draw from Rigidity's Significance?
2. Costs
2.1. Rigidity Without Cost and Controversy
2.2. Theoretical Identity Statements Without Hidden Essentialist Costs
3. Conclusion
7. The Skeptical Argument Impugning Psychophysical Identity Statements: on its Significance and the Cost of its Philosophical Resources
1. Significance
1.1. Against Specific Psychophysical Identities, Not Materialism
1.2. Is Type Identity Irrelevant?
2. Costs
2.1. The Privilege of an Insider's Perspective: a Cost Too High for Eliminative Materialists
2.2. Two-Dimensionalism: No Commitment, No Cost
2.3. Modal Rationalism and Apriority: No Commitment, No Cost
3. Conclusion
8. The Skeptical Argument Further Examined: on Resources, Allegedly Overlooked, for Confirming Psychophysical Identities
1. Psychophysical Identity Statements' Support is Undermined by Missing De Jure Connections to Physically Described Matter
2. Why Not Dispense with De Jure Connections in Favor of Correlation and Scientific Induction?
2.1. Why De Jure Connections Must Attend Correlation and Scientific Induction
2.2. Are De Jure Connections Controversial?
3. De Jure Connections Supplied by way of Scientific Necessitarianism?
3.1. From Subject Terms to Properties to Law-Governed Behavior: the Missing De Jure Link?
3.2. From Subject Terms to Constitution to Law-Governed Behavior: the Missing De Jure Link?
3.3. From Subject Terms to Constitution to Fundamental-Law Governed Behavior
3.4. From Fundamental Laws to Fatalism to Identity
3.5. Dissolving the Problem with Scientific Development
3.6. Where We Are Left: Scientific Empiricism
4. Concluding Remarks
References
Index
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