International Energy Investment Law

Name: International Energy Investment Law | Stability through Contractual Clauses
Brand: Kluwer Law International
Price: 160.99 EUR
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Stability through Contractual Clauses

Mustafa Erkan(Autor*in)

Kluwer Law International (Verlag)

Erschienen am 22. Dezember 2010

440 Seiten

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Inhalt

Intro
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright
Dedication
About the Author
Summary of Contents
Table of Contents
Preface
Foreword
Acknowledgements
Part I: The Risks
Chapter 1. General Introduction and Framework of the Research
1. General Considerations Concerning International Energy Projects
2. Objectives and Scope of the Research
3. Significance of the Book
4. Research Questions
5. Methodology and Research Procedures
5.1. Research Approach
5.1.1. Questionnaire
5.1.2. Interviews
5.1.3. The Respondent Group
5.1.3.1. Total Sample by Profile
5.1.3.2. Total Sample by Country
5.1.3.3. Total Sample by Nature of Investment
5.1.4. Analysis of Data
6. Structure of the Book
Chapter 2. Political Risks Arising from the Intervention of Host States
1. Introduction
2. The Definition and Types of Political Risks
3. Categorization of Political Risks
4. The Nature of Energy Investments: The Aspect of Political Risk
4.1. Is There Any Difference between Developed and Developing Countries in Terms of Political Risk?
5. Historical Analysis of Political Risks to International Energy Investments
5.1. Today's Political Risks
6. Conclusion
Chapter 3. A Way of Taking Over: Indirect Expropriation
1. Introduction
2. Terminology
2.1. Expropriation, Nationalization and Confiscation
2.2. Indirect Expropriation
2.2.1. Creeping Expropriation
2.2.2. Regulatory Expropriation
3. The Concept of Expropriation
3.1. The Basic International Requirements for Expropriation
3.1.1. Public Purpose
3.1.2. Non-Discrimination
3.1.3. Due process of Law
3.1.4. Compensation
4. Resource Nationalism and Indirect Expropriation: a Long-Term and Difficult Issue for the Energy Industry
4.1. Hypothetical Example
5. Types of Devices Used by Host States for Indirect Expropriation
6. Distinguishing between Non-Compensable Regulation (Legitimate Regulatory Measures) and Indirect Expropriation
6.1. Case Law
7. Mitigating Expropriation Risks through Contract Provisions
8. Conclusion
Part II: Managing Political Risks
Chapter 4. Stabilization Clauses: A Way of Managing of Political Risks
1. Introduction
2. General and Historical Perspective on Stabilization Clauses
2.1. Types of Stabilization Clauses
3. The Legal Significance of Stabilization Clauses
3.1. Validity
3.1.1. Under National Law
3.1.2. Under International Law
3.1.2.1. Scholarly Opinion
3.1.2.1.1. The Internationalized Contract
3.1.2.1.2. The Principle of Permanent Sovereignty
3.1.2.1.2.1. Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources
3.1.2.1.3. Moderate view
3.1.3. Empirical Work
3.2. Efficacy
3.2.1. Scholarly Opinion
3.2.1.1. Effectiveness of Stabilization Clauses in Preventing Current Regulatory Risks: Environment and Human Rights
3.2.2. Empirical Work
3.2.3. Evaluations
4. Conclusion
Chapter 5. Flexibility of Contractual Relations in Energy Projects: Renegotiation Clauses
1. Introduction
2. The Concept of Renegotiation
2.1. Types of Renegotiation
2.1.1. Situation-based Renegotiation
2.1.1.1. Post-Deal Renegotiation
2.1.1.2. Intra-Deal Renegotiation
2.1.1.3. Extra-Deal Renegotiation
2.1.2. Initiation by Parties
2.1.2.1. Investor-Led Renegotiation
2.1.2.2. Government-Led Renegotiation
2.2. Theory of Renegotiation
2.2.1. Bargaining Power
2.2.2. Causes of Renegotiation
2.3. From the Principle Pacta Sunt Servanda to the Clausula Rebus Sic Stantibus in Energy Investment Contracts
3. The Need for Renegotiation
3.1. Long-Term Investments (Salvage the Contract)
3.2. Changing Circumstances
3.2.1. Changes in Economic Conditions and Industry Patterns
3.2.2. Changes in Laws and Regulations
3.2.3. Changes in Politics
3.3. Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts
3.4. Providing Flexibility for Cultural Differences
3.5. Providing an Early Opportunity to Settle Disputes
3.6. Avoiding Unilateral Change of Contractual Terms and Indirect Expropriation
3.6.1. Scholarly Opinion
3.6.2. Empirical Work
3.6.3. Testing the Hypothesis
3.7. Balancing Flexibility and Stability in the Energy Investment Contract
4. Reluctance to Use Renegotiation Clauses
5. Conclusion
Chapter 6. Examining Modern Renegotiation (Equilibrium) Clauses in Petroleum Contracts
1. Introduction
2. Can Stabilization and Renegotiation Clauses Coexist in the Same Agreement?
3. Examining Traditional and Modern Renegotiation Clauses in Contractual Practices
3.1. Samples of Renegotiation Clauses from Contracts
3.1.1. Traditional Renegotiation Clauses
3.1.1.1. General Renegotiation Clauses
3.1.1.2. Specific Renegotiation Clauses
3.1.2. Modern Renegotiation (Equilibrium) Clauses
4. Checklist for Drafting Modern Renegotiation (Equilibrium) Clauses
5. Some Principles for the Renegotiation Process
6. The Outcome of Renegotiation
7. Conclusion
Chapter 7. Choice of Law and Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Clauses: Empirical Insights
1. Introduction
Section I: Choice of Law Clauses
2. General Observations
3. Survey Findings on Choice of Law Clauses
3.1. Purpose of Inserting Choice of Law Clauses
3.2. Which Law or Country's Law Was Chosen?
3.3. Why Do You Prefer That Law?
3.4. Would the Outcome of Any Dispute be Different If the Host State's Law Applies?
3.5. Do You Use Any Model or A Standard Choice of Law Clause in Your Contracts?
3.6. The Effectiveness of Choice of Law Clauses
3.7. General Evaluation
Section II: ADR Clauses
4. General Observations
4.1. Types of ADRs
4.1.1. Negotiation
4.1.2. Mediation
4.1.3. Conciliation
4.1.4. Expert Determination
4.1.5. Arbitration
5. Survey Findings on ADR Clauses
5.1. Which, if any, of these dispute resolution methods were used in the petroleum dispute(s) in which you were involved?
5.2. The Effectiveness of ADR Clauses
5.3. Preference of Dispute Settlement Mechanisms from the Parties' Perspective
5.4. ADR is not effective in oil and gas disputes because of the disputes' peculiar nature
5.5. ADR is not effective in oil and gas disputes because it is non-binding and unenforceable
5.6. Evaluation of Dispute Settlement Methods
5.6.1. Evaluation of Some Specific Factors
5.6.1.1. Factor 1: Possibility for Performance of the Contract to Continue
5.6.1.2. Factor 2: Privacy
5.6.1.3. Factor 3: The Speed of the Process
5.6.1.4. Factor 4: Binding Nature
5.6.1.5. Factor 5: Enforceability
5.6.1.6. Factor 6: The Cost of the Method
5.7. General Evaluation
6. Conclusion
Part III: Conclusion and Implications
Chapter 8 Conclusion and Implications
1. Introduction
2. Revisiting the Research Findings
3. Concluding Remarks
Appendices:
Appendix 1. The Questionnaire
Appendix 2. Some of the Omitted Research Findings
Appendix 3. Forced Divestment of Petroleum Production
Appendix 4. The Millennium Wave
Appendix 5. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID)
Appendix 6. The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) (Excerpt)
Appendix 7. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Excerpt)
Appendix 8. ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment
Bibliography

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