Compensating Catastrophe Victims

Name: Compensating Catastrophe Victims | A Comparative Law and Economics Approach
Brand: Kluwer Law International
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A Comparative Law and Economics Approach

Veronique Bruggeman(Autor*in)

Kluwer Law International (Verlag)

Erschienen am 26. Oktober 2010

642 Seiten

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Inhalt

Cover
Half Title Page
Editorial Board
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Table of Contents
List of Abbreviations
List of Figures
Chapter 1 Introduction
1.1 INTRODUCTION
1.2 SETTING THE SCENE
1.3 USE OF TERMS
1.3.1 CATASTROPHES
1.3.2 NATURAL CATASTROPHES, LARGE-SCALE TERRORISM EVENTS AND MAN-MADE DISASTERS
1.3.3 VICTIMS AND THEIR DAMAGES
1.3.4 FINANCIAL COMPENSATION
1.4 METHODOLOGY
1.4.1 LAW AND ECONOMICS
1.4.2 BEHAVIOURAL LAW AND ECONOMICS
1.4.3 LEGAL ANALYSIS
1.4.4 COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS
1.5 A BRIEF OVERVIEW
Part I A Law and Economics Perspective on Compensation for Catastrophe Victims
Chapter 2 The Prevention of Catastrophes: Liability Law and Safety Regulation
2.1 INTRODUCTION
2.2 LIABILITY LAW
2.2.1 MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF LIABILITY LAW
2.2.1.1 Goals of Liability Law
2.2.1.2 Characteristics of Tort Liability
2.2.2 INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TORT LAW
2.2.3 MINIMIZING THE SOCIAL COSTS OF ACCIDENTS
2.2.4 THE LEARNED HAND-FORMULA
2.2.5 NEGLIGENCE OR STRICT LIABILITY FOR UNILATERAL ACCIDENTS?
2.2.5.1 Introduction to the Shavell-Model
2.2.5.2 The Negligence Rule
2.2.5.3 The Strict Liability Rule
2.2.5.4 Interim Findings Relevant for Man-Made Catastrophes
2.2.5.5 A Few Refinements
2.2.5.6 The Use of Liability Law for Man-Made Catastrophes
2.2.6 GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY FOR CATASTROPHES
2.3 TORT LAW IS NOT THE ONLY INSTRUMENT INTERNALIZING EXTERNALITIES
2.4 SAFETY REGULATION
2.4.1 INTRODUCTION
2.4.2 EXPLANATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT REGULATION
2.4.3 SAFETY REGULATION TO PREVENT CATASTROPHES
2.4.4 LOSS-REDUCTION MEASURES AND SAFETY REGULATION
2.5 SAFETY REGULATION VERSUS LIABILITY LAW
2.5.1 THE LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACH ON SAFETY REGULATION VERSUS LIABILITY LAW
2.5.2 SAFETY REGULATION VERSUS LIABILITY LAW IN THE CASE OF CATASTROPHE RISKS
2.6 CONCLUSION ON THE PREVENTION OF CATASTROPHES
Chapter 3 On the Edge of Prevention and Compensation: Insurance
3.1 INTRODUCTION
3.2 BASIC PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE
3.2.1 EXPECTED UTILITY, RISK AVERSION AND INSURANCE
3.2.2 THE LAW OF LARGE NUMBERS
3.2.3 INSURANCE PREMIUM
3.2.4 INSURERS' PROBLEMS DUE TO ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
3.2.4.1 Moral Hazard
3.2.4.2 Remedies to Control Moral Hazard
3.2.4.3 Adverse Selection
3.2.4.4 Remedies to Control Adverse Selection
3.2.5 A COMPETITIVE INSURANCE MARKET
3.2.6 FEATURES OF INSURABILITY
3.3 LIABILITY INSURANCE
3.3.1 INTRODUCTION TO LIABILITY INSURANCE
3.3.2 COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY OR PROPERTY DAMAGE
3.3.3 TRENDS IN LIABILITY LAW AND THEIR EFFECTS ON LIABILITY INSURANCE
3.3.3.1 Joint and Several Liability
3.3.3.2 Channelling of Liability
3.3.3.3 Shifting the Risk of Causal Uncertainty
3.3.3.4 Retrospective Liability
3.3.4 COMPULSORY LIABILITY INSURANCE
3.3.4.1 Economic Arguments for Compulsory Liability Insurance
3.3.4.2 Potential Drawbacks of Compulsory Liability Insurance
3.3.4.3 Conclusions on Compulsory Liability Insurance
3.4 FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE
3.4.1 INTRODUCTION TO FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE
3.4.2 COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY OR PROPERTY DAMAGE
3.5 INSURANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF CATASTROPHE RISKS
3.5.1 THE INSURABILITY OF CATASTROPHES
3.5.1.1 Natural Catastrophes
3.5.1.2 Terrorism Events
3.5.1.3 Man-Made Catastrophes
3.5.1.4 Conclusion on the Insurability of Catastrophes
3.5.2 LIABILITY INSURANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF MAN-MADE CATASTROPHES
3.5.2.1 Introduction
3.5.2.2 Limited Insurance Capacity?
3.5.3 FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF NATURAL CATASTROPHES
3.5.3.1 Introduction
3.5.3.2 Demand for First-Party Insurance against Natural Disasters
3.5.3.2.1 The Decision to Purchase First-Party Insurance: Expected Utility Hypothesis and Other Considerations
3.5.3.2.2 The Lack of Demand for First-Party Insurance against Natural Catastrophes
3.5.3.2.3 Behavioural Law and Economics on the Demand for First-Party Insurance against Natural Catastrophes
3.5.3.2.3.1 It Will Not Happen to Me
3.5.3.2.3.2 Ex Post Government Assistance
3.5.3.2.3.3 Preference for Uncertain Losses
3.5.3.2.3.4 Ineffective Information
3.5.3.2.3.5 Severe Budget Constraints
3.5.3.2.3.6 Conclusions
3.5.3.3 Supply of First-Party Insurance against Natural Catastrophes
3.5.3.3.1 Correlation
3.5.3.3.2 Uncertainty of the Risk
3.5.3.3.3 Limited Capacity
3.5.3.3.4 Risk as Feelings
3.5.3.4 Comprehensive Natural Disaster Insurance
3.5.3.4.1 Advantages
3.5.3.4.2 Setting the Premium in an All-Hazards Insurance Policy
3.5.3.5 Compulsory First-Party Disaster Coverage?
3.5.3.5.1 Economic Arguments for Compulsory First-Party Insurance against Natural Catastrophes
3.5.3.5.2 Drawbacks (and Refinements)
3.5.3.6 Conclusion: Mandatory Comprehensive Disaster Insurance or the Public Purse?
3.6 CONCLUSION ON INSURANCE AGAINST CATASTROPHES
Chapter 4 Solutions to the Catastrophe Insurance Capacity Problem
4.1 INTRODUCTION
4.2 REINSURANCE
4.2.1 THE CONCEPT OF REINSURANCE
4.2.2 GOALS OF REINSURANCE
4.2.3 FORMS OF REINSURANCE
4.2.4 THE REINSURANCE PREMIUM
4.2.5 REINSURANCE FOR CATASTROPHES
4.2.5.1 Insurer Demand for (Natural) Catastrophe Reinsurance
4.2.5.2 Supply of (Natural) Catastrophe Reinsurance
4.2.5.3 Market Cycles
4.2.5.4 Conclusion on Reinsurance for Catastrophes
4.3 ALTERNATIVE RISK TRANSFER
4.3.1 INTRODUCTION TO ALTERNATIVE RISK TRANSFER
4.3.1.1 Classifications of Alternative Risk Transfer
4.3.1.2 ART Market Participants
4.3.1.3 The Future of ART
4.3.2 SELF-INSURANCE AND CAPTIVES
4.3.3 POOLS
4.3.3.1 Pooling by Insurers
4.3.3.2 Pooling by Operators
4.3.4 CAPITAL MARKET INSTRUMENTS
4.3.4.1 Introduction
4.3.4.1.1 Securitization and Insurance-Linked Securities
4.3.4.1.2 Contingent Capital
4.3.4.1.3 (Insurance) Derivatives
4.3.4.2 Insurance-Linked Securities
4.3.4.2.1 Standard Structure
4.3.4.2.2 Benefits and Costs of Insurance-Linked Securities
4.3.4.2.3 Triggers
4.3.4.2.4 Catastrophe Bonds
4.3.4.2.4.1 Standard Structure
4.3.4.2.4.2 Catastrophes Covered
4.3.4.2.4.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Catastrophe Bonds
4.3.4.2.4.4 Future Prospects for Catastrophe Bonds
4.3.4.3 Contingent Capital
4.3.4.3.1 Standard Structure
4.3.4.3.2 Benefits and Costs of Contingent Capital
4.3.4.4 Catastrophe Derivatives
4.3.4.4.1 Standard Structure
4.3.4.4.2 Benefits and Costs of (Catastrophe) Derivatives
4.3.4.4.3 Exchange-Traded Catastrophe Derivatives
4.3.4.4.3.1 Chicago Board of Trade
4.3.4.4.3.2 Catastrophe Risk Exchange
4.3.4.4.3.3 Bermuda Commodities Exchange
4.3.4.4.4 OTC Catastrophe Derivatives
4.3.4.4.4.1 Catastrophe Swap
4.3.4.4.4.2 Pure Catastrophe Swap
4.3.4.4.4.3 Weather Derivatives
4.3.4.4.5 Challenges for Catastrophe Derivatives
4.3.4.5 A Comparative Analysis of Capital Market Instruments
4.3.4.5.1 Liquidity Risk, Basis Risk, Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection, and Credit Risk
4.3.4.5.2 Catastrophe Bonds Versus Catastrophe Reinsurance
4.3.4.6 Capital Markets and the Terrorism Risk
4.3.4.6.1 The Potential of Capital Market Instruments to Undertake Terrorism Coverage
4.3.4.6.2 A Market for Terrorism Catastrophe Bonds?
4.3.4.7 Conclusions on Capital Markets as an Instrument to Manage the Catastrophe Insurance Capacity Problem
4.4 CONCLUSIONS ON SOLUTIONS TO THE CATASTROPHE INSURANCE CAPACITY PROBLEM
Chapter 5 The Potential Role of the Government in Compensating Catastrophic Damages
5.1 INTRODUCTION
5.2 THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT WITHIN THE INSURANCE MARKET
5.2.1 TYPES OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
5.2.1.1 Supporting the Private Insurance Market
5.2.1.2 Risk-Sharing with the Private Sector: The Government as Reinsurer of Last Resort
5.2.1.3 Government-Provided Insurance
5.2.1.4 A Newly Proposed Form of Government Intervention: The Auctioning of XOL Contracts
5.2.2 A LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE ON GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE CATASTROPHE INSURANCE MARKET
5.2.2.1 An Overview of Theories of Public Policy
5.2.2.2 Law and Economics Perspective
5.2.2.2.1 Arguments in Favour of Government Intervention
5.2.2.2.2 Arguments against Government Intervention
5.2.3 MODALITIES FOR EFFICIENT GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE CATASTROPHE INSURANCE MARKETS
5.2.4 CONCLUSIONS ON THE GOVERNMENT INTERVENING WITHIN THE PRIVATE CATASTROPHE INSURANCE MARKET
5.3 THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT OUTSIDE THE INSURANCE MARKET
5.3.1 TYPES OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
5.3.1.1 Additional Risk Layer for the Government
5.3.1.2 Government-Run Compensation Funds
5.3.1.3 A Newly Proposed Form of Government Intervention: Government as Lender of Last Resort
5.3.2 A LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE ON GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION OUTSIDE THE CATASTROPHE INSURANCE MARKET
5.4 CONCLUSION ON THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT IN COMPENSATING CATASTROPHIC DAMAGES
Chapter 6 Summary Findings and Policy Recommendations
6.1 INTRODUCTION
6.2 POINT OF DEPARTURE
6.3 OVERARCHING PRINCIPLES
6.4 CLASSIFICATION OF CATASTROPHES
6.5 NATURAL CATASTROPHES
6.5.1 LIABILITY LAW
6.5.2 FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE
6.5.3 FURTHER GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
6.5.4 OTHER FINANCING TECHNIQUES TO BE PUSHED FORWARD
6.5.5 CONCLUSION
6.6 TECHNOLOGICAL CATASTROPHES
6.6.1 LIABILITY LAW
6.6.2 LIABILITY INSURANCE
6.6.3 FURTHER GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
6.6.4 OTHER FINANCING TECHNIQUES TO BE PUSHED FORWARD
6.6.5 FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE
6.6.6 CONCLUSION
6.7 TERRORISM EVENTS
6.7.1 LIABILITY LAW (AND LIABILITY INSURANCE)
6.7.2 FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE
6.7.3 AN IMPORTANT GOVERNMENTAL ROLE
6.7.4 CONCLUSION
Part II Compensation Solutions in Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United States
Chapter 7 Financial Compensation of Catastrophe Victims in Belgium
7.1 INTRODUCTION
7.2 SOCIAL SECURITY
7.2.1 WORKERS' COMPENSATION
7.2.2 HEALTH INSURANCE
7.3 LIABILITY LAW
7.3.1 THE THREE BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF FAULT LIABILITY AND NEGLIGENCE
7.3.2 THE TWO BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF STRICT LIABILITY
7.3.3 COMPENSATION UNDER TORT LAW
7.3.4 GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY
7.4 INSURANCE (AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION)
7.4.1 NATURAL DISASTERS
7.4.1.1 A Retrospective
7.4.1.1.1 Act of 12 July 1976
7.4.1.1.1.1 Main Disposals
7.4.1.1.1.2 Disadvantages
7.4.1.1.1.3 The 1976 Act in Practice
7.4.1.1.2 Royal Decree of 24 December 1992
7.4.1.1.3 Royal Decree of 16 January 1995
7.4.1.1.4 Act of 21 May 2003
7.4.1.2 Act of 17 September 2005
7.4.1.2.1 Area of Application
7.4.1.2.2 Covered Damage
7.4.1.2.3 Insurance Premium
7.4.1.2.4 Guarantees for the Insurer
7.4.1.2.5 Tariffication Office
7.4.1.2.6 Advantages
7.4.1.2.7 Conclusion
7.4.1.2.8 Judgment Number 39/2007 of the Constitutional Court of 15 March 2007
7.4.2 TERRORIST ATTACKS
7.4.2.1 A Retrospective
7.4.2.1.1 Insurance Act
7.4.2.1.2 Royal Decree of 1 February 1988 and of 24 December 1992
7.4.2.2 Act of 1 April 2007
7.4.2.2.1 Area of Application
7.4.2.2.2 Maximum Compensation
7.4.2.2.3 Covered Damages
7.4.3 MAN-MADE DISASTERS
7.4.3.1 Act of 30 July 1979
7.4.3.1.1 Prevention
7.4.3.1.2 Compensation
7.4.3.1.3 Disadvantages
7.4.3.2 Gellingen/Ghislenghien: A Combination of Insurance and Solidarity
7.5 FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES IN BELGIUM
7.5.1 NATURAL CATASTROPHES
7.5.2 MAN-MADE DISASTERS
7.5.3 TERRORIST ATTACKS
Chapter 8 Financial Compensation of Catastrophe Victims in France
8.1 INTRODUCTION
8.2 SOCIAL SECURITY
8.2.1 WORKERS' COMPENSATION
8.2.2 HEALTH INSURANCE
8.3 LIABILITY LAW
8.3.1 PRIVATE LIABILITY LAW
8.3.1.1 The Three Basic Requirements of Fault Liability and Negligence
8.3.1.2 The Three Basic Requirements of Strict Liability
8.3.2 PUBLIC LIABILITY LAW
8.3.2.1 Fault Liability of Public Authorities
8.3.2.2 Strict Liability of Public Authorities
8.3.2.3 Governmental Liability for Catastrophes
8.3.2.3.1 Natural Catastrophes
8.3.2.3.1.1 Liability of the Mayor in the Prevention of Natural Catastrophes
8.3.2.3.1.2 Liability of the State in the Prevention of Natural Catastrophes
8.3.2.3.1.3 An Example of Liability of the Mayor and the State in the Prevention of Natural Catastrophes
8.3.2.3.2 Terrorist Attacks
8.3.3 COMPENSATION UNDER LIABILITY LAW
8.4 INSURANCE (AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION)
8.4.1 'GARANTIE DES ACCIDENTS DE LA VIE' AND OTHER INSURANCE CONTRACTS COVERING PERSONAL INJURIES
8.4.1.1 'Garantie des Accidents de la Vie'
8.4.1.2 Other Insurance Contracts Covering Personal Injuries
8.4.2 NATURAL DISASTERS
8.4.2.1 Act of 13 July 1982
8.4.2.1.1 Area of Application
8.4.2.1.2 Natural Disasters
8.4.2.1.3 Covered Damage
8.4.2.1.4 Insurance Premium
8.4.2.1.5 Compensation Procedure
8.4.2.1.6 Guarantees for the Insurer
8.4.2.1.7 Tariffication Office
8.4.2.1.8 The Reform Project
8.4.2.2 Act of 25 June 1990
8.4.3 TERRORIST ATTACKS
8.4.3.1 Prevention and a Retrospective on Compensation
8.4.3.2 Act of 9 September 1986
8.4.3.2.1 Area of Application
8.4.3.2.2 Acts of Terrorism
8.4.3.2.3 A Special Provision in Case of 'Major Risks'
8.4.3.3 The New Terrorist Compensation Act
8.4.3.4 Gestion de l'Assurance et de la Réassurance des Risques Attentats et Actes de Terrorisme
8.4.3.4.1 The Creation of GAREAT
8.4.3.4.2 Membership
8.4.3.4.3 Structure
8.4.3.4.4 Premium
8.4.4 MAN-MADE DISASTERS
8.4.4.1 A Retrospective
8.4.4.2 Act of 30 July 2003
8.4.4.2.1 Area of Application
8.4.4.2.2 Technological Catastrophes
8.4.4.2.3 Covered Damage
8.4.4.2.4 Insurance Premium
8.4.4.2.5 Compensation Procedure
8.4.4.2.6 Subrogation
8.5 COMPENSATION FUNDS
8.5.1 'FONDS DE GARANTIE DES VICTIMES D'ACTES DE TERRORISME ET D'AUTRES INFRACTIONS'
8.5.2 'FONDS DE GARANTIE CONTRE LES ACCIDENTS'
8.6 FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES IN FRANCE
8.6.1 PERSONAL INJURIES
8.6.1.1 Natural Catastrophes, Terrorist Attacks and Man-Made Disasters
8.6.1.2 Terrorist Attacks
8.6.2 PROPERTY DAMAGE
8.6.2.1 Natural Catastrophes
8.6.2.2 Man-Made Disasters
8.6.2.3 Terrorist Attacks
Chapter 9 Financial Compensation of Catastrophe Victims in the Netherlands
9.1 INTRODUCTION
9.2 SOCIAL SECURITY
9.2.1 WORKERS' COMPENSATION
9.2.2 HEALTH INSURANCE
9.3 LIABILITY LAW
9.3.1 THE THREE BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF FAULT LIABILITY AND NEGLIGENCE
9.3.2 THE TWO BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF STRICT LIABILITY
9.3.3 COMPENSATION UNDER LIABILITY LAW
9.3.4 GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY
9.4 INSURANCE AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
9.4.1 NATURAL (AND MAN-MADE) CATASTROPHES
9.4.1.1 A Retrospective of Insurance against Losses from Natural Disasters
9.4.1.2 Act of 25 May 1998
9.4.1.2.1 Area of Application
9.4.1.2.2 Covered Damage
9.4.1.2.3 Compensation Procedure
9.4.1.2.4 The Calamities Compensation Act in Practice
9.4.1.3 The Actual Insurability of Natural Catastrophes
9.4.2 TERRORIST ATTACKS
9.4.2.1 A Retrospective
9.4.2.2 The Dutch Terrorism Risk Reinsurance Company NHT
9.4.2.2.1 Area of Application
9.4.2.2.2 Definition of the Terrorism Risk
9.4.2.2.3 Capacity of the NHT
9.4.2.2.4 Compensation Procedure
9.4.2.2.5 Emergency Act on Financial Transactions
9.4.2.2.6 The NHT in Practice
9.5 AD HOC COMPENSATION. THE EXAMPLE OF SOME RECENT MAN-MADE DISASTERS
9.5.1 ENSCHEDE
9.5.1.1 Financial Compensation to the Victims of the Enschede Catastrophe
9.5.1.2 Governmental Liability?
9.5.2 VOLENDAM
9.5.2.1 Financial Compensation to the Victims of the Volendam Catastrophe
9.5.2.2 Governmental Liability?
9.6 COMPENSATION FUNDS
9.6.1 AD HOC COMPENSATION FUNDS
9.6.2 STRUCTURAL COMPENSATION FUNDS
9.6.2.1 Introduction
9.6.2.2 Compensation Fund for Victims of Violent Crime
9.6.3 THE NATIONAL DISASTER FUND
9.7 REFORM
9.8 FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES IN THE NETHERLANDS
9.8.1 NATURAL CATASTROPHES
9.8.2 MAN-MADE DISASTERS
9.8.3 TERRORIST ATTACKS
Chapter 10 Financial Compensation of Catastrophe Victims in the United States
10.1 INTRODUCTION
10.2 SOCIAL SECURITY
10.2.1 WORKERS' COMPENSATION
10.2.2 DISABILITY PROVISIONS
10.2.3 HEALTH INSURANCE
10.2.4 GAPS IN SOCIAL SECURITY COVERAGE
10.3 LIABILITY LAW
10.3.1 INTENTIONAL TORTS
10.3.2 NEGLIGENCE
10.3.3 STRICT LIABILITY
10.3.4 COMPENSATION UNDER LIABILITY LAW
10.3.5 THE INCENTIVE TO SUE IN TORT, ALSO AFTER A CATASTROPHIC ACCIDENT
10.4 PRIVATE INSURANCE
10.5 GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE
10.5.1 LEGISLATIVE NO-FAULT OR INSURANCE SCHEMES
10.5.1.1 Federal Government Involvement in the Insurance Market
10.5.1.1.1 National Flood Insurance Program
10.5.1.1.1.1 A Retrospective of Assistance to Flood Victims
10.5.1.1.1.2 The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968
10.5.1.1.1.3 Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973
10.5.1.1.1.4 National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994
10.5.1.1.1.5 Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004
10.5.1.1.1.6 The Provision of Flood Insurance: The WYO Program
10.5.1.1.1.7 The Mandatory Flood Insurance Purchase Requirement
10.5.1.1.1.8 The Standard Flood Insurance Policy
10.5.1.1.1.9 Covered Damage
10.5.1.1.1.10 Insurance Premium
10.5.1.1.1.11 Funding
10.5.1.1.1.12 Flood Insurance Demand
10.5.1.1.1.13 Problems with and Failures of the NFIP
10.5.1.1.1.14 The Future of the NFIP
10.5.1.1.2 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act
10.5.1.1.2.1 Insured Losses after 9/11
10.5.1.1.2.2 Background to Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002
10.5.1.1.2.3 TRIA of 2002
10.5.1.1.2.4 TRIEA of 2005
10.5.1.1.2.5 Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007
10.5.1.1.2.6 How Are the Losses Really Distributed under TRIA?
10.5.1.1.2.7 Advantages and Disadvantages of TRIA
10.5.1.1.2.8 Expiration Debate and Alternatives to TRIA
10.5.1.2 State Government Involvement in the Insurance Market
10.5.1.2.1 California Earthquake Authority
10.5.1.2.2 Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund
10.5.1.2.3 Hawaii Hurricane Relief Fund
10.5.2 FEDERAL EMERGENCY RELIEF: FEMA
10.5.2.1 Roles and Responsibilities in Emergency Relief
10.5.2.2 Federal Emergency Relief
10.5.2.3 Disaster Relief to Individuals under FEMA
10.5.2.4 FEMA in the Twenty-First Century
10.5.3 FUND SOLUTIONS: THE SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND
10.5.3.1 The Special Master
10.5.3.2 Eligibility to the Fund
10.5.3.3 Covered Damage
10.5.3.4 Compensation Procedure
10.5.3.5 A Mixed Balance?
10.5.3.6 The Fund as a Model for the Future?
10.5.3.7 Financial Relief through the Fund
10.5.3.8 Other Financial Relief after 9/11, Independent of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund
10.5.3.8.1 Federal Aid
10.5.3.8.2 Charity
10.5.3.8.3 Tort
10.5.3.8.4 Social Security
10.5.3.8.5 Crime-Victim Programmes
10.5.3.8.6 Workers' Compensation
10.5.3.8.7 Tax Relief
10.5.3.8.8 Totality of Compensation after 9/11
10.6 FINANCIAL COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF CATASTROPHES IN THE UNITED STATES
10.6.1 NATURAL CATASTROPHES
10.6.2 MAN-MADE DISASTERS
10.6.3 TERRORIST ATTACKS
Part III Comparative Conclusions and Policy Recommendations with Regard to Compensating Catastrophe Victims
Chapter 11 Comparative Conclusions from a Law and Economics Perspective
11.1 INTRODUCTION
11.2 NATURAL CATASTROPHES
11.2.1 BELGIUM
11.2.2 FRANCE
11.2.3 THE NETHERLANDS
11.2.4 UNITED STATES
11.2.5 COMPARATIVE TABLE
11.2.6 COMPARATIVE CONCLUSIONS FROM A LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE
11.2.7 SUMMARY
11.3 MAN-MADE DISASTERS
11.3.1 BELGIUM
11.3.2 FRANCE
11.3.3 THE NETHERLANDS
11.3.4 UNITED STATES
11.3.5 COMPARATIVE TABLE
11.3.6 COMPARATIVE CONCLUSIONS FROM A LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE
11.3.7 SUMMARY
11.4 TERRORIST ATTACKS
11.4.1 BELGIUM
11.4.2 FRANCE
11.4.3 THE NETHERLANDS
11.4.4 UNITED STATES
11.4.5 COMPARATIVE TABLE
11.4.6 COMPARATIVE CONCLUSIONS FROM A LAW AND ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE
11.4.7 SUMMARY
Chapter 12 General Conclusions on Financial Compensation to Victims of Catastrophes
12.1 INTRODUCTION
12.2 FIVE CATEGORIES OF COMPENSATION MECHANISMS
12.3 COUNTRY EXPERIENCES
12.4 AN INTERIM CONCLUSION
12.5 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
12.6 FINAL CONCLUSION
12.7 TOPICS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Bibliography
Index
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