Naturalism and the First-Person Perspective

Introduction: What is the Problem? The Claim of Naturalism A Challenge to Naturalism What is at Stake An Overview Part I: The Core Argument Chapter 1. Varieties of Naturalism What Counts As 'Science'? Reductive Naturalism Nonreductive Naturalism Disenchantment and Optimism Chapter 2. On Naturalizing the First-Person Perspective What is Naturalization? The Robust First-Person Perspective The Rudimentary First-Person Perspective Chapter 3. Reductive Approaches to the First-Person Perspective John Perry on an Epistemic Account of the Self David Lewis on De Se Belief A Comment on John Searle Can Cognitive Science Save the Day? Chapter 4. Eliminative Approaches to the First-Person Perspective Daniel Dennett on Consciousness Thomas Metzinger on a Self-Model Theory My Recommendation Chapter 5. Arguments Against First-Person Naturalization From First-Person Concepts to First-Person Properties A Linguistic Argument: A Complete Ontology Must Include First-Person Properties A Metaphysical Argument Against Ontological Naturalism Part II: An Account of the First-Person Perspective Chapter 6. From the Rudimentary to the Robust Stage of the First-Person Perspective The First-Person Perspective: Consciousness and Self-Consciousness Language and the Acquisition of Concepts How to Acquire a Self-Concept Human Persons: Wrap Up Chapter 7. Is the Idea of the First-Person Perspective Coherent? Personal Identity: A First-Personal Approach Objections and Replies Mark Johnston on the Self as Illusory Johnston's Critique Side-Stepped Chapter 8. A Metaphysical Framework for The First-Person Perspective First-Person Properties Dispositional Properties Haecceitistic Implications Chapter 9. Agents, Artifacts, Moral Responsibility: Some Contributions of the First-person Perspective Personhood Agency Artifacts Moral Responsibility Chapter 10. Natural Reality Near-Naturalism Property-Constitution and Causation Emergentism and Downward Causation How Naturalistic is Near-Naturalism? Index