Preface. > Part 1: Ontology: > The Identity Theory and Functionalism: > Introduction. >1. The Identity Theory: Is Consciousness a Brain Process? > U. T. Place. >2. Early Causal and Functionalist Views: The Causal Theory of Mind: > D. M. Armstrong. >The Nature of Mental States: > Hilary Putnam. >3. Anomalous Monism. Mental Events: > Donald Davidson. >4. Homuncular and Teleological Functionalism: The Appeal to Tecit Knowledge in Psychological Explanation: > Jerry A. Fodor. The Continuity of Levels of Nature: > William G. Lycan. Putting the Function Back into Functionalism: > Ellite Sober. > Part II: Instrumentalism: > Introduction. >5. An Instrumentalist Theory: True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why it Works: > Daniel C. Dennett. Dennett on Intentional Systems: > Stephen P Stich. Real Patterns: > Daniel C. Dennett. > Part III: Eliminativism and Neurophilosophy. > >Introduction. >6. Current Eliminativism: Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes: > Paul Churchland. >7. Neurophilosophy and Connectionism: Neural Representation and Neural Computation: > Patricia Smith Churchland and Terrence Sejnowski. The Case for Connectionism: > William Bechtel. >What Might Cognition Be, If Not Computation? > Tim Van Gelder. > Part IV: The 'Language of Thought' Hypothesis. > >Introduction. >8. Defending the 'Language of Thought': Why There Still Has to Be a Language of Thought: > Jerry A. Fodor. >9. Attacking the 'Language of Thought': Stalking the Wild Epistemic Engine: > Paul M. Churchland and Patricia Smith Churchland. >10. Psychosemantics: Biosemantics: > Ruth Garrett Millikan. A Theory of Content: > Jerry A Fodor. > Part V: The Status of Folk Psychology: > Introduction. >11. Attacking 'Folk Psychology': Autonomous Psychology and the Belief-Desire Thesis: > Stephen P Stich. >12. Defending 'Folk Psychology': Folk Psychology is Here to Stay: > Terence Horgan and James Woodward. >13. The Debate of Narrow Content: A Narrow Representational Theory of the Mind: > Michael Devitt. Narrow Content Meets Fat Syntax: > Stephen P Stich. >14. Supervenient Causation: Mental Causation: > Jaegwon Kim. >Type Epiphenomenalism, Type Dualism, and the Causal Priority of the Physical: > Brian McLaughlin. >15. Wide Causation: Individualism and Supervenience: > Jerry A. Fodor. An A Priori Argument: The Argument from Causal Powers: > Robert A. Wilson. >16. Self Knowledge: Knowing One's Mind: > Donald Davidson. Privileged Access: > John Heil. >17. The Simulation Theory: Folk Psychology as Simulation: > Robert Gordon. The Mental Simulation Debate: > Martin Davies. > Part VI: Consciousness, 'Qualia,' and Subjectivity: > Introduction. >18.'Qualia' - Based Objections to Functionalism: An Excerpt from 'Troubles with Functionalism': > Ned Block. Epiphenomenal Qualia: > Frank Jackson. >19. Functionalist Responses: What Experience Teaches: > David Lewis. >Understanding the Phenomenal Mind: Are We All Just Armadillos? > Robert Van Gulick. >20. The Rep... (Part Contents).
