Examines the process of dismantling the democratic institutions and protections in Venezuela under the Hugo Chávez regime. The actions of the Chávez government have influenced similar processes and undemocratic manoeuvrings in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Honduras. Since the election of Hugo Chávez as president of Venezuela in 1998, a sinister form of nationalistic authoritarianism has arisen at the expense of long-established democratic standards. During the past decade, the 1999 Venezuelan Constitution has been systematically attacked by all branches of the Chávez government, particularly by the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, which has legitimized the Chávez-ordered constitutional violations. The Chávez regime has purposely defrauded the Constitution and severely restricted representative government, all in the name of a supposedly participatory democracy controlled by a popularly supported central government. This volume illustrates how an authoritarian, nondemocratic government has been established in Venezuela.
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Verlagsort
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ISBN-13
978-0-511-76206-2 (9780511762062)
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Autor*in
Universidad Central de Venezuela
Allan R. Brewer-Carías has been Professor at the Central University of Venezuela since 1963 and currently is an adjunct Professor of Law at Columbia University Law School. He is Vice President of the International Academy of Comparative Law (The Hague), a Member of the Board of Directors of the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights, and Member of the Venezuelan National Academy of Political and Social Sciences, where he served as President from 1997-1999. In Venezuela, he is a former Senator for the Federal District, Head of the Presidential Commission on Administrative Reform, and Minister for Decentralization; he was also elected Member of the National Constituent Assembly in 1999. Since 1980, Brewer-Carías has been the Director of the Revista de Derecho Público (Public Law Journal) of Venezuela and has published numerous books and articles on constitutional and administrative law.
Part I. The Political Assault to State Powers Through an Elected but Exclusionist Constituent Assembly and the Framework for Authoritarianism: 1. The 1999 constitution making process as an instrument for framing an authoritarian political regime; 2. The 1999 constitution: from an exclusionist constitution making process to its distorting implementation; 3. The endless and illegitimate transitory regime preventing the effective enforcement of the constitution; 4. The outcome: the consolidation of authoritarianism defrauding democracy; Part II. Institutional Developments for the Consolidation of Authoritarianism: 5. The reinforced centralization of the federation; 6. Powers' concentration and authoritarian government; 7. The catastrophic dependence and political subjection of the supreme tribunal of justice; 8. Statization, nationalization, expropriation and confiscation of private assets; Part III. The Constitutional Reforms Proposals Designed to Consolidate Authoritarianism: 9. The failed attempt to consolidate an authoritarian, socialist, centralized, repressive and militarist state in the constitution; 10. The alternate principle of government and the 2009 constitutional amendment on continuous reelection.
