State Aid and the European Economic Constitution

1. Introduction

PART I

2. The Constitutional Framework
1. The Concept of a European Economic Constitution
A. Ordo-liberalism and the European Economic Constitution
B. The Continuing Relevance of the Concept of Economic Constitution
2. The Economic Orientation of the Internal Market Case Law
A. The Role of Economic Liberalism
B. The Balance between Internal Market and Social Rights
3. The Limits of Constitutional Adjudication
A. National Identity and the Social Market Economy in the Court
B. Varieties of Capitalism and Market Integration
4. Conclusion

3. The Distinctive Nature of State Aid Law
1. Family Resemblances
A. State Aid and Antitrust
B. State Aid and Free Movement
C. Competition Between States
2. Centralisation and its Rationale
A. Direct Effect, Centralised and Decentralised Enforcement
B. Administrative Rule-Making
3. Discretion
A. Economic and Non-Economic Considerations
B. Discretion and the European Interest
4. Conclusion

PART II

4. The State as Market Participant
1. State Attribution
2. The Market Operator Principle and its Ramifications
A. Questioning the Market Operator Principle
B. From Neutrality to Substantive Equality
C. The Limits of the Market Paradigm
D. Legal Certainty
3. Conclusion

5. The State as Regulator
1. The Market Participant-Regulator Boundary
2. Selectivity
A. Competitors and Comparators
B. The Relevance of Objectives
C. Regulatory Justifications for Unequal Treatment
D. Towards a 'Rule of Reason' in State Aid Law?
3. The Use of Public Resources
4. Conclusion

PART III

6. State Aid and Self-Government
1. The Geographic Dimension of Selectivity
A. The Relevant Economic Space
B. The Constitutional Dimension
2. The Shifting Scope of Tax Competition
3. Conclusion

7. Funding Public Services
1. Services of General Economic Interest
2. Compensation for Public Service Obligations
A. The 'State Aid' and 'Compensation' Approaches
B. Altmark and Beyond
C. A Retreat from Altmark?
D. The Commission Packages
3. Defining SGEIs
A. State Aid and the Constitutional Relevance of Solidarity
B. Evaluating Compensation
4. Beyond the Market Participant-Regulator Dichotomy
5. Conclusion

8. Conclusion