An acritical philosophy of information

The project of an acritical philosophy of information is nothing but a defence of the necessity for the philosophical element in our cognitive, epistemic and informational endeavours, and simultaneously a manner of refusing the formalist, criticist or ideological marginalisation of the philosophical. This underlines the fact that there are many things that the disciplinary discourses do not or cannot know, not even when these discourses accumulate into a huge pile of knowledges.

This project poses many challenges to both information science and philosophy. Only when information science is understood as an interscience that operates in a multi-faceted and interconceptual and even interdiscursive way, as it is suggested here, will it be able to comply with the challenges. In the fulfilment of this task it needs to be accompanied by a philosophical approach that will take it beyond the mere critical and linear approach to scientific work.

For this reason an acritical philosophical approach is proposed that will be characterised by multiple, complex and inventive styles of thinking, organised by a compositional rather than an oppositional inspiration. This initiative is carried by the conviction that information science will hereby be enabled to make contributions to significant knowledge inventions that may bring about a better world.

Keywords

acritical thinking; complexity; compositional thinking; interconcepts; interscience; invention; knowledge ecology; multiple; wisdom

1.1 Introduction

Reflection on knowledge, information, the sciences, philosophy and literature always takes place in a biospheric, technological, economic and cultural environment, from which it draws its resources and on which it will produce its effects. This situation of intellectual activity in a complex and multi-layered environment can be referred to as knowledge ecology. This term refers to the network of relations linking human activity to a natural environment that both constrains it and is altered by it, and by which specific activities such as intellectual interventions or interferences take place in a dynamic, situational relation to socio-cultural contexts.

The production and forms of knowledge or scientific developments and the character and role of cognitive activity have neither existence nor meaning outside their relation to this techno-economico-cultural environment. This contextualisation is itself a form of knowledge, designated in different sites and situations by terms such as ecology, context theory, cybernetic holism, complex adaptive systems or actor-network theory. The project of an acritical philosophy of information is nothing but a defence of the necessity for 'the philosophical' in our cognitive, epistemic and informational endeavours, and simultaneously a manner of refusing the aestheticist, formalist or ideological marginalisation of the philosophical. This underlines the fact that there are many things that the disciplinary discourses do not or cannot know, not even when these discourses accumulate into one huge pile of knowledges.

A further perspective on these domains, sites and situations that lies beyond disciplinary exercises and that calls for another kind of investigation and reflection has been detected by the architect Bernard Tschumi (1998). He emphasises the importance of taking cognisance of the exterior of any discipline and its possible impact on the discipline. Martin Heidegger's appeal for practising 'adequate reflection' links up with the view of Tschumi that there is something outside the generally accepted status of scientific endeavours. Heidegger (1977) refers to this reflection as the courage to turn the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be questioned. Presuppositions, assumptions, prejudices and personal preferences play an immensely important role in what will eventually be considered to be scientific knowledge. Paul Ricour (1991: 465) emphasises something similar in relation to language and poetry: 'My philosophical project is to show how human language is inventive despite the objective limits and codes which govern it, to reveal the diversity and potentiality of language which the erosion of everyday, conditioned by technocratic and political [and scientific and professional] interests, never ceases to obscure.' He sketches the responsibility of the philosopher as follows: 'to preserve the varieties of the uses of language and the polarities between these different kinds of language, ranging from science through political and practical language and ordinary language, let us say poetry. And ordinary language mediating between poetry, on one hand, and scientific language, on the other hand' (Ricour, 1991: 448). Here the emphasis is on the dimensions of language that lie outside the disciplinary languages but which most certainly affect these languages.

Hans-Georg Gadamer, using statistics as an example, shows how the hermeneutical dimension encompasses the entire procedure of science. He points out that science always operates in definite conditions of methodological abstraction, and that the successes of modern sciences rest on the fact that other possibilities for questioning are concealed by this abstraction. In the process, truth becomes distorted and even obfuscated. Other facts will come to the fore if other questions are asked, questions he considers to be hermeneutic questions. Other questions might generate other meanings of the facts and other consequences. Here he invites the decisive function of fantasy or imagination to elaborate and connect facts, meanings and consequences (Gadamer, 1976: 11-13).

It should be clear from these few remarks that not only is the philosophical always with us but that there exists a central and fundamentally important place for it. But 'the philosophical', or philosophy, in what sense? There are so many different approaches.

1.2 Philosophy as an act of thinking

Philosophy and more specifically 'the philosophical' as a human characteristic or even disposition (and not philosophical schools) is about human thinking and how human thinking finds expression and fulfils an orientation function in many situations. Thinking remains very probably the most special capacity humans possess - all humans. Thinking, in as far as it is a noetic endeavour, teaches us the very art of living (Morin, 2004: 151-9; also see Morin's studies on Ideas, 1991). Morin (1991: 12) writes: 'Our most profound lack is the lack of wisdom.' We need to revisit the idea of wisdom we inherited from the thought of antiquity but have lost in modern times.

'The work of thinking well' Pascal raised includes reflection: self-examination, self-critique that struggles constantly against internal illusions and lying to oneself, as well as the questioning of assumptions, prejudices and personal preferences. At the same time it entails the avoidance of unilateral ideas, mutilated conceptions and views regarding important matters, and the search to conceive of human complexity. The main challenge posed to our unique capacity to think is, then, think well, since this is our highest moral principle!

As such, philosophy is the human effort to delve deep, as deeply as possible, into the spiritual and mental activities of humans in all situations, not only in matters of life but also in matters of science and knowledge, matters of human creativity and inventiveness and human faults, failure and despair. All these activities inspire and motivate humans to act. Never are authentic philosophical investigations, although sometimes very critical, meant to be destructive. They support humans and they support and guide human endeavours such as science, culture and practices.

Philosophy does not take anything for granted. It questions everything in a search for truth and truthfulness. Humans reflect on their lives, their goals, their convictions, their beliefs. Serious reflection does not hesitate to delve deep into the origins and foundations that direct and guide these issues. Humans articulate, that is they put into words what they discover in these processes. In short, they try to give meaning to what they discover. This meaning-giving activity is called conceptualisation. Working with concepts, analysing concepts, organising and reorganising concepts comprise the work or activity of the philosopher or of the philosophical in us.

Philosophy does this in a structured and focused way. Deleuze and Guattari (1994) can help us greatly in this regard. I will briefly return to them at a later stage. No science, no writing, no thinking can happen without concepts. But concepts are relational, they relate all the time to domains other than the domains of their immediate activity. Concepts relate and connect the history of thought, history of science and history of human life. As such, when it is true to its nature, philosophy is much more of a compositional than an oppositional activity (Stiegler, 2003). Its critical function is a secondary and not an original function. It starts with and emerges out of a sense of wonder rather than an enthusiasm for critique and criticism. For Michel Serres, as he expressed it in an interview with Bruno Latour, knowledge has two modes: 'The concern with verification and the burdens it requires, but also risk taking, the production of newness, the multiplicity of found objects - in short, inventiveness. It is better to avoid diminishing the second aspect in favour of...