Chapter II.
Method of Operation
Table of Contents Our method of operation, although in accord with military practice and with the Allies' agreement, could only be rendered effective and efficient by complete cooperation between the forces concerned. It is a pleasure to bear witness to the hearty cooperation existing from the very beginning of our participation in the war until active operations ceased with the signing of the armistice. This cooperation was not one on the surface only, but it was a real unitedness of effort, both in respect to material and spirit. The relations between the forces of the respective nations, extending from the commanders throughout the entire commissioned and enlisted personnel, were at all time of the most friendly nature. There were literally no disagreeable incidents, no friction. On the contrary, there was always a spirit of give and take, resulting in a mutual relation that approached the ideal.
This happy condition of affairs was largely due to the character and ability of the senior officers of the French naval service, with whom we were brought in contact. Their influence was reflected in all ranks of the French Navy.
In accordance with agreement, the Senior Allied Naval Officer Present commanded all forces operating in any particular country or section of a country. Thus, logically, all American forces on the west coast of France were under the command of the Senior French Naval Officer. For the greater part of our service this officer was Vice Admiral Moreau, Prefet Maritime of the Second Arrondissement, with headquarters at Brest.
Directly under Vice Admiral Moreau was Vice Admiral Schwerer, Commandant Superieur of the Divisions of Brittany. Under the Prefet Maritime, Vice Admiral Schwerer was for all practical purposes in command of the greater portion of the French cruising forces on duty in the Bay of Biscay. The chief part of these French forces were based on
Brest. In addition, there were mine-sweepers, small torpedo-boats, and gunboats, known as the "Defense Mobile", and based on the two other arrondissements of the west coast of France. Their headquarters were at Lorient and Rochefort.
In the beginning of our operations, when there were only a few of our vessels in French waters, they were based on Brest, which from the first was the headquarters of the Commander, United States Naval Forces in France. But, with the expansion of our forces and the increase in escort duty performed by these vessels, it became necessary to transfer some of them to other sections of the coast.
The practicability of their transfer was to a large extent dependent upon the ability to obtain fuel-oil at some port other than Brest, and because at first fuel-oil could only be obtained at Brest, it was necessary that the first vessels transferred should be coal burners. The relative speed and importance of the convoys reaching the various ports introduced another factor for consideration-it was decided that the smaller and slower vessels, which, for other reasons, were of the least military value, were most suitable for serving the convoys entering the Gironde River. The decision was reached to transfer a number of yachts for basing in the District of Rochefort, some seventy miles north of the entrance to the Gironde River.
Accordingly, between January 31 and February 19, 1918, the converted yachts CORSAIR, NOMA, WAKIVA, MAY, NOKOMIS and APHRODITE, were sent to Rochefort to base. The reasons that these vessels were not sent simultaneously were, first, certain of them were undergoing repairs incident to their continuous service since their arrival in Europe, and, second, they could not immediately be spared.
A mine-sweeper division, under the command of Captain T. P. Magruder, U. S. Navy, proceeded to Lorient between December 13, 1917, and February 5, 1918. This division was made up of the converted yacht GUINEVERE, and the converted fishing-vessels McNEAL, CAHILL, ANDERTON. BAUMAN, LEWES, COURTNEY, HUBBARD, JAMES, HINTON and DOUGLAS.
Captain Magruder became senior American naval officer in the District of Lorient-under him these vessels were assigned by the French a definite section of the approaches to St. Nazaire for the purpose of maintaining the section clear of mines. This was extremely important duty. Transports, as well as storeships, discharged at St. Nazaire, and the approaches to this port could easily be mined; hence constant sweeping was necessary to insure the safety of our ships. In addition to his other duties. Captain Magruder was given command of a naval district corresponding to the Third Arrondissement of the French-this ran from Penmarch to the southward of St. Nazaire. The initiative and ability in the administration of this district of Captain Magruder, popularly known as the "Duke of Morbihan", was of the greatest assistance in the carrying on of our work.
The mine-sweepers-converted fishing vessels-had been sent to France with the expectation of their fulfilling a double purpose: mine-sweeping and escorting slow convoys along the west coast of France. But almost immediately upon their arrival, it was found that they were not fit for the second part of the duty on account of their unseaworthiness. These vessels had made the trip from Boston to Brest without misadventure; but they had been fortunate in having had almost ideal weather conditions for most of the distance, for the sea in the Bay of Biscay and the English Channel in bad weather is of a sort to try even the staunchest of small vessels. One of the vessels, the REHOBOTH, foundered off the Island of Ushant shortly after her arrival, and in fact, upon her first trip to sea.
On account of their relative unseaworthiness, therefore, these vessels were assigned exclusively to the work of minesweeping, rescue work, and salvage work within their district. Nevertheless, at times when our forces were taxed to their limit during the height of the submarine campaign, these vessels did render assistance in escorting ships from Brest to the southward; but weather conditions were always considered.
Captain N. A. McCully, U. S. Navy, reported in France, and was assigned to the duty as commander of the Rochefort
District. This corresponded to the Fourth Arrondissement, and extended from where the Lorient District ended to the coast of Spain. As in the case of Lorient, we were very fortunate in obtaining for this duty an officer who combined tact and ability to a high degree.
Captain H. H. Hough, U. S. Navy, arriving in France, was assigned to the command of the Brest District. This corresponded to the Second Arrondissement of France, ran from Cape Brehat southward to Penmarch Point, and was the district of our greatest activity.
Commander David Boyd, U. S. Navy, was assigned to command the Cherbourg District. This district corresponded to the First Arrondissement. It reached from Cape Antifer to the boundary of the Brest District. The growth of this district was really only beginning towards the end of the war, and its success was really due to the energy and ability of Captain Boyd. We could give little aid in the way of ships to him, and had to rely on his ability to stretch his slender resources to the utmost.
At various times, naval port officers were assigned to certain ports-to Brest, Havre, Cherbourgh, Rouen, St. Malo, Granville, St. Nazaire, Nantes. Quiberon Bay. Sables d'Olonne, Bordeaux, La Pallice, Rochefort, Royan, Verdon. Pauillac, and St. Jean de Luz.
The port officers were under the immediate command of the District Commanders, and were the naval representatives in the various ports. Their duty was to advise the Army officials as well as the masters of ships on all points where the advice of a naval officer conversant with the sea and with the coast of France might be useful; to keep the Commander, U. S. Naval Forces in France informed of the approximate dates when ships would be ready for sea-this so that they could he fitted into convoys; to assist in the quick turn-around of vessels; to care for the administration of discipline aboard naval ships; and, in general, to assist in every way in the efficient handling of ships that entered their respective ports. With the sailing of convoys at regular intervals a gain of a day in discharging a ship might easily avoid a loss of eight days in her departure for the United States.
Soon after our arrival on the coast, it was decided by the Commander, U. S. Naval Forces in France, and by the French naval authorities that the former should assume the responsibility for the escorting and the routing of ships that carried American troops to and from the coast of France. This decision did not apply to the French liners which carried, a comparatively small number of troops to and from Bordeaux.
At first, the agreed-upon procedure was somewhat modified by the fact that the American destroyers basing on Queenstown escorted nearly all troopship groups to the pilot waters of the French coast. Here they were taken over by the American forces basing on Brest, which then assumed the responsibility for guiding them to port.
All special westbound convoys of troopships and fast American storeships were escorted and routed by the Commander, U. S. Naval Forces in France.
The agreement between the French and the British gave to the French the responsibility for the safe escorting of storeships to the west coast of France-this procedure was not modified by our entry into the war. Upon our arrival, the orders for these convoys were issued by the French, and we assigned vessels to cooperate with the French and to operate under their command.
As time passed, the number of the...
