Introduction

How good is British intelligence? What kind of a return do ministers and officials get for the hundreds of millions of pounds spent on espionage each year? How does this secret establishment find direction and purpose in an age when old certainties have evaporated? Very few people, even in Whitehall, would feel confident enough to answer these questions. So the time is right, I think, to explore the matter publicly.

The aim of this book is firstly to examine the performance of the British intelligence services during the last years of the Cold War, as they finally came to terms with the fact that this historic clash of ideologies was over, and secondly to examine the relevance of those services in the 1990s and beyond. In researching this book, I have had many revelations: about the effectiveness of those agencies, about their relationship with the USA, about how much government ministers knew, and many other matters.

This book takes the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 as its starting point. The publication in February 1996 of the Scott Report on the 'arms to Iraq' affair marks its conclusion. It is not a study of the broad sweep of world events during those tumultuous years, but rather an examination of how well British intelligence understood them, whether its product was particularly useful to those in power or to Britain's allies, and how the agencies are now trying to remain relevant in an age where many no longer believe there is any direct threat to the security of the United Kingdom. I have tried to provide just enough information about events to answer these questions, but by necessity this is not a history book.

In trying to address these questions, I have been helped by the change of climate brought about by John Major's premiership, which has allowed a freer discussion of intelligence issues. Several years ago I was tempted to start a similar book, but the idea soon ran aground because so few people were prepared to talk. In writing this one, I was able to interview key officials and politicians: I therefore believe it is the first account of the subject to draw on a truly authoritative cast of players. Another sign of the changed climate is that access to many key people is not dependent on an unquestioning or 'sympathetic' journalistic approach - so I have also sought to scrutinize areas that people in power or those giving Whitehall briefings often prefer not to discuss.

It might be argued that now is too early to look at such recent history. But there are important differences between the examination of intelligence matters and the wider business of government. Despite changes in the procedures for declassifying government papers, those concerning the sources of secret intelligence are likely to remain hidden from public view for decades, perhaps for as long as a hundred years. Given the present willingness of so many people who have been involved in this field to talk, my imperative was to interview them as soon as possible, before memories fade.

Many in the intelligence agencies would still like to cloak everything they do in secrecy: this may be necessary to protect the life of an agent, or it may simply be useful to those who are guilty of overspending. Even in the changed atmosphere of the mid-1990s, the writer on intelligence matters must respect certain requirements of secrecy. I do not reveal the names of serving intelligence officers (unless already publicly identified), the identity of any current agent, the precise location of buildings where not previously publicized, or the specific signals intelligence techniques used against any current target.

This book was not cleared, in its entirety, before publication by any arm of government nor by the Defence Press and Broadcasting Committee, better known as the D-notice committee, the joint press/official liaison body which has been in existence since 1912. Instead a few chapters were shown to officials of GCHQ, MI6 and MI5 in instances where I had specific concerns about endangering their sources or operations. I agreed to a small number of changes on these operational grounds. After the hardback edition of UK Eyes Alpha was published I was told that senior officials at the Cabinet Office had asked the Ministry of Defence to ensure that no future book of this kind would be brought out without prior clearance. In the age of the internet and fax, I believe this simply shows how outdated many mandarins are in their attitudes to secrecy.

Now the Cold War is over, my personal view is that the time has come to scrap the D-notice committee and the system of so-called 'voluntary' consultation between journalists and Whitehall which goes with it. This type of self-censorship belongs to an era when many believed the UK might be involved in total war with as little as four minutes warning. Since defence and intelligence planning in this country is now predicated on the assumption that it would take months or years for a new threat to emerge, the restoration of arrangements like the D-notice system can now safely be added to some unspecified future time of tension when war clouds are gathering-just as they were in 1912.

Would the ending of this cooperative system affect national security? I do not believe it would in the slightest. Having reviewed the D-notice committee's papers at the Public Record Office and talked to many people about the past workings of the system, I do not believe there has ever been an occasion when a journalist has tried to name an active agent of MI5 or MI6 or perhaps to reveal the operation of particular eavesdropping techniques - the real secrets which the agencies are entitled to protect - let alone one where this system has stopped such a disclosure happening. Peter Wright began the destruction of old attitudes to secrecy with the publication of Spycatcher. The D-notice system has been widely ignored in recent years, be it by tabloids revealing Stella Rimington's address, television journalists compiling timely reports on counter-terrorist operations or by the recent book-writing of former members of the Special Air Service.

Only a fool would forget that the government may still choose to take legal action against a former employee for breach of confidentiality or a journalist for damaging national security. I think it would be better for all sides if the intelligence agencies named press officers and made their telephone numbers widely available (as I understand MI5 is planning to do at the time of writing). That way the journalist with concerns about a story will know where to find them. Who knows, the agencies might well find that, by undermining further cloak-and-dagger mystique, such a step would work in their interests too.

In addressing the effectiveness of British intelligence collection, I targeted the two principal centres of analysis: the Cabinet Office Joint Intelligence Committee staff and the Defence Intelligence Staff. These compile the assessments sent to ministers, using publicly-available information as well as that produced by British and allied agencies. They usually know how good signal intelligence or agent reports were on any given subject and how great a role British collectors of intelligence played. In examining the work of the analysts themselves, I have asked the ministers or officials who received such reports to say whether they were useful or not.

Despite the atmosphere of greater openness, those in the principal collection agencies - MI6, MI5 and GCHQ - remain very reluctant to be quoted. I have however had many briefings from intelligence officials since 1990, although the terms of strict non-attributability on which they were provided prevent me from referring to them in any specific way. Although they formed part of my general background knowledge, these interviews did not play a major role in this study. Even when available, such interviews tend to be governed by strict briefing terms, so I sought my own interviews with individuals who had been involved with these three organizations; it was something of a relief not to be bound by any deals with the agencies. About twenty people who had worked for MI5, MI6 or GCHQ helped on condition that I did not use their names; for this reason they do not appear in the list of interviewees below. About the same number of people in the Foreign Office, other government departments, the armed forces and industry also provided non-attributable information.

I would like to thank the following people who have helped me with this study: Julian Loose, my editor; Nick Menzies, for valuable research help; Jean-Claude Racape who kindly allowed me to live in seclusion at the Manoir des Mauvaises Lignes while writing the book; Jonathan Lloyd, my agent; Peter Horrocks, editor of Newsnight, for putting up with a correspondent distracted by book production; and most of all, my wife Hilary for her patience in supporting me through the project.

The list of source interviews uses titles or ranks current at the time of publication. In the interests of brevity, I have avoided mentioning knighthoods or peerages in the text. In a couple of cases, quotations in the text have come from previously unpublished sections of BBC interviews that I conducted during the production of reports on intelligence matters. However, the great majority of the people listed below were interviewed specifically for this book.

Morton Abramowitz Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research (INR), US State Department, 1985-9

Air Chief Marshal Sir Michael Armitage Chief of Defence Intelligence, 1982-5

Derrick Averre University of Birmingham

David...