Commitment to Equity Handbook

Name: Commitment to Equity Handbook | Estimating the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty
Brand: Brookings Institution Press
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Estimating the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty

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Nora Lustig(Herausgeber*in)

Brookings Institution Press

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Erschienen am 1. Mai 2023

1412 Seiten

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Edited by Nora Lustig, the Commitment to Equity Handbook: Estimating the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty (Brookings Institution Press and CEQ Institute-Tulane University, 2nd edition, 2022) is a unique manual on the theory and practical methods to estimate the impact of taxation and public spending on inequality and poverty. In addition, the second edition covers frontier topics such as alternative approaches to measure the redistributive effect of education, health, and infrastructure spending. Policymakers, social planners, and economists are provided with a step-by-step guide to applying fiscal incidence analysis, illustrated by country studies. The 2nd edition of the Handbook has two volumes. Volume 1 is comprised of Part I, Methodology, describes what a CEQ Assessment is and presents the theoretical underpinnings of fiscal incidence analysis and the indicators used to assess the distributive impact and effectiveness of fiscal policy. Part II, Implementation, presents the methodology on how taxes, subsidies, and social spending should be allocated. It includes a step-by step guide to completing the CEQ Master Workbook, a multi-sheet Excel file that houses detailed information on the country's fiscal system and the results used as inputs for policy discussions, academic papers, and policy reports. Part III, ',Applications,' presents applications of the CEQ framework to low- and middle-income countries and includes simulations of policy reforms. In this 2nd edition, chapters 1, 6, and 8 have been significantly updated and two new country studies have been added to Part III. Parts IV (updated), V (new), and VI (new) are available online only. Part IV contains the CEQ Assessment's main tools. Part V includes the databases housed in the CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution. Part VI contains the CEQ Institute's microsimulation tools. Volume 2 (new) includes a collection of chapters whose purpose is to expand the knowledge and methodological frontiers to sharpen even further the analysis of fiscal policy's redistributive impact. Topics include: alternative approaches to value in-kind education and health services, alternative methods to evaluate spending on infrastructure, corporate taxes and taxation on capital incomes, inter-temporal fiscal incidence and the redistributive consequences of social insurance pensions, fiscal redistribution, macroeconomic stability and growth, and, the political economy of fiscal redistribution.

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Inhalt

Cover
Volume 1
Title Page
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
List of Illustrations
Foreword
Acknowledgments CEQ Handbook
Abstracts
Introduction
1. About Volume 1: Fiscal Incidence Analysis: Methodology, Implementation, and Applications
2. The Relevance of Fiscal Incidence Analysis in Today's World
4. Main Messages
5. Organization of Volume 1
6. Implementing a CEQ Assessment: How to Use Volume 1
7. CEQ Assessment: Data Requirements
8. About Volume 2: Methodological Frontiers in Fiscal Incidence Analysis
9. About the CEQ Institute
10. About the CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution
Part I. Methodology
Introduction
1. The Theory of Fiscal Redistribution: Key Analytical Insights
1.1 The Fundamental Equation of the Redistributive Effect
1.2 Lambert's Conundrum
1.3 The Wildcard: Reranking of Households
2. Fiscal Incidence Analysis at a Glance
2.1 Allocating Taxes and Transfers to Individuals: The Art of Fiscal Incidence Analysis
2.2 Old-Age Social Insurance Contributory Pensions: A Government Transfer or Deferred Income
2.3 Policy Simulations
2.4 Caveats: No Behavioral Responses, No Intertemporal Effects, and No Spillover Effects
3. CEQ Assessment: Indicators
3.1 How Much Income Redistribution and Poverty Reduction Is Being Accomplished in Each Country through the Fiscal System (Taxes, Social Spending, and Subsidies)?
3.1.1 Does the Fiscal System Reduce Inequality?
3.1.2 Does the Fiscal System Decrease Poverty
3.1.3 Does the Fiscal System Make the Poor Poorer or the Non-Poor Poor?
3.2 How Equalizing and Pro-Poor Are Specific Taxes and Government Spending?
3.2.1 Is a Particular Tax or Transfer Equalizing (Unequalizing)?
3.2.2 What is the Contribution of a Tax or a Transfer to the Fiscally Induced Change in Inequality and Poverty?
3.2.3 What Is the Impact of Fiscal Reforms That Change the Size and Progressivity of a Particular Tax or Spending Program?
3.2.4 Is a Particular Spending Item Pro-Poor?
3.3 How Effective Are Taxes and Government Spending in Reducing Inequality and Poverty?
3.3.1 Impact and Spending Effectiveness Indicators
3.3.2 Effectiveness Indicators for Transfers: Definitions of Coverage, Errors of Exclusion, and Errors of Inclusion
Chapter 2. Analytic Foundations: Measuring the Redistributive Impact of Taxes and Transfers
Introduction
1. The Fiscal System and Income Redistribution: The Case of a Single Tax or a Single Transfer
1.1 A Single Tax
1.1.1 Equalizing, Neutral, and Unequalizing Net Fiscal Systems: Conditions for the One-Tax Case
1.1.2 Comparing Two Taxes of Different Sizes
1.2 A Single Transfer
1.2.1 Fiscal Systems: Comparing Two Single-Transfer Systems of Different Sizes
2. The Fiscal System and Income Redistribution: Multiple Taxes and Transfers
2.1 Equalizing, Neutral, and Unequalizing Net Fiscal Systems
2.1.1 Conditions for the One Tax-One Transfer Case
2.1.2 Conditions for the Multiple Taxes and Transfers Case
2.2 Equalizing, Neutral, and Unequalizing Taxes or Transfers
2.2.1 Conditions for the One Tax-One Transfer Case
2.2.2 Conditions for the Multiple Taxes and Transfers Case
2.3 The Derivative of Marginal Contribution with Respect to Progressivity and Size
2.3.1 The Derivatives for the Case of a Marginal Change in Taxes
2.3.2 The Derivatives for the Case of a Marginal Change in Transfers
2.4 The Sensitivity of Marginal Contribution Analysis to the Use of the Conventional Gini Index
Appendix 2A. The Shapley Value
1. Simple Shapley Value
1.1 Simple Shapley Value: ZID Approach
1.2 Simple Shapley Value: EID Approach
2. Hierarchy-Shapley Value
2.1 Hierarchy-Shapley Value: Nested Shapley
2.2 Hierarchy-Shapley Value: Owen Decomposition
3. Concluding Remarks
Chapter 3. Measuring the Redistributive Impact of Taxes and Transfers in the Presence of Reranking
Introduction
1. Notations
1.1 Gini and Concentration Coefficients
1.2 Reynolds-Smolensky and Kakwani Indexes
1.3 The Relationship between the Redistributive Effect, Vertical Equity, and Reranking
1.4 Marginal Contribution
1.5 Vertical Equity
2. In the Presence of Reranking, Is the Marginal Contribution of a Tax Equalizing?
2.1 The Case of Only One Tax
2.2 The Case of Adding a Tax to a System That Has a Transfer in Place
2.3 The Case of Adding a Tax to a System with Multiple Taxes and Transfers in Place
3. In the Presence of Reranking, Is the Marginal Contribution of a Transfer Equalizing?
3.1 The Case of Only One Transfer
3.2 The Case of Adding a Transfer to a System That Has a Tax in Place
3.3 The Case of Adding a Transfer to a System with Multiple Taxes and Transfers in Place
4. Is the Total System More Equal? The Case of Adding a Tax and a Transfer
5. The Effect of a Marginal Change in One Tax or Transfer on the Equalizing (Unequalizing) Effect of a Whole System
5.1 The Case of a Marginal Change in a Tax
5.2 The Case of a Marginal Change in a Transfer
6. Lambert's Conundrum Revisited
Chapter 4. Can a Poverty-Reducing and Progressive Tax and Transfer System Hurt the Poor?
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. The Problems with Conventional Measures
2.1 Poverty Measures
2.2 Horizontal Equity and Progressivity
2.3 Real-World Examples
3. Measures of Fiscal Impoverishment
3.1 Axioms
3.2 An Axiomatic Measure of Fiscal Impoverishment
3.3 Fiscal Impoverishment Dominance Criteria
4. Fiscal Gains of the Poor
4.1 An Axiomatic Measure of Fiscal Gains of the Poor
4.2 Decomposition of the Difference between Pre-Fisc and Post-Fisc Poverty
5. Illustration
5.1 Results for Seventeen Developing Countries
5.2 Results for a Range of Poverty Lines in Brazil
6. Conclusions
Acknowledgments
Appendix 4A
A.1 FI Axioms
A.2 FGP Axioms
A.3 Proofs
Chapter 5. Measuring the Effectiveness of Taxes and Transfers in Fighting Inequality and Poverty
Introduction
1. Notation
2. New CEQ Effectiveness Indicators
2.1 Shortcomings of the 2013 Effectiveness Indicator
2.2 Impact and Spending Effectiveness Indicators
2.2.1 Impact Effectiveness
2.2.2 Spending Effectiveness
2.3 Fiscal Impoverishment and Gains Effectiveness Indicators
3. Conclusion
Part II. Implementation
Chapter 6. Allocating Taxes and Transfers and Constructing Income Concepts: Completing Sections A, B, and C of the CEQ Master Workbook
Introduction
1. The CEQ Master Workbook
1.1 The Microdata: Description of the Household Survey and Data Harmonization Assumptions
1.1.1 Definition of Household
1.1.2 Unit of Analysis
1.1.3 Missing or Zero Incomes
1.1.4 Top Coding
1.1.5 Outliers and Extreme Values
1.1.6 Under-Reporting and Top Incomes
1.1.7 Adult Equivalence and Economies of Scale
1.1.8 Spatial Price Adjustments
1.1.9 Expressing Values in Annual Terms
1.2 Data on Fiscal Systems
2. Income Concepts: Definitions
2.1 Market Income
2.2 Market Income plus Pensions
2.3 Net Market Income
2.4 Gross Income
2.5 Disposable Income
2.6 Consumable Income
2.7 Final Income
3. Constructing Income Concepts: The Art of Allocating Taxes and Transfers
3.1 Methods
3.1.1 Direct Identification
3.1.2 Inference
3.1.3 Imputation
3.1.4 Simulation
3.1.5 Prediction
3.1.6 Alternate Survey
3.1.7 Secondary Sources
3.2 Constructing Market Income and Market Income plus Pensions
3.2.1 Grossing Up
3.2.2 Negative Farm, Business, and Self-Employed Incomes
3.2.3 Imputed Rent for Owner-Occupied Housing
3.2.4 Value of Production for Own Consumption
3.3 Constructing Gross Income
3.4 Constructing Taxable Income
3.5 Constructing Net Market Income
3.6 Constructing Disposable Income
3.7 Constructing Consumable Income
3.7.1 Subtract Indirect Taxes
3.7.2 Add Indirect Subsidies
3.8 Constructing Final Income
3.8.1 Add In-Kind Transfers
3.8.2 Education
3.8.3 Health
3.8.4 Additional Concerns for In-Kind Transfers
4. Construction of Income Concepts in Practice: Additional Methodological Challenges
4.1 Using Consumption Instead of Income
4.2 Underestimation of Beneficiaries
4.3 Discrepancies between Survey and Administrative Data
4.4 Tax Expenditures
4.5 When the Year of the Survey Does Not Match the Year of Interest of the Analysis
4.6 Infrastructure and Other Public Goods
4.7 Additional Sensitivity Analyses
5. Completing Section C of the CEQ Master Workbook
Appendix 6A. Comparing the Definitions of Income Concepts between the United Nations' Canberra Group Handbook on Household Income Statistics. 2011 and the CEQ Handbook, Vol. 1
1. Income Definitions, Concepts, and Components
2. Methodology
Appendix 6B. EUROMOD: The Tax-Benefit Microsimulation Model for the European Union
Appendix 6C. LATAX: A Multi-Country Flexible Tax Microsimulation Model
Appendix 6D. Correcting for Underestimating Number of Beneficiaries
Appendix 6E. Definition of Household: Sensitivity Tests
Appendix 6F. Comparing Methods to Estimate the Value of Public Health Spending to Its Beneficiaries
1. Average Cost
1.1 Average Cost and Actual Use
1.2 Average Cost and Insurance Value
2. Willingness to Pay
3. Health Outcomes
4. Financial Risk Protection
Appendix 6G. The CEQ Master Workbook: Contents
Chapter 7. Constructing Consumable Income: Including the Direct and Indirect Effects of Indirect Taxes and Subsidies
Introduction
1. Direct Impacts of Subsidies and Taxes
1.1 Inelastic Demand
1.2 Homothetic Preferences
2. Indirect Impacts of Subsidies and Taxes
3. Theory: The Price-Shifting Model
4. Methods for Generating Indirect Effects of Indirect Taxes
4.1 Practical Solutions for Indirect Effects
4.2 Estimating Indirect Impacts with Stata
5. Example Calculations: Steps 1 and 6-7
6. Taxes versus Subsidies
7. Relaxing Model Constraints
8. Summary and Conclusion
Appendix 7A. Dealing with Taxes on Intermediate Stages of Production and Consumption
Chapter 8. Producing Indicators and Results, and Completing Sections D and E of the CEQ Master Workbook© Using the CEQ Stata Package
Introduction
1. Basic Concepts
1.1 Core Income Concepts
1.2 Fiscal Interventions
1.3 Income Components
1.4 Extended Income Concepts
1.5 Initial Income
1.6 End Income
1.7 Prefiscal Income
1.8 Postfiscal Income
1.9 Marginal Contribution
1.10 Progressivity and Pro-Poorness
1.11 Deciles
1.12 Poverty Lines
1.12.1 PPP Conversions Using 2005 ICP
1.12.2 PPP Conversions Using 2011 ICP
1.13 Income Groups
1.14 Sampling Weights and Stratification
2. The CEQ Master Workbook Sections D and E
2.1 Structure
2.2 Indicators
2.2.1 Inequality
2.2.2 Inequality of Opportunity
2.2.3 Poverty
2.2.4 Fiscal Impoverishment
2.2.5 Fiscal Gains of the Poor
2.2.6 Effectiveness Indicators
2.2.7 Progressivity Measures
2.2.8 Vertical and Horizontal Equity
2.2.9 Incidence and Concentration
2.2.10 Income Distribution
2.2.11 Fiscal Profiles
2.2.12 Concentration and Kakwani Coefficients
2.2.13 Coverage, Errors of Exclusion, Errors of Inclusion, and Errors of Social Programs
2.2.14 Fiscal Mobility Matrices
2.2.15 Education Enrollment Rates
2.2.16 Infrastructure Access
2.2.17 Sociodemographic Characteristics
2.2.18 Lorenz Curves
2.2.19 Concentration Curves
2.2.20 Cumulative Distribution Functions of Income
2.2.21 Comparison over Time
2.2.22 Descriptive Statistics
2.2.23 Population
2.2.24 Statistical Significance
2.2.25 Dominance Tests
2.2.26 Marginal Contributions to Inequality
2.2.27 Marginal Contributions to Poverty
2.2.28 Marginal Contributions to Vertical Equity and Reranking
2.2.29 Covariance
2.2.30 Assumption Testing
3. CEQ Stata Package
3.1 Preliminaries
3.2 Structure and Options
3.2.1 Income Concept Options
3.2.2 Fiscal Intervention Options
3.2.3 PPP Conversion Options
3.2.4 Survey Information Options
3.2.5 Poverty Line Options
3.2.6 Income Group Cut-Off Options
3.2.7 Produce a Subset of Results
3.2.8 Export Directly to the CEQ MWB
3.2.9 Option to Ignore Missing Values
3.2.10 Option to Allow Calculations of Indicators with Negative Values
3.3 Specific Commands
3.3.1 ceqdes
3.3.2 ceqpop
3.3.3 ceqextpop
3.3.4 ceqlorenz
3.3.5 ceqiop
3.3.6 ceqfi
3.3.7 ceqstatsig
3.3.8 ceqdom
3.3.9 ceqef
3.3.10 ceqconc
3.3.11 ceqfiscal
3.3.12 ceqextend
3.3.13 ceqmarg
3.3.14 ceqefext
3.3.15 ceqcov
3.3.16 ceqextsig
3.3.17 ceqdomext
3.3.18 ceqcoverage
3.3.19 ceqtarget
3.3.20 ceqeduc
3.3.21 ceqinfra
3.3.22 ceqhhchar
3.3.23 ceqindchar
3.3.24 ceqgraph
3.3.25 ceqassump
Chapter 9. Analyzing the Impact of Fiscal Policy on Ethno-Racial Inequality
Introduction
1. Background Information
1.1 Sheet F1. Key Assumptions
1.2 Sheet F2. Ethno-Racial Definitions
1.3 Sheet F3. Ethno-Racial Populations
1.4 Sheet F4. Linked Information
2. Results
2.1 Sheet F5. Population Composition
2.2 Sheet F6. Income Distribution
2.3 Sheet F7. Summary Poverty Rates
2.4 Sheet F8. Summary Poverty Gap Rates
2.5 Sheet F9. Summary Poverty Gap Squared Rates
2.6 Sheet F10. Summary Inequality Indicators
2.7 Sheet F11. Mean Incomes
2.8 Sheet F12. Incidence by Decile
2.9 Sheet F13. Incidence by Income Group
2.10 Sheet F14. Cross-Race Incidence
2.11 Sheet F15. Horizontal Equity
2.12 Sheet F16. Fiscal Profile
2.13 Sheet F17. Coverage Rates (Total Population)
2.14 Sheet F18. Coverage Rates (Target Population)
2.15 Sheet F19. Leakages
2.16 Sheet F20. Mobility Matrices
2.17 Sheet F21. Education (Totals)
2.18 Sheet F22. Education (Rates)
2.19 Sheet F23. Infrastructure Access
2.20 Sheet F24. Theil Decomposition
2.21 Sheet F25. Inequality of Opportunity
2.22 Sheet F26. Significance
Part III. Applications Included in First Edition
Chapter 10. Fiscal Policy, Income Redistribution, and Poverty Reduction in Low-and Middle-Income Countries
Introduction
1. Taxes and Public Spending: Levels and Composition
2. Fiscal Policy and Inequality
3. Measuring the Marginal Contribution of Taxes and Transfers
4. Is There Evidence of a Robin Hood Paradox?
5. Redistributive Effect: A Comparison with Advanced Countries
6. Fiscal Policy and the Poor
7. Education and Health Spending
8. Conclusions
Chapter 11. Argentina: Taxes, Expenditures, Poverty, and Income Distribution
Introduction
1. The Fiscal System in Argentina: Taxes and Expenditures
1.1 Direct Taxes
1.2 Indirect Taxes
1.3 Flagship Cash Transfer Program: The Universal Allowance per Child
1.4 Noncontributory Pensions
1.5 Other Cash and Near-Cash Transfers
1.6 Subsidies
1.7 Education and Health
2. Data Sources and Methodological Assumptions
3. Main Results
3.1 Impact on Inequality and Poverty
3.2 Coverage and Effectiveness of Direct Transfers
3.4 Progressivity
3.5 Poverty
3.6 Fiscal Mobility
4. Conclusions
Chapter 12. Brazil: Fiscal Policy and Ethno-Racial Poverty and Inequality
Introduction
1. Methodology
1.1 Definitions and Measurements
1.2 Social Spending and Taxation in Brazil
1.3 Data
2. Results
2.1 Inequality
2.2 Poverty
3. Conclusions
Chapter 13. Chile: The Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty
Introduction
1. Social Spending and Taxes in Chile
2. Methodology, Data, and Assumptions
3. Main Results
3.1 Redistributive Effects of Chile's Fiscal System
3.2 Fiscal Redistribution in Chile: A Comparative Perspective
4. Conclusions
Appendix 13A. Marginal Contributions to Inequality by End Income Concept, Concentration Coefficients, and Kakwani Indexes for All Fiscal Interventions
Chapter 14. The Dominican Republic: Fiscal Policy, Income Redistribution, and Poverty Reduction
Introduction
1. Methodology and Sources of Information
1.1 CEQ Methodology
1.2 Data Sources
1.3 Main Assumptions
2. Main Results
2.1 The Redistributional Impact of Taxes
2.1.1 Direct Taxes
2.1.2 Indirect Taxes
2.2 Social Spending in the Dominican Republic
2.2.1 Direct Transfers
2.2.2 Indirect Subsidies
2.2.3 In-Kind Transfers: Education and Health
3. Net Impact of the Fiscal System on Income Redistribution in the Dominican Republic
3.1 Fiscal Policy Instruments, Poverty, and Inequality
3.2 Is Fiscal Policy More or Less Redistributive and Pro-Poor than in Other Countries
3.3 Income Redistribution: Vertical and Horizontal Equity and Effectiveness Indicators
3.4 Resource Needs to Fill In Coverage Gaps
4. Options for Enhancing the Equity Outcomes of Fiscal Policy in the Dominican Republic
4.1 Alternative VAT Scenarios for a Fiscal Impact Pact
4.2 Policy Options and Conclusion
Appendix 14A. Structure of Revenue and Expenditure
Chapter 15. El Salvador: The Impact of Taxes and Social Spending on Inequality and Poverty
Introduction
1. Taxes and Public Spending
1.1 Fiscal Revenue: Taxes and Contribution Fees
1.1.1 Income Tax
1.1.2 Value-Added Tax
1.1.3 Special Fees: Fuel
1.1.4 Contributions to Social Security (Health)
1.2 Social Spending
1.2.1 Social Programs
1.2.2 Cash Transfers
1.2.3 Direct Transfers In-Kind
1.3 Subsidies
1.3.1 Electricity
1.3.2 Water
1.3.3 Public Transportation
1.4 Social Services: In-Kind Transfers
1.4.1 Education
1.4.2 Health
1.4.3 Women's City
1.4.4 Contributory Pensions
2. Data
3. Methodology
3.1 Market Income
3.2 Disposable Income
3.3 Consumable Income
3.4 Final Income
4. Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty
4.1 Coverage and Leakages
5. Conclusions
6. Recommendations
Appendix 15A. Estimating the Incidence of Consumption Subsidies
1. Electricity Subsidy
2. Public Transportation Subsidy
3. Water Subsidy
4. LP Gas Subsidy
Chapter 16. Ghana and Tanzania: The Impact of Reforming Energy Subsidies, Cash Transfers, and Taxes on Inequality and Poverty
Introduction
1. Examples
1.1 Eliminating Energy Subsidies
1.2 Expanding Conditional Cash Transfers
2. Making Taxation More Progressive
Chapter 17. Fiscal Policy, Inequality, and Poverty in Iran: Assessing the Impact and Effectiveness of Taxes and Transfers
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. Overview of Iran's Fiscal System and the Taxes and Transfers Included in This Analysis
3. Methodology and Data
4. Results
4.1 Contribution of Fiscal Interventions to Changes in Inequality and Poverty
4.2 Alternative Scenarios for Implementation of the "Targeted Subsidy Program"
5. Conclusion
Chapter 18. Tunisia: Fiscal Policy, Income Redistribution, and Poverty Reduction
Introduction
1. Taxation and Social Spending in Tunisia
1.1 Taxation
1.1.1 Personal Income Tax
1.1.2 Social Security Contributions
1.1.3 Indirect Taxes
1.1.4 Corporate Taxes
1.2 Social Spending
1.2.1 Direct Transfers
1.2.2 Indirect Subsidies
1.2.3 In-Kind Transfers
2. Methodology and Data
3. Main Assumptions
4. The Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty
4.1 Who Benefits from Direct Transfers and Subsidies and Who Bears the Burden of Taxes?
5. Conclusions
Chapter 19. Uganda: The Impact of Taxes, Transfers, and Subsidies on Inequality and Poverty
Introduction
1. Social Spending and Taxation in Uganda
1.1 Social Spending and Subsidies
1.1.1 In-Kind Transfers
1.1.2 Direct Transfers
1.1.3 Indirect Subsidies
1.2 Revenues
1.2.1 Taxes
1.3 International Perspective on Fiscal Magnitudes and Composition
2. Methods and Data
2.1 Methodological Summary
2.2 Data Sources
2.3 Allocation Assumptions
2.3.1 Personal Income Taxes
2.3.2 Simulated Direct Transfers
2.3.3 VAT, Excise, and Fuel Excise: Based on Expenditure Records
2.3.4 Electricity and Water Subsidies
2.3.5 Agricultural Input Subsidy
2.3.6 In-Kind Transfers
3. Results
3.1 Does Fiscal Policy Have an Impact on Inequality and Poverty?
3.2 How Many Ugandans Are Impoverished by Taxes, Transfers, and Subsidies?
3.3 How Many Poor Ugandans Experience Income Gains via Fiscal Expenditures?
3.4 Market to Disposable Income: Pensions, Personal Income Taxes, and Direct Transfers
3.5 Disposable to Final Income: Indirect Taxes and Subsidies, In-Kind Health, and Education Expenditures
3.6 Redistribution, Reranking, and the Total Impact on Inequality
4. Conclusions and Policy Implications
Chapter 20. China: The Impact of Taxes and Transfers on Income Inequality, Poverty, and the Urban-Rural and Regional Income Gaps in China
Introduction
1. Methodology
1.1 Fiscal Incidence Analysis: Construction of Income Concepts
1.2 Decomposition of Theil Index
2. Data and Assumptions
2.1 Data
2.2 Allocation of Taxes and Social Spending: Assumptions
2.2.1 Taxes
2.2.2 Social Spending
3. Main Findings
3.1 Size of Taxes and Government Spending
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Impact on Inequality
3.2.2 Impact on Poverty
4. Conclusion
Appendix 20A. The Fiscal System in China
Appendix 20B. Consumption Tax Rate
Chapter 21. Argentina: Fiscal Policy, Income Redistribution and Poverty Reduction in Argentina
Introduction
1. Fiscal Incidence Analysis: Methodological Highlights
2. Description of the Argentine fiscal system
2.1 Tax Revenues
2.2 Expenditures
2.2.1 Pensions
2.2.2 Other Direct Transfers
2.2.3 Indirect Subsidies
2.2.4 In-Kind Transfers
3. Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Tax Allocation
3.2.2 Pensions as Deferred Income or Government Transfer (PDI or PGT)
3.2.3 Public Spending Allocation
4. Results
4.1 The Impact of Fiscal Policy on Inequality and Poverty
4.2 Determinants: Size, Progressivity, and Reranking
4.3 Components of the Fiscal System: Marginal Contributions, Pro-Poorness, and Leakages to the Non-Poor
5. Conclusions
Appendix 21A. Zero Income
Appendix 21B. Methodology
Appendix 21C. Incidence
Part IV. The CEQ (Commitment to Equity) Assessment Tools
Part V. CEQ Data Center on Fiscal Redistribution
Part VI. CEQ Microsimulation Tools
About the Authors
Index
Volume 2
Title Page
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
List of Illustrations
Abstracts
Alternative Methods to Value Transfers in Kind: Health, Education, and Infrastructure
Chapter 1. The Effect of Government Health Expenditure on Income Distribution: A Comparison of Valuation Methods in Ghana
Introduction
1. What's Wrong with the Cost of Provision?
2. Using Healthcare Consumers' Choices to Estimate the Compensating Variation for Public Healthcare Expenditures
2.1 Example Application: Demand for Healthcare Consultations in Ghana
2.2 Discussion of the Revealed Preference Approach to Valuing Publicly Funded Healthcare
3. The Health Outcomes Approach
3.1 Example Application
3.2 Discussion of the Health Outcomes Approach
4. Summary: Choosing among the Options
4.1 Conceptual Validity
4.2 Comprehensiveness
4.3 Detail
4.4 Data Requirements
4.5 Ease of Use
4.6 Advice
5. Insurance Value of Financial Risk Reduction
5.1 Example Application: Financial Risk Reduction from Ghana's National Health Insurance Scheme
5.2 Discussion of Methods to Value Financial Risk Reduction
6. Conclusion
Appendix 1A
1. Using the Spectrum Policy Models Software
2. Financial Risk Protection with Consumption Floor Proportional to Income
3. Concentration Curves by Valuation Method
4. Using Willingness and Ability to Pay by Matching Publicly Funded Health Services to Private Health Services
4.1 Example Application
4.2 Discussion of Public/Private Matching
5. Data and Do-Files for Replication
Chapter 2. The Market Value of Public Education: A Comparison of Three Valuation Methods
Introduction
1. First Method: Schooling Is Worth What It Costs the State to Provide It
2. Second Method: Schooling Is Worth What the Labor Market Says It Is Worth
3. Third Method: Schooling Is Worth What the Private Education Market Says It Is Worth
4. Comparison of Results
5. Conclusion
Chapter 3. Redistribution through Education: Assessing the Long-Term Impact of Public Spending
Introduction
1. The Conceptual Framework
2. The Value of Public Education Spending to Its Beneficiaries
2.1 Cost of Provision as a Proxy for Benefits
2.2 Incorporating Behavioral Responses
2.2.1 Public Subsidies and the Demand for Education
2.2.2 Long-Term Impacts of Education
2.3 Long-Term Distributional Effects of Public Spending in Education
3. Chile and Ghana: Differences and Similarities
3.1 Data Sources
3.1.1 Chile
3.1.2 Ghana
3.2 Educational Attainment Levels
3.3 Costs of Education
3.4 Summary Statistics
4. Empirical Analysis
4.1 The Cost of Provision Approach
4.2 Behavioral Responses in Practice
4.2.1 Approach 1: Aggregate Enrollment and Public Spending
4.2.2 Approach 2: Individual-Level Analysis
4.3 Human Capital and Earnings Profiles
4.4 Benefits versus Costs
4.5 Assessing the Long-Term Impact of Public Spending on Inequality
5. Conclusions
Appendix 3A. Dynamic Fiscal Incidence of Public Spending in Education
1. The Recursive Problem
2. Intertemporal Fiscal Incidence Analysis
Appendix 3B. Instrumental Variable
Chapter 4. The Market Value of Owner-Occupied Housing and Public Infrastructure Services
Introduction
1. Literature
2. Methodology
3. Imputing Rents and Public Infrastructure Services for 2015
4. Comparisons with 2005 and 1995
5. Conclusions
Fiscal Incidence of Corporate Taxes
Chapter 5. Taxes, Transfers, and Income Distribution in Chile: Incorporating Undistributed Profits
Introduction
1. Tax Regime and Social Spending in Chile
1.1 Tax Regime
1.1.1 Direct Taxes
1.1.2 Indirect Taxes
1.2 Social Spending
1.2.1 Social Protection System
1.2.2 Pension System
1.2.3 Education System
1.2.4 Health System
2. Data, Methodology, and Assumptions
2.1 Data
2.2 Construction of the Main Concepts of Income
2.2.1 Market Income
2.2.2 Net Market Income
2.2.3 Disposable Income
2.2.4 Consumable Income
2.2.5 Final Income
3. Results
4. Marginal Contribution and Shapley Value
4.1 Formalization
4.2 Application
5. Distributive Effects of the 2014 Tax Reform
6. Conclusions
Redistributive Impact of Contributory Pensions
Chapter 6. The Within-System Redistribution of Contributory Pension Systems: A Conceptual Framework and Empirical Method of Estimation
Introduction
1. Are Pension Systems Tax-Transfers or Deferred Wages Schemes?
2. Redistribution, Neutrality, and Actuarial Fairness
3. Social Security Pensions in Argentina
4. How Redistribution Works for Social Security Pensions in Argentina
4.1 Differential Mortality by Pension Income, 2015-16
4.2 Preliminary Estimates of Redistribution
5. An Alternative Methodological Framework
6. Conclusion
Fiscal Redistribution and Sustainability
Chapter 7. Intertemporal Sustainability of Fiscal Redistribution: A Methodological Framework
Introduction
1. Income Concepts, Fiscal Redistributions, and Sustainability
1.1 CEQ Income Concepts
1.2 Public Wealth Constraint
1.3 Fiscal Sustainability
1.4 Natural Resource Rents, Wealth, and Fiscal Redistributions
2. Fiscal Redistributions, Demography, and Wealth Constraints
2.1 The Lifecycle Deficit
2.2 Fiscal Redistributions and Cohorts
2.3 Wealth Constraints and Lifecycle Wealth
2.3.1 Cohorts' Savings and Wealth
2.3.2 Aggregation and the Macroeconomy
3. Fiscal Redistributions and Income Strata
3.1 Integrating Distribution and Demography
4. Concluding Remarks
Appendix 7A. Pensions as Deferred Income
1. Income Strata and Deferred Income
2. Private Wealth and Forced Savings
3. Demography and Wealth
Appendix 7B. Nomenclature
Chapter 8. Fiscal Redistribution, Sustainability, and Demography in Latin America
Introduction
1. Fiscal Policy and Redistribution Outcomes
1.1 Fiscal Redistribution, Primary Balance, and Fiscal Space
1.2 The Structure of Fiscal Redistribution in 16 Latin American Countries
1.3 Fiscal Redistribution and Distributive Impact
2. Fiscal Redistributions and Debt Sustainability
3. The Future Sustainability of Fiscal Policy in Aging Societies
3.1 On the Demographic Transition in Latin America
3.2 The Impact of the Demographic Transition on the Fiscal Redistribution Structure
3.3 Simulations with Fixed-Age Profiles
3.4 The Impact of Demographic-Driven Changes on Fiscal Space and Distribution
4. Conclusion
Political Economy of Redistribution
Chapter 9. On the Political Economy of Redistribution and Provision of Public Goods
Introduction
1. The Meltzer and Richard (1981) Pure Redistribution Model
2. Assumptions of Linear Tax Rates and the Importance of Public Provision
3. The Provision of Public Goods Using a Median Voter Framework
4. Extension to Nonlinear Tax Schemes
4.1 Gouveia and Oliver (1996)
4.2 Consequences of a Flat Tax with Exemption on Changes in Inequality
5. The Provision of Public Goods Financed with a Flat Tax with Exemptions
5.1 Empirical Patterns
5.2 Theoretical Model
6. Taxation and Redistribution Models without Functional Form Assumptions
7. Conclusion
Appendix 9A. Technical Derivations of the Meltzer and Richard (1981) Model
1. Response of Consumption to Government Transfers
2. Response of Pretax Income to Productivity
Appendix 9B. Technical Derivations of Lambert (2001
About the Authors
Index

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