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Reimagining Established Institutions

If the problem is that the interests of future generations are inadequately considered by democratic institutions, can this tendency towards short-termism be 'designed out'? Can we purposely reshape democratic institutions so that future generations are given due weight in decision-making? This chapter considers modifications to the structure and practices of two long-established and defining institutions of democracy: the legislature and the constitution. In considering the redesign of these institutions, we are interested in how structures and practices might encourage decision makers to consider the future in their political judgements.

Many of the design propositions that I discuss in this chapter remain thought experiments - proposals that have not made it off the drawing board. In a few instances, we can learn from the practice of actually existing institutions. The aim of this chapter - and of those that follow - is to consider the extent to which the design of democratic institutions can be effective in altering the temporal orientation of political judgements. To what extent can restructuring institutions ameliorate the different drivers of democratic myopia? In designing institutions, we need to be cognisant of the effect that this can have on their democratic legitimacy. The danger is that altering institutional structures and practices might undermine democratic credentials. Similarly, we need to assess the feasibility of proposals more broadly - not least how practical it is to envisage the institutionalisation of reforms.1

The legislature

For contemporary representative democracy, the legislature plays a critical role in legitimising the political system as a whole. The legislature is the body that embeds the principle of political equality, at least formally. Any citizen has the right to stand for election to the legislative assembly. Every citizen has the same power in the selection of representatives: one person, one vote. In practice, of course, political equality is far from realised. Only members of major political parties have a realistic chance of electoral success. We end up with a political class that tends to share similar social backgrounds. The structure of the electoral system affects the relative influence of voters on the composition of the legislature. The general rule is that more proportional systems provide for a wider range of political parties to represent different social interests and ensure that votes are closer to equal weight. Alan Jacob's work on the implementation of pensions schemes within advanced industrial democracies suggests, perhaps counterintuitively, that the more veto points there are within a political system, the more likely it is that the system in question will deliver outcomes that are sensitive to long-term considerations.2 The combination of proportional systems, the coalition governments that typically result, and federal arrangements will tend to promote a more effective long-term governance. This is confirmed by research on environmental outcomes, although the results are not consistent across all areas.3 The suggestion is that the more consensual a political system is, the more capacity it displays for dealing with long-term policy challenges. This is only relative. Most of the time, most legislatures are driven by short-term concerns and fail to attend systematically to the long term.

Many of the drivers of democratic myopia relate to the actions of elected representatives. Relatively short electoral cycles motivate politicians to focus on policies that have a visible return before the next election, or that promise immediate returns just after. Changes in government every four to five years reduce the credibility of long-term commitments. How can politicians and voters be sure that the promises of one administration will be followed through by those that follow? The inability of future generations to stand for election or to vote means that their interests are not represented within the body. Without a social group's presence, its interests are rarely fully considered and safeguarded. The influence of interest groups on the work of elected officials reinforces the status quo. It is as if legislatures and other elected offices had been explicitly designed to undermine long-term thinking.

In rethinking legislatures, a number of design options emerge that respond to different aspects of democratic myopia. These options can be distinguished by the extent to which existing electoral rules and membership remain unchanged. Proposals either focus on the internal practices of the existing legislature, leaving membership intact, or look to more significant structural change, aiming to reform the electoral rules or the characteristics of representatives.

Parliamentary committees

The Parliamentary Committee for the Future in eduskunta (the Finnish parliament) is perhaps the best known example of reform within the current structures of a legislature.4 Established in 1993, it has gained the international profile of the first permanent parliamentary committee to have the consideration of the long term across all policy areas as its core mission. The committee is unusual in that it has no explicit legislative responsibilities: it does not scrutinise government bills. Other committees can request its advice, although this happens rarely. Its main obligation is to respond to the Government's Report on the Future, which is published once every electoral term. These reports have been on themes such as Finland's changing external environment, the country's place and role in the world, the impact of an ageing population, realising carbon neutrality, sustainable growth, and the future of work. This scrutiny function places the committee in dialogue with the government. While the Report on the Future and the committee's response to it come rather late in any government's term, they can have an agenda-setting effect on the governments that follow. Outside this required function, the committee is free to determine its own agenda and practices. Most of its time is taken up by its own inquiries. The reports that emerge have relatively little impact on the everyday activity of eduskunta.

The committee's independence from the legislative timetable and tendency to select less politically controversial issues for its inquiries have led to a comparatively non-partisan, deliberative, and consensual style of working. This has contributed to the longevity of the committee. It is no threat to the work of the government, political parties, or other committees. Even though the immediate impact of the committee is limited, its different way of working and its more strategic orientation ensure continued interest among parliamentarians in being members of it. The committee is recognised as an important training ground for politicians in their early career. Significant individuals, including prime ministers, have credited the time they served on the committee with opening their eyes about long-term challenges and shaping their thinking in this area.

Other countries have adopted committees with similar characteristics; the Parliamentary Advisory Council on Sustainable Development in the Bundestag is one such example. It is not clear why the German parliamentary committee has not achieved a status similar to that of its Finnish counterpart. One possible combination of explanatory factors is the relatively small size of eduskunta, the relatively consensual style of Finnish politics, and the way in which the structure and practices of the Finnish committee promote cross-party deliberation. The explicit focus on the future rather than on sustainable development is also a potential explanatory factor. 'Sustainable development' can be interpreted as a more politically loaded term, in which environmental considerations are given priority.

The Foundation for Democracy and Sustainable Development (FDSD) has made the case for a Committee for Future Generations in the House of Lords in the United Kingdom.5 This is a very specific legislative context: a rare legislative body with appointed members that does not work under the constraints normally generated by elections. The potential to take a longer term view by comparison with the elected House of Commons is a common justification for the existence of this non-elected chamber. At present the House of Lords has no internal infrastructure to express that function systematically. FDSD argues that a Committee for Future Generations should be given a more prominent legislative function than we see in the Finnish model - namely the right to scrutinise any legislation that the committee deems may have significant impact on future generations. Whether this risks the politicisation that the Finnish committee has avoided is an open question. Party discipline is weaker in the unelected House of Lords, and committees less partisan and more consensual. The Well-Being of Future Generations Bill that has been proposed in the United Kingdom makes the case for a cross-parliamentary 'committee for the future', which would consist of members of both Houses.6 Institutional design faces the challenge of balancing the desire for a non-partisan culture against the potential to impact the legislative process.

The Scottish Futures Forum, established in 2005, draws inspiration from the Finnish committee, although it takes a very different form. The forum views itself as the independent...