1 - Preface [Seite 5]
2 - List of abbreviations [Seite 16]
3 - A. Introduction [Seite 21]
3.1 - 1. Background [Seite 21]
3.2 - 2. Terminology [Seite 21]
3.2.1 - 2.1. Tax evasion [Seite 21]
3.2.2 - 2.2. Tax avoidance and tax mitigation [Seite 22]
3.3 - 3. Scope of the study [Seite 24]
3.3.1 - 3.1. Point of departure [Seite 24]
3.3.2 - 3.2. Bringing GAARs into play [Seite 25]
3.4 - 4. The comparative approach and the research question [Seite 26]
3.5 - 5. Structure of the study [Seite 29]
4 - B. Judicial anti-avoidance [Seite 30]
4.1 - 1. Introduction [Seite 30]
4.2 - 2. Judicial anti-avoidance in Germany [Seite 31]
4.2.1 - 2.1. Introduction [Seite 31]
4.2.2 - 2.2. The traditional view: Formal and literal interpretation [Seite 32]
4.2.3 - 2.3.Major tax reform [Seite 33]
4.2.3.1 - 2.3.1. Adoption of the "economic perspective" and introduction of a GAAR [Seite 33]
4.2.3.2 - 2.3.2. Consequences of the reform [Seite 35]
4.2.3.2.1 - 2.3.2.1. Counteracting abuse using the GAAR [Seite 35]
4.2.3.2.2 - 2.3.2.2. Counteracting abuse by way of interpretation (and other means) [Seite 36]
4.2.3.2.3 - 2.3.2.3. The tax reform was successful [Seite 39]
4.2.4 - 2.4. Further development [Seite 39]
4.2.4.1 - 2.4.1. National Socialist excesses under the guise of statutory interpretation [Seite 39]
4.2.4.2 - 2.4.2. Developments after 1945: (re-)adoption of the "economic perspective" [Seite 41]
4.2.4.3 - 2.4.3. The "economic perspective" as a means of teleological interpretation [Seite 42]
4.2.4.4 - 2.4.4. The status quo: Sec 42 Fiscal Code [Seite 44]
4.2.4.4.1 - 2.4.4.1. Introduction in 1977 [Seite 44]
4.2.4.4.2 - 2.4.4.2. Amendment in 2001 [Seite 45]
4.2.4.4.3 - 2.4.4.3. Amendment in 2008 and present state [Seite 45]
4.2.4.5 - 2.5. The legal relevance of Sec 42 Fiscal Code [Seite 47]
4.2.4.5.1 - 2.5.1. Two ways to deal with abuse [Seite 47]
4.2.4.5.2 - 2.5.2. The concept of Innentheorie [Seite 48]
4.2.4.5.3 - 2.5.3. The concept of Außentheorie [Seite 50]
4.2.4.5.4 - 2.5.4. Tax law and the mechanism of analogy [Seite 50]
4.2.4.5.5 - 2.5.5. More than just two theories [Seite 52]
4.2.4.6 - 2.5.6. Regarding the controversy and function of Sec 42 Fiscal Code [Seite 55]
4.3 - 3. Judicial anti-avoidance in the UK [Seite 59]
4.3.1 - 3.1. Introduction [Seite 59]
4.3.2 - 3.2. The traditional view: Literalism and formalism (The Duke of Westminster) [Seite 59]
4.3.2.1 - 3.2.1. The pillars of the Duke of Westminster [Seite 59]
4.3.2.2 - 3.2.2. The Duke of Westminster [Seite 61]
4.3.2.3 - 3.2.3. The Duke of Westminster put to the test [Seite 63]
4.3.2.4 - 3.2.4. Literal interpretation and form vs. substance: A myth is born [Seite 65]
4.3.3 - 3.3. The interim view: The uncertainty of Ramsay [Seite 67]
4.3.3.1 - 3.3.1. Initial remarks [Seite 67]
4.3.3.2 - 3.3.2. Artificial, circular and self-cancelling transactions: W.T. Ramsay Ltd. v IRC [Seite 68]
4.3.3.2.1 - 3.3.2.1. Facts of the case and the taxpayer's view [Seite 68]
4.3.3.2.2 - 3.3.2.2. Two ways to deal with the case [Seite 68]
4.3.3.2.3 - 3.3.2.3. The House of Lords' approach [Seite 69]
4.3.3.2.4 - 3.3.2.4. The House of Lords' alternative suggestion [Seite 70]
4.3.3.3 - 3.3.3. Ramsay confirmed: IRC v Burmah Oil [Seite 71]
4.3.3.3.1 - 3.3.3.1. Facts of the case and the taxpayer's view [Seite 71]
4.3.3.3.2 - 3.3.3.2. The House of Lords' approach [Seite 72]
4.3.3.4 - 3.3.4. Step transaction test: Furniss v Dawson [Seite 74]
4.3.3.4.1 - 3.3.4.1. Facts of the case and starting situation [Seite 74]
4.3.3.4.2 - 3.3.4.2. Ramsay as a transaction based anti-avoidance approach [Seite 74]
4.3.3.4.3 - 3.3.4.3. The impacts of Furniss v Dawson [Seite 76]
4.3.3.5 - 3.3.5. Ramsay at a dead end: Craven v White [Seite 77]
4.3.3.5.1 - 3.3.5.1. Facts of the cases [Seite 77]
4.3.3.5.2 - 3.3.5.2. Limiting the impacts of Ramsay [Seite 78]
4.3.3.5.3 - 3.3.5.3. Ramsay as an approach to statutory construction? [Seite 79]
4.3.4 - 3.4. The status quo: Ramsay as an approach to statutory interpretation [Seite 79]
4.3.4.1 - 3.4.1. The rediscovery of statutory construction: McGuckian v IRC [Seite 79]
4.3.4.1.1 - 3.4.1.1. Facts of the case and the taxpayer's view [Seite 79]
4.3.4.1.2 - 3.4.1.2. The House of Lords' approach [Seite 80]
4.3.4.2 - 3.4.2. Ramsay as a principle of statutory construction: MacNiven v Westmoreland [Seite 83]
4.3.4.2.1 - 3.4.2.1. Facts of the case and the taxpayer's view [Seite 83]
4.3.4.2.2 - 3.4.2.2. The House of Lords' approach [Seite 83]
4.3.4.3 - 3.4.3. Ramsay as a principle of statutory construction confirmed: BMBF [Seite 85]
4.3.4.3.1 - 3.4.3.1. Facts of the case and the taxpayer's view [Seite 85]
4.3.4.3.2 - 3.4.3.2. The House of Lords' approach [Seite 86]
4.3.4.4 - 3.4.4. Statutory construction can be difficult [Seite 88]
4.3.4.4.1 - 3.4.4.1. Making use of various methods of interpretation [Seite 88]
4.3.4.4.2 - 3.4.4.2. Mayes v HMRC ("SHIPS 2") as a reason for the introduction of the GAAR [Seite 91]
4.3.4.4.3 - 3.4.4.3. HMRC v DCC Holdings: What if? [Seite 95]
4.4 - 4. Judicial anti-avoidance in the EU [Seite 97]
4.4.1 - 4.1. Introduction [Seite 97]
4.4.2 - 4.2. Development of an abuse test [Seite 99]
4.4.2.1 - 4.2.1. Emsland Stärke [Seite 99]
4.4.2.2 - 4.2.2. Was it necessary to set up an abuse test? [Seite 100]
4.4.2.2.1 - 4.2.2.1. The pillars of Emsland Stärke [Seite 100]
4.4.2.2.2 - 4.2.2.2. Different approaches? [Seite 104]
4.4.2.2.3 - 4.2.2.3. There was no need to set up an abuse test in Emsland Stärke [Seite 106]
4.4.2.3 - 4.2.3. Implications of the abuse test [Seite 106]
4.4.2.3.1 - 4.2.3.1. No influence in the short run [Seite 106]
4.4.2.3.2 - 4.2.3.2. No influence in the short run also in the field of VAT [Seite 110]
4.4.2.3.3 - 4.2.3.3. Very influential in the long run [Seite 112]
4.4.3 - 4.3. Abuse in the field of VAT [Seite 114]
4.4.3.1 - 4.3.1. Halifax [Seite 114]
4.4.3.1.1 - 4.3.1.1. Facts of the case and questions referred to the Court [Seite 114]
4.4.3.1.2 - 4.3.1.2. Adopting the abuse test in the field of VAT [Seite 114]
4.4.3.1.3 - 4.3.1.3.There was no need to adopt the abuse test [Seite 115]
4.4.3.1.4 - 4.3.1.4. Implications of the objective test [Seite 117]
4.4.3.1.5 - 4.3.1.5. Implications of the subjective test [Seite 118]
4.4.3.2 - 4.3.2. Cases adopting the Halifax abuse test [Seite 119]
4.4.3.2.1 - 4.3.2.1. Part Service and Weald Leasing [Seite 119]
4.4.3.2.2 - 4.3.2.2. Objective test and tax advantage [Seite 121]
4.4.3.2.3 - 4.3.2.3. Subjective test [Seite 122]
4.4.3.2.4 - 4.3.2.4. Legal consequences [Seite 124]
4.4.3.3 - 4.3.3. New focus: Wholly artificial arrangements in the field of VAT [Seite 124]
4.4.3.3.1 - 4.3.3.1. Change of focus [Seite 124]
4.4.3.3.2 - 4.3.3.2. Wholly artificial arrangements in respect of the relevant statute [Seite 125]
4.4.4 - 4.4. Abuse in the field of direct taxation [Seite 129]
4.4.4.1 - 4.4.1. Cadbury Schweppes [Seite 129]
4.4.4.1.1 - 4.4.1.1. Facts of the case and questions referred to the Court [Seite 129]
4.4.4.1.1.1 - 4.4.1.2. Question of justification or question of scope? [Seite 130]
4.4.4.1.1.2 - 4.4.1.3. Preventing the creation of "wholly artificial arrangements" [Seite 133]
4.4.4.1.1.3 - 4.4.1.4. Proportionality of the restriction and no subjective test [Seite 134]
4.4.4.1.2 - 4.4.2. Shifting the emphasis towards proportionality [Seite 138]
4.4.4.1.3 - 4.4.3. Bringing Halifax and Cadbury Schweppes together [Seite 139]
4.4.4.1.4 - 4.4.4. Further development of the case law [Seite 140]
4.4.4.1.5 - 4.4.5. New focus: Wholly artificial arrangements in primary law [Seite 142]
4.4.4.1.5.1 - 4.4.5.1. Requirements for a restriction to be proportional [Seite 142]
4.4.4.1.5.2 - 4.4.5.2. The Court's approach in Cadbury Schweppes and Thin Cap [Seite 143]
4.4.4.1.5.3 - 4.4.5.3. The Court's approach in further cases [Seite 144]
4.4.5 - 4.5. A uniform concept of abuse? [Seite 148]
5 - C. Comparison of the GAARs [Seite 151]
5.1 - 1. Introduction [Seite 151]
5.2 - 2. The way to the GAARs and identifying common elements [Seite 152]
5.2.1 - 2.1. The way to the GAAR in Germany [Seite 152]
5.2.1.1 - 2.1.1. The GAAR has a long lasting history [Seite 152]
5.2.1.2 - 2.1.2. Statutory requirements and the courts' approach [Seite 152]
5.2.2 - 2.2. The way to the GAAR in the UK [Seite 154]
5.2.2.1 - 2.2.1. The failed attempt to introduce a GAAR in the late 1990s [Seite 154]
5.2.2.2 - 2.2.2. Aaronson Report [Seite 155]
5.2.2.2.1 - 2.2.2.1. Background of the Aaronson Report [Seite 155]
5.2.2.2.2 - 2.2.2.2. Main findings of the Aaronson Report [Seite 156]
5.2.2.2.3 - 2.2.2.3. General Anti-Avoidance Rule or General Anti-Abuse rule? [Seite 158]
5.2.2.2.4 - 2.2.2.4. Aaronson's GAAR [Seite 159]
5.2.2.3 - 2.2.3. The UK GAAR [Seite 159]
5.2.2.3.1 - 2.2.3.1. Introduction of a general anti-abuse rule [Seite 159]
5.2.2.3.2 - 2.2.3.2. Statutory requirements [Seite 160]
5.2.2.3.3 - 2.2.3.3. The importance of the GAAR Guidance [Seite 161]
5.2.3 - 2.3. The way to the GAAR in the EU [Seite 162]
5.2.3.1 - 2.3.1. The pillars of the EU GAAR [Seite 162]
5.2.3.1.1 - 2.3.1.1. CCCTB Proposal: The first EU GAAR initiative [Seite 162]
5.2.3.1.2 - 2.3.1.2. Article 80 CCCTB and the influence of the ECJ [Seite 164]
5.2.3.2 - 2.3.2. The EU GAAR [Seite 165]
5.2.3.2.1 - 2.3.2.1. Recommendation of an EU GAAR [Seite 165]
5.2.3.2.1.1 - 2.3.2.2. Requirements of the EU GAAR [Seite 165]
5.2.3.2.1.2 - 2.3.2.3. Practical importance: The EU GAAR and domestic GAARs [Seite 166]
5.2.3.2.1.3 - 2.3.2.4. Practical importance: The EU GAAR and the PSD GAAR and the BEPS GAAR [Seite 167]
5.2.4 - 2.4. Identifying common requirements [Seite 169]
5.2.4.1 - 2.4.1. Overview of the common requirements [Seite 169]
5.2.4.2 - 2.4.2. The idea behind the various requirements [Seite 170]
5.3 - 3. Arrangements covered [Seite 172]
5.4 - 4. Taxes covered [Seite 173]
5.5 - 5. Objective test [Seite 175]
5.5.1 - 5.1. Common elements [Seite 175]
5.5.2 - 5.2. The objective test in the German GAAR [Seite 176]
5.5.2.1 - 5.2.1. Starting point [Seite 176]
5.5.2.2 - 5.2.2. Leaving the application of Sec 42 Fiscal Code open [Seite 177]
5.5.2.3 - 5.2.3. Using Sec 42 Fiscal Code as a starting aid [Seite 179]
5.5.3 - 5.3. The objective test in the UK GAAR [Seite 182]
5.5.3.1 - 5.3.1. Starting point [Seite 182]
5.5.3.2 - 5.3.2. Indicators of abuse [Seite 183]
5.5.3.2.1 - 5.3.2.1. Indicators of abusive arrangements (Sec 207 (4) FA 2013) [Seite 183]
5.5.3.2.2 - 5.3.2.2. Indicator of a non-abusive arrangement (Sec 207 (5) FA 2013) [Seite 185]
5.5.3.3 - 5.3.3. Drawing the line between use and abuse: Examples of the GAAR Guidance [Seite 187]
5.5.3.4 - 5.3.4. Examples where the GAAR does not apply [Seite 187]
5.5.3.4.1 - 5.3.4.1. The arrangement is in line with the statutory requirements [Seite 187]
5.5.3.4.2 - 5.3.4.2. The "contrived or abnormal" arrangement is in line with the statutory requirements [Seite 189]
5.5.3.5 - 5.3.5. Examples where the GAAR applies on grounds of Sec 207 (2) (a) FA 2013 [Seite 191]
5.5.3.6 - 5.3.6. Examples where the GAAR applies on grounds of Sec 207 (2) (c) FA 2013 [Seite 194]
5.5.3.6.1 - 5.3.6.1. Further development of the law [Seite 194]
5.5.3.6.2 - 5.3.6.2. The GAAR and Mayes (SHIPS 2) [Seite 196]
5.5.3.6.3 - 5.3.6.3. Counteracting arrangements using the instruments of teleological reduction and analogy [Seite 197]
5.5.3.7 - 5.3.7. Lessons learnt from the examples [Seite 199]
5.5.3.7.1 - 5.3.7.1. The importance of the various GAAR elements [Seite 199]
5.5.3.7.2 - 5.3.7.2. The objective test as an approach to statutory interpretation [Seite 200]
5.5.3.7.3 - 5.3.7.3. The objective test as a reminder of having to properly interpret the law [Seite 201]
5.5.4 - 5.4. The objective test in the EU GAAR [Seite 202]
5.5.4.1 - 5.4.1. The objective test is not flawless [Seite 202]
5.5.4.2 - 5.4.2. The objective test will be applied differently [Seite 203]
5.5.5 - 5.5. Conclusion: An objective test can be valuable [Seite 205]
5.6 - 6. Subjective tests [Seite 205]
5.6.1 - 6.1. Common elements [Seite 205]
5.6.1.1 - 6.1.1. Subjectivity in the German GAAR [Seite 205]
5.6.1.2 - 6.1.2. Subjectivity in the UK GAAR [Seite 206]
5.6.1.3 - 6.1.3. Subjectivity in the EU GAAR [Seite 207]
5.6.1.3.1 - 6.1.3.1. Starting point [Seite 207]
5.6.1.3.2 - 6.1.3.2. The EU GAAR reveals weaknesses [Seite 207]
5.6.1.4 - 6.1.4. Subjectivity is present on various layers [Seite 210]
5.6.2 - 6.2. Arrangement test [Seite 210]
5.6.2.1 - 6.2.1. What it is about and the difference from the objective test [Seite 210]
5.6.2.1.1 - 6.2.2. (In)appropriateness: The arrangement test instead of the objective test [Seite 211]
5.6.2.1.1.1 - 6.2.2.1. Starting point [Seite 211]
5.6.2.1.1.2 - 6.2.2.2. Inappropriate and appropriate arrangements [Seite 211]
5.6.2.1.1.2.1 - 6.2.2.2.1. Non-tax reasons to rebut the inappropriateness [Seite 211]
5.6.2.1.1.2.1.1 - 6.2.2.2.2. Arrangements that have the effect of offsetting or cancelling each other [Seite 214]
5.6.2.1.1.2.1.2 - 6.2.2.2.3. Overall plan [Seite 216]
5.6.2.1.1.2.1.3 - 6.2.2.2.4. Interposition of persons [Seite 217]
5.6.2.1.1.2.1.4 - 6.2.2.2.5. Arrangements and the expectation of a reasonable business conduct [Seite 221]
5.6.2.1.1.3 - 6.2.2.3. The arrangement test must be rejected [Seite 223]
5.6.2.1.2 - 6.2.3. Artificiality: The arrangement test in addition to the objective test [Seite 224]
5.6.2.1.2.1 - 6.2.3.1. Starting point [Seite 224]
5.6.2.1.2.2 - 6.2.3.2. "Artificial" [Seite 225]
5.6.2.1.2.3 - 6.2.3.3. The arrangement test must be rejected [Seite 226]
5.6.3 - 6.3. Purpose test [Seite 227]
5.6.3.1 - 6.3.1. Main or essential purpose. [Seite 227]
5.6.3.2 - 6.3.2. . of the arrangement or the person? [Seite 229]
5.6.3.3 - 6.3.3. The purpose test must be rejected [Seite 231]
5.6.4 - 6.4. Tax advantage [Seite 233]
5.6.4.1 - 6.4.1. The idea behind the tax advantage [Seite 233]
5.6.4.2 - 6.4.2. The presence of the tax advantage [Seite 233]
5.6.4.3 - 6.4.3. The subjectivity of the tax advantage [Seite 236]
5.6.4.4 - 6.4.4. Requiring a tax advantage must be rejected [Seite 237]
5.6.5 - 6.5. Double-reasonableness test [Seite 238]
5.6.5.1 - 6.5.1. What is it about [Seite 238]
5.6.5.2 - 6.5.2. The double-reasonableness test must be rejected [Seite 240]
5.6.6 - 6.6. Conclusion: Subjective tests must be rejected [Seite 240]
5.6.6.1 - 6.6.1. Summary of the critique [Seite 240]
5.6.6.2 - 6.6.2. Solution [Seite 242]
5.7 - 7. Legal consequences [Seite 244]
5.7.1 - 7.1. Basing taxation on a fictional arrangement [Seite 244]
5.7.2 - 7.2. Reconstruction poses serious problems [Seite 247]
5.7.3 - 7.3. Consequential adjustments [Seite 248]
6 - D. Valuation of the GAARs [Seite 251]
6.1 - 1. Introduction [Seite 251]
6.2 - 2. Judicial anti-avoidance [Seite 251]
6.2.1 - 2.1. Points of departure in the UK and in Germany [Seite 251]
6.2.1.1 - 2.1.1. Resembling starting positions: The legal form is decisive [Seite 251]
6.2.1.2 - 2.1.2. Contrasting developments: Various methods of interpretation vs. literal interpretation [Seite 252]
6.2.1.2.1 - 2.1.2.1. Tax reform in Germany [Seite 252]
6.2.1.2.2 - 2.1.2.2. No action taken in the UK [Seite 254]
6.2.1.2.3 - 2.1.2.3. Developments around the Second World War [Seite 255]
6.2.1.2.4 - 2.1.2.4. Developments in the post-war years [Seite 256]
6.2.1.3 - 2.1.3. Reasons for these divergent developments [Seite 258]
6.2.1.3.1 - 2.1.3.1. The relationship of tax law with other fields of law [Seite 258]
6.2.1.3.2 - 2.1.3.2. Liberalism and social reasons [Seite 259]
6.2.1.3.3 - 2.1.3.3. Victorian values and background of the judges [Seite 260]
6.2.1.3.4 - 2.1.3.4. Common law and influence of academics [Seite 262]
6.2.1.3.5 - 2.1.3.5. Parliamentary sovereignty, legal certainty and the rule of law [Seite 263]
6.2.1.4 - 2.1.4. Consequence: Different drafting of tax legislation [Seite 265]
6.2.2 - 2.2. EU Law: Adding another layer of complexity [Seite 267]
6.2.2.1 - 2.2.1. Abuse was a latecomer in EU law [Seite 267]
6.2.2.2 - 2.2.2. Judicial anti-avoidance in European law [Seite 268]
6.2.3 - 2.3. All roads lead to Rome [Seite 270]
6.2.3.1 - 2.3.1. Counteracting abuse on grounds of a judicially developed GAAR? [Seite 270]
6.2.3.1.1 - 2.3.1.1. The initial uncertainty of Ramsay and the concept of Außentheorie [Seite 270]
6.2.3.1.2 - 2.3.1.2. Ramsay did not develop into a judge-made GAAR [Seite 273]
6.2.3.2 - 2.3.2. Counteracting abuse as a matter of interpretation? [Seite 274]
6.2.3.2.1 - 2.3.2.1. Common elements: Transaction based anti-avoidance [Seite 274]
6.2.3.2.2 - 2.3.2.2. Germany: Counteracting abuse should only be a matter of interpretation [Seite 276]
6.2.3.2.3 - 2.3.2.3. UK: Counteracting abuse is a matter of interpretation [Seite 278]
6.2.3.2.4 - 2.3.2.4. EU: Counteracting abuse should return to a matter of interpretation [Seite 279]
6.2.3.3 - 2.3.3. Development of similar ways to counteract abuse by interpretation [Seite 280]
6.2.3.3.1 - 2.3.3.1. Summary [Seite 280]
6.2.3.3.2 - 2.3.3.2. Influence of other countries on the UK [Seite 282]
6.2.3.3.3 - 2.3.3.3. Influence of the ECJ on UK courts [Seite 283]
6.2.3.4 - 2.3.4. Substance-over-form and the economic perspective (wirtschaftliche Betrachtungsweise) [Seite 285]
6.2.3.4.1 - 2.3.4.1. Substance-over-form approach from a German court's perspective [Seite 285]
6.2.3.4.2 - 2.3.4.2. Economic perspective (wirtschaftliche Betrachtungsweise) from a UK court's perspective [Seite 286]
6.3 - 3. Statutory anti-avoidance (GAARs) [Seite 289]
6.3.1 - 3.1. Common elements inherent in the GAARs [Seite 289]
6.3.2 - 3.2. Drawing the line between "abusive" and "non-abusive" arrangements [Seite 290]
6.3.3 - 3.3. The GAARs only codify what courts already did [Seite 291]
6.4 - 4. Reasons for introducing and suggesting the GAARs [Seite 292]
6.4.1 - 4.1. To raise revenue and for political reasons [Seite 292]
6.4.2 - 4.2. To compensate legislative cowardice [Seite 295]
6.4.2.1 - 4.2.1. Overly complex tax systems as a source of tax avoidance [Seite 295]
6.4.2.2 - 4.2.2. Tax systems do not have to be 'perfect' [Seite 297]
6.4.2.3 - 4.2.3. GAARs as a result of legislative cowardice [Seite 298]
6.4.3 - 4.3. To compensate judicial and administrative shortcomings in statutory interpretation [Seite 299]
6.4.3.1 - 4.3.1. Methods of interpretation and the complexity of the tax system [Seite 299]
6.4.3.2 - 4.3.2. Applying various methods of interpretation can be difficult [Seite 301]
6.4.3.3 - 4.3.3. GAARs as a tool to compensate shortcomings in interpretation [Seite 303]
6.5 - 5. What remains at the end? [Seite 304]
6.5.1 - 5.1. What is claimed to be achieved [Seite 304]
6.5.2 - 5.2. What is achieved [Seite 305]
6.5.2.1 - 5.2.1. GAARs leading to a simpler tax system? [Seite 305]
6.5.2.1.1 - 5.2.1.1. A GAAR alone does not make the tax system simpler [Seite 305]
6.5.2.1.2 - 5.2.1.2. Legislators may contribute to the simplification of a tax system [Seite 306]
6.5.2.2 - 5.2.2. GAARs reducing the uncertainty surrounding the case law? [Seite 310]
6.5.2.2.1 - 5.2.2.1. Uncertainty is a result of overly complex tax systems [Seite 310]
6.5.2.2.2 - 5.2.2.2. GAARs can contribute to legal uncertainty and inequality [Seite 311]
6.5.2.3 - 5.2.3. GAARs can be detrimental to the legal culture [Seite 313]
6.5.2.3.1 - 5.2.3.1. The finding of an abusive arrangement is a matter of interpretation [Seite 313]
6.5.2.3.2 - 5.2.3.2. GAARs may have an adverse effect on the legal culture [Seite 314]
6.5.3 - 5.3. Is there even a remaining scope for GAARs? [Seite 316]
6.5.3.1 - 5.3.1. GAARs as reminders of having to interpret the law [Seite 316]
6.5.3.2 - 5.3.2. Making interpretation possible [Seite 318]
7 - E. Summary [Seite 320]
7.1 - 1. Starting position [Seite 320]
7.2 - 2. The courts' approach [Seite 320]
7.3 - 3. The GAARs' approach [Seite 328]
7.4 - 4. Valuation of the GAARs [Seite 333]
7.5 - F. Annex [Seite 338]
7.5.1 - 1. Overview of the common requirements of the German, UK and EU GAAR [Seite 338]
7.5.2 - 2. German GAAR (author's translation) [Seite 339]
7.5.2.1 - 2.1. Sec 4 and 5 Reich Fiscal Code [Seite 339]
7.5.2.2 - 2.2. Sec 6 Fiscal Adjustment Act [Seite 339]
7.5.2.3 - 2.3. Sec 42 Fiscal Code in the version of 1977and 2001 [Seite 339]
7.5.2.4 - 2.4. Sec 42 Fiscal Code in the version of 2008 [Seite 340]
7.5.3 - 3. UK GAAR [Seite 340]
7.5.4 - 4 . EU GAAR [Seite 347]
7.5.4.1 - 4.1. EU GAAR: Commission Recommendation on Aggressive Tax Planning [Seite 347]
7.5.4.2 - 4.2. PSD GAAR [Seite 348]
7.5.4.3 - 4.3. BEPS GAAR [Seite 348]
8 - G. Bibliography [Seite 350]