Chapter 2: Carl von Clausewitz

Prussian officer and military theorist Carl Philipp Gottfried (or Gottlieb) von Clausewitz placed emphasis on the "moral," or psychological in current parlance, and political aspects of engaging in war. Though unfinished at the time of his passing, his most famous work, Vom Kriege ("On War"), is regarded as a key study on military tactics.

While in some ways romantic, Clausewitz was a realist in many other terms, including realpolitik. He also extensively drew from the rationalist concepts of the European Enlightenment.

Clausewitz emphasized the dialectical interaction of various factors, pointing out that commanders must act quickly in the face of unexpected developments that are occurring in the "fog of war" (i.e., in the face of incomplete, dubious, and frequently inaccurate information as well as great fear, doubt, and excitement). He believed that history served as an essential check on intellectual abstractions that did not match reality. He maintained that, in contrast to Antoine-Henri Jomini's early work, war could not be measured or reduced to mapwork, geometry, or graphs. The most well-known of Clausewitz's many aphorisms is "War is the continuation of policy by other methods." (often mistranslated as "by other ways").

In non-German publications, Clausewitz's Christian names have occasionally been listed as "Karl," "Carl Philipp Gottlieb," or "Carl Maria." In order to align himself with the classical Western tradition, he spelled his own given name with a "C"; writers who use "Karl" sometimes want to stress their German (rather than European) origin. On Clausewitz's gravestone, it says "Carl Philipp Gottfried.".

On June 1, 1780, Clausewitz was born in Burg bei Magdeburg, in the Prussian Duchy of Magdeburg. He was the youngest and fourth son of a noble-status-claiming family, which Carl acknowledged.

The family of Clausewitz claimed to be descended from the Upper Silesia-based Barons of Clausewitz, even though academics dispute the association.

On Machiavelli was written by Johann Gottlieb Fichte, as a Writer, and His Writings, Passages, June 1807.

("Über Machiavell, als Schriftsteller, and instances from his writings").

Regarding his book on Machiavelli, Carl Clausewitz sent a fascinating and anonymous letter to Fichte in 1809.

The letter was printed in Verstreute kleine Schriften by Fichte, 157-166.

See Carl von Clausewitz Historical and Political Writings for an English translation of the text. D and Peter Paret edited the text.

Moran (1992).

On December 10th, 1810, he married the socially prominent Countess Marie von Brühl, whom he'd first encountered in 1803.

She was a member of the noble German Brühl family originating in Thuringia.

The couple circulated in echelon, getting to know Berlin's political, literary, and intellectual élite.

Marie was educated and politically connected; she was instrumental in her husband's professional and intellectual development.

She passed away in January 1836.

Although Clausewitz served as a professional combat soldier in multiple military operations, he is best known as a military theorist who studied war and used Napoleon's and Frederick the Great's campaigns as models for his writing. Before this period, soldiers had produced treatises on a variety of military topics, but no one had attempted a thorough philosophical analysis of war on the same level as Clausewitz and Leo Tolstoy, who were both motivated by the events of the Napoleonic Era.

The fact that Clausewitz's writings are still studied today shows how relevant they still are. Between 2005 and 2014, more than sixteen significant English-language volumes particularly devoted to his work were released, in contrast to the decline of his 19th-century adversary Jomini. According to historian Lynn Montross, this result "may be accounted for by the distinction between Jomini's military system and Clausewitz's philosophy. New weapons have rendered the first obsolete, while the latter continues to shape the design of those weapons."

The best demonstration of a prince or general's brilliance is when he or she knows exactly how to organize the war in accordance with the goals and available resources, doing neither too little nor too much. However, the results of this talent are more clearly seen in the overall successful outcome than in the creation of novel action modes, which might catch the attention right away. We should admire the precise fulfillment of assumptions made in silence and the quiet harmony of the entire action, which only becomes apparent in the end result.

-?Clausewitz, On War, Book III, Chapter 1:?Vol.

I pgs.

85-86?

With significant ramifications for practical policy, military teaching, and operational planning as well as for historical and analytical writing, Clausewitz introduced systematic philosophical reflection into Western military thought. He drew on his own life experiences, contemporaneous Napoleonic texts, and extensive historical research. In his first in-depth analysis of the Thirty Years' War, which he wrote when he was 25 years old, his historiographical perspective is clear. He dismisses the Enlightenment's interpretation of the war as a disorderly jumble and argues that its protracted operations can be explained by the time's economy and technology, the sociological makeup of the warriors, and the politics and psychology of the commanders. In On War, Clausewitz argues that all conflicts are the result of choices being made in a risky and uncertain environment, as well as being a socio-political reality. He also emphasized the complexity of war, which includes both operational and sociopolitical aspects, as well as the importance of state policy. (Although he undoubtedly mentions other types of protagonists, one should be careful not to confine his thoughts on conflict to battle between nations.).

The main concepts covered in On War are:

the military analysis method using dialectics

the techniques used in "critical analysis"

The logic of economic enterprise, which seeks to maximize profits, can be applied to both the conduct of war and peace negotiations.

what the balance is like the mechanism-of-power

the connection between political and military goals in conflict

the uneven interaction of offense and defense

what constitutes "military brilliance" (involving matters of personality and character, beyond intellect)

the "amazing trinity" (wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit) of war

"Real war," "ideal war," and "absolute war" are distinguished philosophically.

The defining poles of "genuine war" are b) war to "make the opponent helpless" and a) constrained objectives (political and/or military).

the notion that conflict and how it is conducted are inherently social issues rather than matters of art or science

Although "strategy" is largely an artistic endeavor, it is bound by quantitative comparisons of political gains and losses vs military costs and losses.

"Tactics" is essentially a scientific concept (most obvious in the development of siege warfare)

the significance of "moral forces" (more than just "morale") in contrast to measurable physical factors

professional armies' "military virtues" (which do not necessarily trump the rather different virtues of other kinds of fighting forces)

On the other hand, a dominance in numbers and "mass" has very significant consequences.

the inherent unpredictable nature of conflict

the "war fog"

"Friction" is the difference between how well units, organizations, or systems perform under ideal conditions and how well they really perform in practical situations (Book I, Chapter VII)

operational and strategic "centers of gravity"

the "high point of the assault"

"the final measure of victory"

Because Clausewitz built his case using a dialectical approach, his ideas have frequently been misinterpreted. British military theorist B. H. Liddell Hart claims that the Prussian military establishment's enthusiastic adoption of what they thought to be Clausewitz's ideas, particularly Moltke the Elder, a former student of Clausewitz, and the ensuing widespread adoption of the Prussian military system had a negative impact on military theory and practice as a result of their egregious misinterpretation of his ideas:

As is sometimes the case, Clausewitz's students took his advice too far, contrary to what their teacher had meant. [...] [Clausewitz's] theory of war was explained in a style that was too complex and abstract for regular soldier-minds, which are essentially concrete, to follow the line of his reasoning, which sometimes veered off in the opposite direction from where it appeared to be going. They seized at his vivid leading lines, impressed yet dazed, understanding just their surface meaning and missing the underlying thread of his ideas.

According to Christopher Bassford, a former professor of strategy at the United States National War College,:

The dialectical technique of presentation used by Clausewitz is one of the main causes of misunderstanding about his strategy.

For example, Clausewitz's famous line that "War is the continuation of policy with other means," ("Der Krieg ist eine bloße Fortsetzung der Politik mit anderen Mitteln") while accurate as far as it goes, was not meant to be taken as fact.

It is the inverse of a dialectical argument, the thesis of which is that "war is nothing but a duel [or wrestling match]," as was stated earlier in the analysis, broader than [the extended metaphor in which that discussion was embedded]. His analysis, It...