The Legal Framework of Sovereign Debt Management

1 - Cover [Seite 1]
2 - Introduction [Seite 17]
2.1 - 1. The persistence of sovereign defaults [Seite 23]
2.1.1 - 1.1. The insolvency of sovereign borrowers [Seite 23]
2.1.2 - 1.2. The timelessness of modified debt crisis [Seite 26]
2.1.3 - 1.3. The absence of institutional mechanisms [Seite 28]
2.2 - 2. The place of international law in sovereign debt management [Seite 30]
2.2.1 - 2.1. The search of a legal framework [Seite 30]
2.2.2 - 2.2. The unsuccessful concrete proposals [Seite 32]
2.2.3 - 2.3. Determination of the field of study [Seite 33]
3 - PART I. SOVEREIGN DEBT - BETWEEN PUBLIC INTEREST AND PRIVATE INSTRUMENTS [Seite 37]
3.1 - Title I. CONTRACTUALISATION OF DEBT SUPPORTS [Seite 38]
3.1.1 - CHAPTER 1. Decline of International Financial Agreements [Seite 39]
3.1.1.1 - 1. Financial cooperation and debt policy [Seite 39]
3.1.1.1.1 - 1.1. International relations and interstate financial agreements [Seite 40]
3.1.1.1.1.1 - 1.1.1. Sovereign financial obligations and international law [Seite 40]
3.1.1.1.1.2 - 1.1.2. Economic diplomacy through financial agreements [Seite 46]
3.1.1.1.2 - 1.2. The termination of bilateral financial agreements [Seite 49]
3.1.1.1.2.1 - 1.2.1. The absence of an international conventional framework [Seite 50]
3.1.1.1.2.2 - 1.2.2. The challenge of international financial treaties [Seite 54]
3.1.1.2 - 2. Multilateral financial cooperation [Seite 58]
3.1.1.2.1 - 2.1. Multilateralisation of public financing [Seite 58]
3.1.1.2.1.1 - 2.1.1. Sovereign financing by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund [Seite 58]
3.1.1.2.1.2 - 2.1.2. The objective of a sovereign debt management [Seite 62]
3.1.1.2.2 - 2.2. Regionalisation of sovereign financing [Seite 64]
3.1.1.2.2.1 - 2.2.1. Multiplication of public operators [Seite 64]
3.1.1.2.2.2 - 2.2.2. Entry of financial markets in international public finance [Seite 66]
3.1.2 - CHAPTER 2. Generalisation of Private Contracts through Banking Intermediation [Seite 68]
3.1.2.1 - 1. Banking intermediation in sovereign financing [Seite 68]
3.1.2.1.1 - 1.1. Private creditors versus sovereignty [Seite 68]
3.1.2.1.1.1 - 1.1.1. Historical intervention of private creditors [Seite 69]
3.1.2.1.1.2 - 1.1.2. Sovereign debtors through economic prism [Seite 71]
3.1.2.1.2 - 1.2. Emergence of international syndicated loan markets [Seite 74]
3.1.2.1.2.1 - 1.2.1. International syndicated loans financing sovereign debt [Seite 75]
3.1.2.1.2.2 - 1.2.2. Collapse of US banks and fear of contagion [Seite 77]
3.1.2.2 - 2. Privatisation of sovereign debt [Seite 79]
3.1.2.2.1 - 2.1. Private law and sovereign debt [Seite 79]
3.1.2.2.1.1 - 2.1.1. Contractual standardisation [Seite 79]
3.1.2.2.1.2 - 2.1.2. Managing sovereign risk [Seite 82]
3.1.2.2.1.3 - 2.1.3. Standard covenants applied to sovereign borrowers [Seite 84]
3.1.2.2.2 - 2.2. Disintermediation of debt market [Seite 87]
3.1.2.2.2.1 - 2.2.1. A debt system organised by private operators [Seite 87]
3.1.2.2.2.2 - 2.2.2. Disintermediation of debt products [Seite 88]
3.1.3 - Title I. CONCLUSION [Seite 91]
3.2 - Title II. IMPACT OF DEBT PRIVATISATION ON SOVEREIGN DEBT DEFAULT [Seite 92]
3.2.1 - CHAPTER 3. Financialisation of Sovereign Debt and Imposition of Market Practices [Seite 93]
3.2.1.1 - 1. Internationalisation of sovereign debt instruments [Seite 93]
3.2.1.1.1 - 1.1. Configuration of sovereign debt primary market [Seite 93]
3.2.1.1.1.1 - 1.1.1. Predominance of sovereign debt bonds [Seite 94]
3.2.1.1.1.2 - 1.1.2. Heterogeneous bond issuance practices [Seite 97]
3.2.1.1.2 - 1.2. Sovereign debt bonds on secondary markets [Seite 101]
3.2.1.1.2.1 - 1.2.1. A financial reference for markets [Seite 101]
3.2.1.1.2.2 - 1.2.2. Sovereign financing securitisation [Seite 103]
3.2.1.2 - 2. Internationalisation of sovereign debt operators [Seite 104]
3.2.1.2.1 - 2.1. Professionalisation of debt operators [Seite 104]
3.2.1.2.1.1 - 2.1.1. Concentration of operators and dispersion of investors [Seite 105]
3.2.1.2.1.2 - 2.1.2. Professionalisation of debt management [Seite 108]
3.2.1.2.2 - 2.2. States and international institutional regulators [Seite 111]
3.2.1.2.2.1 - 2.2.1. States and organisation of financial markets [Seite 111]
3.2.1.2.2.2 - 2.2.2. Debt management by central banks and supervisory authorities [Seite 112]
3.2.2 - CHAPTER 4. Reinforcement of Sovereign Debt Crises [Seite 113]
3.2.2.1 - 1. Sovereign debt crises [Seite 114]
3.2.2.1.1 - 1.1. From financial crisis to sovereign debt crisis [Seite 114]
3.2.2.1.1.1 - 1.1.1. Anatomy of the crisis and analysis of a contagion [Seite 115]
3.2.2.1.1.2 - 1.1.2. Result of a predictable situation [Seite 117]
3.2.2.1.1.3 - 1.1.3. Criteria of sovereign default on the financial market [Seite 119]
3.2.2.1.2 - 1.2. Challenges and pending questions [Seite 122]
3.2.2.1.2.1 - 1.2.1. Lack of international financial architecture [Seite 122]
3.2.2.1.2.2 - 1.2.2. Lack of lender of last resort for States [Seite 124]
3.2.2.1.2.3 - 1.2.3. Legal inconsistencies in sovereign financing [Seite 127]
3.2.2.2 - 2. Costs of default [Seite 129]
3.2.2.2.1 - 2.1. Restricted funding [Seite 129]
3.2.2.2.1.1 - 2.1.1. Financial, economic and commercial sanctions [Seite 130]
3.2.2.2.1.2 - 2.1.2. Political consequences [Seite 131]
3.2.2.2.2 - 2.2. Arbitrability of sovereign debt litigation [Seite 132]
3.2.2.2.2.1 - 2.2.1. End of sovereign immunity on debt matters [Seite 132]
3.2.2.2.2.2 - 2.2.2. Success of holdout creditors [Seite 135]
3.2.3 - Title II. CONCLUSION [Seite 139]
3.3 - PART I. CONCLUSION [Seite 140]
4 - PART II. PUBLICISATION OF SOVEREIGN DEBTMANAGEMENT [Seite 141]
4.1 - Title III. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF CONTRACTUAL INSTRUMENTS [Seite 143]
4.1.1 - CHAPTER 5. Choice of Contractual Measures for Debt Restructuring [Seite 143]
4.1.1.1 - 1. Ad hoc restructuring fora for collective processing [Seite 144]
4.1.1.1.1 - 1.1. Restructuring plans of the Paris and London Clubs [Seite 144]
4.1.1.1.1.1 - 1.1.1. The Paris Club, from restructuring to debt reduction [Seite 144]
4.1.1.1.1.2 - 1.1.2. The London Club, banking committees for restructuring [Seite 148]
4.1.1.1.2 - 1.2. Greek restructuring under the auspices of the Troika [Seite 151]
4.1.1.1.2.1 - 1.2.1. Towards the establishment of a European legal framework for restructuring [Seite 151]
4.1.1.1.2.2 - 1.2.2. Unequal contribution of private creditors [Seite 155]
4.1.1.1.2.3 - 1.2.3. Absence of formal hierarchy of creditors [Seite 157]
4.1.1.2 - 2. Contractual clauses and litigation [Seite 159]
4.1.1.2.1 - 2.1. Procedural issues of the Argentine Republic [Seite 159]
4.1.1.2.1.1 - 2.1.1. Holdout creditors before courts [Seite 159]
4.1.1.2.1.2 - 2.1.2. Alternative diplomatic methods [Seite 163]
4.1.1.2.2 - 2.2. Legal technicality and privatisation of sovereign debt litigation [Seite 166]
4.1.1.2.2.1 - 2.2.1. Clauses anticipating litigation [Seite 166]
4.1.1.2.2.2 - 2.2.2. Integration of collective action clauses [Seite 168]
4.1.1.2.2.3 - 2.2.3. Limits of contractual approach and ad hoc mechanisms [Seite 170]
4.1.2 - CHAPTER 6. International Financial Institutions and Rescheduling [Seite 171]
4.1.2.1 - 1. The International Monetary Fund, an ad hoc rescheduling regulator [Seite 172]
4.1.2.1.1 - 1.1. Mediator of renegotiations [Seite 173]
4.1.2.1.1.1 - 1.1.1. A financial mediator and a lender of last resort [Seite 173]
4.1.2.1.1.2 - 1.1.2. IMF and debt restructuring [Seite 178]
4.1.2.1.2 - 1.2. IMF proposals to manage restructuring [Seite 181]
4.1.2.1.2.1 - 1.2.1. The sovereign debt restructuring mechanism [Seite 181]
4.1.2.1.2.2 - 1.2.2. Renunciation to the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism [Seite 184]
4.1.2.2 - 2. International financial institutions and debt management [Seite 186]
4.1.2.2.1 - 2.1. Sovereign indebtedness versus development [Seite 186]
4.1.2.2.1.1 - 2.1.1. Initiators of debt management [Seite 187]
4.1.2.2.1.2 - 2.1.2. Debt renegotiation and debt relief [Seite 189]
4.1.2.2.1.3 - 2.2. Monitoring sovereign debt levels [Seite 192]
4.1.3 - Title III. CONCLUSION [Seite 196]
4.2 - Title IV. SOVEREIGN DEBT MANAGEMENT, AN INTERNATIONAL PRIORITY FOR STATES [Seite 197]
4.2.1 - CHAPTER 7. Global Debt Management and Framework Proposals [Seite 198]
4.2.1.1 - 1. Institutional action to restore financial multilateralism [Seite 198]
4.2.1.1.1 - 1.1. Strengthening international cooperation [Seite 199]
4.2.1.1.1.1 - 1.1.1. Status quo of the international consensus [Seite 199]
4.2.1.1.1.2 - 1.1.2. Promoting financial multilateralism [Seite 202]
4.2.1.1.2 - 1.2. Sharing good management practices [Seite 204]
4.2.1.1.2.1 - 1.2.1. International audits [Seite 204]
4.2.1.1.2.2 - 1.2.2. Towards an accounting of the overall debt level [Seite 206]
4.2.1.2 - 2. Defining rules to ensure stability [Seite 208]
4.2.1.2.1 - 2.1. Financial innovation for collective interest [Seite 208]
4.2.1.2.1.1 - 2.1.1. Modifying global finance [Seite 209]
4.2.1.2.1.2 - 2.1.2. Towards a regulation of European debt bonds [Seite 210]
4.2.1.2.2 - 2.2. A unique way to multilateral dispute settlement [Seite 211]
4.2.1.2.2.1 - 2.2.1. A mutualisation of benefits [Seite 211]
4.2.1.2.2.2 - 2.2.2. Towards a European crisis resolution framework [Seite 216]
4.2.2 - CHAPTER 8. Elaboration of an International Economic Law of Sovereign Indebtedness [Seite 218]
4.2.2.1 - 1. General principles for comprehensive operations [Seite 219]
4.2.2.1.1 - 1.1. Soft law and international financing law [Seite 220]
4.2.2.1.1.1 - 1.1.1. Codes of good conduct, reports and information sharing [Seite 220]
4.2.2.1.1.2 - 1.1.2. Towards a standardised debt management [Seite 221]
4.2.2.1.2 - 1.2. Soft law regulation of sovereign financing [Seite 223]
4.2.2.1.2.1 - 1.2.1. Soft law and international financial institutions [Seite 223]
4.2.2.1.2.2 - 1.2.2. Soft law and market professionals [Seite 226]
4.2.2.1.2.3 - 1.2.3. Soft law and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development [Seite 230]
4.2.2.2 - 2. An imperfect law for sovereign debt management [Seite 233]
4.2.2.2.1 - 2.1. De-formalisation of international law [Seite 234]
4.2.2.2.2 - 2.2. Enhancing general principles [Seite 237]
4.2.3 - Title IV. CONCLUSION [Seite 241]
4.3 - PART II. CONCLUSION [Seite 242]
5 - GENERAL CONCLUSION [Seite 243]
6 - Bibliography [Seite 249]