Corporate Bankruptcy Law in China

1. Introduction
1.1. Theoretical Framework: Economic Analysis of Law
1.2. Why Bankruptcy Law Matters
1.3. Methodology
1.4. Structure of the Book

PART I
BACKGROUND
2. China's Socio-Economic, Political and Legal Environment
2.1. Economic and Political Transformation of China
2.2. Power and the Party-State
2.3. Laws and Rules in China
2.4. Courts, the Party-State and Limited Law Enforcement in China
2.5. Corporate Ownership and Control in China
3. Debt Finance and Enforcement in China
3.1. Debt Finance in China
3.2. Companies' Access to Credit in China
3.3. Debt Enforcement Mechanisms in China
3.4. General Challenges to Debt Enforcement in China

PART II
THE EBL AND ITS PRACTICAL LIMITATIONS
4. Bankruptcy Law in China
4.1. History of Bankruptcy Law in China
4.2. Black-letter Overview of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006
4.3. Supreme People's Court's Interpretations and Judicial Cases
4.4. Personal Bankruptcy Law
5. Limited Use of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006 and its Causes
5.1. Limited Use of the Enterprise Bankruptcy Law 2006
5.2. Reasons for the Limited Use of the EBL - The Four 'Constraints'
6. The First Constraint - Creditors and Debtors Feel Insufficiently Protected under the EBL
6.1. Implications of Courts' Duties to Protect Employees
6.2. Heightened Threat of Scrutiny and Liability under the EBL
6.3. Insolvency as De Facto Entry Requirement for Reorganisation
7. The Second Constraint - Reduced Recoveries under the EBL
7.1. General Flaws in Debt Enforcement that Negatively Affect Recoveries under the EBL
7.2. Shortcomings that Specifically Affect EBL Enforcement
7.3. The EBL not Viable for Certain Types of Debt Contracts
8. The Third Constraint - Limitations and Biases of EBL Enforcers
8.1. Courts' and Lawyers' Internal Limitations
8.2. Administrators' Passivity
8.3. The Party-state's Influence over Court Enforcement of the EBL
9. The Fourth Constraint - Non-EBL Debt Enforcement Mechanisms
9.1. Private Alternatives and their Perceived Advantages
9.2. Politically Driven Alternatives and their Perceived Advantages

PART III
DESIRABILITY AND OPTIONS FOR REFORM
10. Desirability of Reforming Bankruptcy Law in China
10.1. Is a Greater Use of Bankruptcy Law in China Desirable?
10.2. Benefits of Greater Use of (Reformed) EBL
10.3. Nature of Further Reform
11. Options for Reform
11.1. Reforms Aimed at Improving EBL Provisions
11.2. Reforms Aimed at Improving EBL Enforcement Practices and Surrounding Rules
11.3. Reforms Aimed at EBL Enforcers
12. Recent Reform Initiatives 2015-20
12.1. What Set Off Recent Bankruptcy Law Reform?
12.2. Summary of Key Reforms 2015-20
12.3. Reform 1: Encourage Greater Use of the EBL - Resolving Zombie Companies
12.4. Reform 2: Specialised Bankruptcy Courts and Administrator Associations
12.5. Reform 3: EBL Platform
12.6. Reform 4: Judicial and Political Guidance
12.7. Reform 5: Local Conferences and Experience-sharing Events
12.8. Reform 6: Simplified EBL Procedure
12.9. Reform 7: Personal Bankruptcy
12.10. Reform 8: Bankruptcy Assistance Fund
12.11. Reform 9: Judges' Evaluation System for Resolving EBL Cases
12.12. Reform 10: Cooperation with Local Party-state
12.13. The Future

PART IV
FOREIGN STAKEHOLDERS AND THE EBL
13. The Role of Foreign Parties in Corporate Bankruptcy Cases in China
13.1. Foreign Influence in the Making of the EBL
13.2. Rules and Guidance that Govern Cross-border Bankruptcies in China
13.3. Foreign Stakeholders in Corporate Bankruptcy Cases in China
Conclusion