Preface

As many of you will know, every year, pilots and cabin crew have to receive training in crew resource management (CRM). This is essentially human factors training but specifically for aviation. Because this is a legal requirement, it has to be completed within a specified time-frame. Occasionally, because of illness or scheduling difficulties, we have to run a one-to-one CRM course so that the crew member remains legal to operate flights. As a freelance CRM instructor, I also do training for a variety of different airlines as well as my own airline. A while back, I carried out some CRM training for a business jet operator based in Europe. Unfortunately, one senior training captain was unable to attend the CRM training. Because he was due to start a work trip within the next couple of days, we had to arrange for him to complete his CRM training prior to leaving. In the event, the easiest way to achieve this was for him to fly to the UK and get him to undertake a one-to-one CRM course with me. If there are any CRM instructors reading this, you will know that it can be incredibly difficult to run a successful course with just one person. One of the key benefits of CRM training is the discussion that occurs between different crew members. Opinions and experiences are shared, situations are analyzed from a variety of different perspectives and, hopefully, consensus is reached. Needless to say, this becomes a lot more difficult when there is just one student in the room. The pilot in question was a highly experienced training captain who had served for many years in the military. He had flown for both commercial and business jet operators and had been exposed to CRM training since its development in the 1980s.

Given that there were just the two of us, I thought I would start the session by asking a candid question so I asked him what he thought of CRM. At first he gave me the answers that I have come to expect. He talked about how important it was, how communication is important, teamwork is important, and so on. He also said that it was relevant because it is the human rather than the machine that leads to aviation accidents these days. I pressed him a little further on this. These were answers that I had heard on just about every other CRM course where I had been an instructor or a participant: well-rehearsed, timeworn phrases that I could imagine hearing from any pilot, cabin crew member, aviation instructor or training department manager. Given that his answers were pretty standard, I took a different tack and asked him how CRM training has affected his behavior during day-to-day operations. This was clearly a more difficult question as he was unable to give me any examples of how his 20 years of CRM training had affected his performance in any way whatsoever. Based on this, I repeated my first question. "What you think of CRM?" Finally, he gave me his honest answer: "It's a waste of time".

Unfortunately, I think he is right.

When CRM training came into being back in the 1980s, it was generally felt that aircraft were becoming safer and safer and that it was now the human element that led to accidents and incidents. The old image of the gallant, swashbuckling captain, wrestling the burning aircraft on to the runway, while all around him panic, was beginning to fade. It was becoming increasingly apparent that successful management of abnormal situations was best achieved by utilizing the resources of all the crew members. This became the basis of modern CRM training. It was a profound step and, indeed, many other industries looked and continue to look to aviation as the pioneers of this new and exciting field. But what is CRM today? Has it lived up to the promise of revolutionizing aeronautical safety? Or is it, as I have heard from so many students, just common sense by a different name? I suspect that many crew members feel the same as that business jet training captain does: a good idea in principle; a waste of time in reality.

I think that it is important that from the outset that I give you my answers to these questions as this explains why I thought it was important to write this book. I think that we, as an industry, have failed. Although our initial analysis was correct, insofar as the human element had become the key to understanding the accidents and incidents happening in aviation, we have not followed this up in either our training philosophy or our legislation. A common statistic that is often repeated is that 70% of aviation accidents are due to human error. While I take some exception to this figure (show me an accident that does not include an element of human error!), it leads to an interesting observation. When we consider how we train pilots and cabin crew, the vast majority of the time allotted is spent in training them how to deal with technical failures. We spend comparatively little time looking at human factors. Why should this be so, given that we know that the majority of accidents are due to human error? For me, the answer is simple: it is easier to teach technical subjects. As will become apparent to you as you work through this book, human factors is a truly huge subject. It encompasses just about every aspect of human performance. It is far easier to teach crew members how to deal with technical failure than it is to equip them with accurate, research-based human factors strategies and behaviors that they can use in the workplace to enhance safety and efficiency.

Another major drawback of human factors in aviation is that it is rarely assessed. Although it is common for national regulators to stipulate that crew members' "non-technical skills" are assessed in the simulator and during line checks, we do not routinely assess an individual's knowledge of the human factors. I am reminded of a conversation I had with someone who worked for the national regulatory authority. We were talking about the importance of CRM training and I expressed my view that it was strange that it was the only subject that was not formally assessed and that this may, inaccurately, suggest to students that the subject is not important. The response I received was, "If you can get the subject across to just one or two people in the room, then you're doing well". Would we have the same, laissez-faire view if the subject was "hydraulics" or "safety and emergency procedures"? Of course not! We require all crew members to learn and be able to recall the details of these technical subjects. Failure to do so may have a negative impact on an individual's career. Why then, if we have all agreed on the importance of human factors with regard to aviation safety, do we not take the same approach to teaching and assessing this subject?

The only answer that occurs to me is that the science of human factors is so broad and so "messy" that we have not, as an industry, agreed on what is important and what is not. For example, the concept of "situational awareness" is still hotly debated. There are some human factors academics who feel that this is not a useful term.1 There are others who think that it is a useful term. Who is right? The sad answer is that we do not know. Unlike hydraulics or safety and emergency procedures, the subject of human factors is not black and white. While national legislation specifies that human factors must be taught in the form of CRM and lists various topics that must be covered in such training, it does not, as yet, specify which approach should be taken to each of these topics. As you will soon see, there are multiple approaches that can be taken with each topic. If there is no uniformity in how different operators determine how a topic should be taught, is it fair to assess people on it? The unfortunate side-effect of this dilemma is that when crew members are scheduled to attend CRM training they are well aware that their knowledge of the subject will not be assessed at the end of the day. I believe that this, tragically, leads to the impression that the subject is not important. If it is not important enough to assess, then where is the motivation to pay attention and to learn?

Sadly, for the time being, the legislation is what it is although there do seem to be some changes on the horizon in Europe with recent proposed changes put forward by the European Aviation Safety Agency. When I look back on my experience of teaching this subject, I have come to the conclusion that the term "CRM" is tainted. This generation of crew has been brought up in a system that has not made up its mind on which is the most effective way to teach this safety-critical subject. Although some people are willing to engage with the subject, I believe that the majority of people are unconvinced about its importance and, for that, instructors like me must bear some responsibility. If there are any other CRM instructors reading this now, I am sure you will, as I have, have had the heartbreaking experience of standing up in front of a group that you have taught the year before and asked them to recall anything of what they have learned previously, and been met with blank stares. If the information is not being retained or, more importantly, not being put into practice, then what is the point of CRM training? This is a question that troubles me deeply.

Unfortunately, I am not a legislator. If I were, I would drop the term "CRM" and replace it with "human factors". I would completely revise and expand the training syllabus and give specific objectives to be achieved for each subject, and I would make it compulsory for each subject to be assessed formally. As it stands, I am a humble instructor trying to communicate the importance of these...