Mechanical Choices

Preface and Acknowledgments Chapter 1: Introduction Part I: Criminal Law and the Morality of Ascribing Responsibility Chapter 2: The General Structure of Criminal Law in Terms of Ascriptive Moral Principles Part II: The Criminal Law's Suppositions About the Psychology of Persons Chapter 3: Human Actions at the Root of Moral Wrongdoing and Criminal Law's Actus Reus Chapter 4: Intention and Belief at the Root of Moral Culpability and Mens Rea Chapter 5: Further Questions About the Basic Distinction Between Intention and Belief Chapter 6: The Royal Road to the Criminal Law's Concept of the Psychology of Persons: The Insanity Defense Part III: The Challenges to Criminal Law by Neuroscience Chapter 7: The Challenging Data of Neuroscience and the Challenges Mounted From that Data Part IV: The Hard Determinist Challenge Chapter 8: The Libertarian, Fictionalist, and Compatibilist Responses to Hard Determinism Chapter 9: Rescuing the Volitional Excuses from Compatibilism (The Overshoot Problem for Compatibilism) PART V: The Epiphenomenalist Challenge Chapter 10: The Initiation of the Epiphenomenalist Challenge in the Work of Benjamin Libet Chapter 11: The Limited Compatibilism of Epiphenomenalism with Responsibility PART VI: The Reductionist Challenge Chapter 12: "Nothing But a Pack of Neurons" Part VII: Neuroscience as the Helper rather than the Challenger of the Criminal Law Chapter 13: The Potential Contributions of Neuroscience to our Understanding of Addiction