Corporate Governance in the Shadow of the State

1: Introduction
I. What is this Book About?
II. The Plan for the Book
III. Provisos to the Following Discussion
2: Defining Corporate Governance as a Subject of Legal Enquiry
I. The Problem of Corporate-Managerial Power
II. The Structural Imperative of Legitimating Corporate-Managerial Power
III. Why Shareholder Exclusivity?
IV. Summary
3: The Contractarian Paradigm of Corporate Governance Law
I. The Purported 'Privity' of Anglo-American Corporate Law
II. (A Brief) Historical and Intellectual Background to Corporate Contractarianism
III. How Do Contractarians Rationalise the Most Prominent Features of Anglo-American Corporate Governance?
IV. Legitimating Reciprocal Power Imbalance Within the Contractarian Paradigm
V. Summary
4: The Contractual Dimensions of US Corporate Governance Law
I. 'Opt-Out', 'Opt-In', and Reversible-Default Rules
II. Competitive Federalism
III. Judicial Deference to Private Ordering: The Business Judgment Rule
IV. Anti-Takeover Measures
V. Federal Deference to Private Ordering: The Rule 14a-8 Proposal
VI. The US Corporate Board as a Pre-Regulatory Institution
VII. Summary
5: The Contractual Dimensions of UK Corporate Governance Law
I. The Contractual Principle
II. Judicial Deference to Private Ordering
III. The Endogeneity of the British Corporate Board
IV. Market-Invoking Regulation
V. Summary
6: The (Expanding) Regulatory Dimensions of Anglo-American Corporate Governance Law
I. The 'De-Privatisation' of Anglo-American Corporate Governance Law?
II. The Mandatory Nature of Corporate Disclosure Regulation in the United States and United Kingdom
III. The Regulatory Division of Corporate Decision-Making Power in the UK
IV. The Counter-Contractual Nature of the Equitable Fiduciary Principle under Anglo-American Law
V. Summary
7: Rationalising Regulatory State Paternalism within an Expanded Contractarian Paradigm
I. Are Mandatory Rules 'Mandatory' at all?
II. The Acceptable Ambit of State Interventionism in Private Ordering: Negative Externalities and Public Goods
III. The 'Market Mimicking' Rationalisation of Regulatory State Interventionism
IV. The Limitations of the 'Market Mimicking' Rationalisation
V. Expanding the Frontiers of the Contractarian Paradigm
VI. Summary
8: Conclusions