- Efficient Anonymous Authentication and Key Management Techniques for Vehicular Ad-hoc Networks
- ABSTRACT
- ACKNOWLEGDEMENT
- TABLE OF CONTENTS
- LIST OF TABLES
- LIST OF FIGURES
- LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS
- CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION
- 1.1 VANET OVERVIEW
- 1.1.1 VANET System Model
- 1.1.2 Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC)
- 1.1.3 VANET Characteristics
- 1.2 SECURITY ISSUES IN VANET
- 1.3 PROPOSED WORKS
- 1.4 OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH WORK
- 1.5 ASSUMPTIONS
- 1.6 ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
- CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE SURVEY
- 2.1 INTRODUCTION
- 2.2 SECURITY SERVICES OF VANETS
- 2.3 AVAILABILITY IN VANETS
- 2.3.1 Threats and Attacks on Availability
- 2.3.2 Works on Availability
- 2.4 CONFIDENTIALITY IN VANETS
- 2.4.1 Threats and Attacks on Confidentiality
- 2.4.2 Works on Confidentiality
- 2.5 AUTHENTICATION IN VANETS
- 2.5.1 Threats and Attacks on Authentication
- 2.5.2 Requirements for Authentication
- 2.5.3 Works on Authentication with Privacy Preservation
- 2.5.4 Computational Cost for Various Authentication Schemes
- 2.6 DATA INTEGRITY IN VANETS
- 2.6.1 Threats and Attacks on Data Integrity
- 2.6.2 Works on Data Integrity
- 2.7 NON-REPUDIATION IN VANETS
- 2.7.1 Attack on Non-repudiation
- 2.7.2 Works on Non-repudiation
- 2.8 COUNTERMEASURES ON VARIOUS SECURITYATTACKS
- 2.9 WORKS ON KEY MANAGEMENT
- 2.10 LITERATURE SURVEY GAPS
- 2.11 PROPOSED WORK
- 2.12 CONCLUSIONS
- CHAPTER3 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
- CHAPTER 4 DUAL AUTHENTICATION AND DUAL KEYMANAGEMENT FOR GROUP COMMUNICATION
- 4.1 INTRODUCTION
- 4.2 PROPOSED DUAL AUTHENTICATION TECHNIQUE
- 4.2.1 Registration Through Offline Mode
- 4.2.2 Vehicle's Authentication Process
- 4.2.3 Trusted Authority's Authentication Process and the Provisionof Authentication Code (AC)
- 4.3 PROPOSED DUAL KEY MANAGEMENT FOR GROUPCOMMUNICATION
- 4.3.1 TA Initial Set Up
- 4.3.2 Group Key Computation
- 4.3.3 Secure Data Transmission in VANETs
- 4.3.4 Key Updating
- 4.4 SECURITY ANALYSIS
- 4.4.1 Resistance to Replay Attack
- 4.4.2 Masquerade and Sybil Attacks
- 4.4.3 Message Tampering /Fabrication/Alteration Attack
- 4.4.4 Backward Secrecy
- 4.4.5 Forward Secrecy
- 4.4.6 Collusion Attack
- 4.5 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
- 4.6 CONCLUSIONS
- CHAPTER 5 CPAV: COMPUTATIONALLY EFFICIENT PRIVACY PRESERVING ANONYMOUS AUTHENTICATION FOR A VEHICLE USER IN VANETS
- 5.1 INTRODUCTION
- 5.2 SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
- 5.3 BILINEAR PAIRING
- 5.4 PROPOSED CPAV SCHEME
- 5.4.1 System Initialization
- 5.4.2 Registration
- 5.4.3 Secure Activation Key Distribution
- 5.4.4 CPAV Secure Anonymous Mutual Authentication
- 5.5 SECURITY ANALYSIS
- 5.5.1 Message Integrity and Source Authentication
- 5.5.2 Conditional Privacy Preservation
- 5.5.3 Anonymity
- 5.6 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
- 5.7 CONCLUSIONS
- CHAPTER 6 EFFICIENT ANONYMOUS AUTHENTICATION OF AN RSU
- 6.1 INTRODUCTION
- 6.2 ANONYMOUS AUTHENTICATION
- 6.2.1 System Initialization
- 6.2.2 Anonymous Authentication of an RSU
- 6.3 SECURITY ANALYSIS
- 6.4 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
- 6.4.1 RSU Serving Capability
- 6.5 CONCLUSIONS
- CHAPTER 7 CEKD: COMPUTATIONALLY EFFICIENT KEY DISTRIBUTION
- 7.1 INTRODUCTION
- 7.2 CEKD SCHEME
- 7.2.1 System Initialization
- 7.2.2 VANET License Issuing
- 7.2.3 CEKD Scheme
- 7.3 SECURITY ANALYSIS
- 7.4 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
- 7.5 CONCLUSIONS
- CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS
- 8.1 DUAL AUTHENTICATION AND DUAL KEY MANAGEMENT FOR GROUP COMMUNICATION
- 8.2 CPAV: COMPUTATIONALLY EFFICIENT PRIVACY PRESERVING ANONYMOUS AUTHENTICATION
- 8.3 EFFICIENT ANONYMOUS AUTHENTICATION OF AN RSU
- 8.4 CEKD: COMPUTATIONALLY EFFICIENT KEY DISTRIBUTION
- 8.5 FUTURE WORKS
- REFERENCES
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Chapter 4.5 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS:
The proposed research work is analysed in terms of two performance metrics namely the computation time and communication time for updating the group key in order to perform secure group communication in the PUs of VANET communication. The computation time is defined as the time taken to compute group key at the TA when group membership changes in the VANET group. The communication time is defined as the time taken to broadcast the amount of information from TA in order to make the VANET users to recover the group key. Table 4.1 shows the computation and storage complexities of various key management approaches, namely Chinese Remainder Group Key (CRGK) (Zheng et al. 2007), Fast-chinese Remainder Group Key (FRGK) (Syamsuddin et al. 2008), Key-tree Chinese Remainder Theorem (KCRT) (Zhou & Ou 2009), Number Theory Research Unit (NTRU) (Lv et al. 2012) and Elgamal Group Key Management (EGKM) (Lv et al. 2012) and the proposed VANET Group Key Management (VGKM) which are based on the CRT. The notations used for comparisons are defined as: n is the number of users, t is the maximum number of children of each node of the tree, EEA is the time taken to find the inverse element of a multiplicative group using Extended Euclidean Algorithm, exp represtens the exponential operation, M represents the multiplication operation, D represents the division operation, A represents the addition operation and S represents the subtraction operation.
Among these schemes, the Number Theory Research Unit (NTRU) based group key management scheme uses a multiplication ring from which it chooses some polynomial values as private and public keys from which it computes a common group key. Hence, the multiplication operation used in this scheme is performed by using the convolution product method. All the remaining schemes use a multiplicative group for choosing and computing the keys. Moreover, all the existing schemes take O(n) for updating the group key when a single AV user joins or leaves from the secure VANET communication. From Table 4.1, it is evident that all the existing approaches take more computation complexity if it is used in the TA side in the VANET for computing the group key for performing a single user join/leave operation which is very high in comparison with the proposed approach. Therefore, the proposed approach takes less computation complexity when it is compared with all the remaining five approaches since it takes only 1 subtraction operation or (addition) operation to be performed when a single user leave or join operation is performed. Moreover, the proposed approach doesn't perform any cyclic convolution product operation and multiplicative inverse operation on the user side which reduces user's computational complexity. The amount of information bits necessary to be communicated while updating the group key to our proposed approach and existing approaches are calculated and are also shown in Table 4.1. It is very clear that the proposed group key management scheme takes the same communication complexity as that of most of the existing group key management protocol which are based on CRT [.].
The graphical results shown in Figure 4.3 are used to compare the group key computation time of TA for the proposed method with the existing methods. It compares the results obtained from the proposed VGKM with CRGK, FRGK, KCRT, NTRU and EGKM. From Figure 4.3, it is observed that when the key is 512 bits, the group key computation time of TA is found to be 19ms in the proposed approach, which is better in comparison with the other existing schemes. The results shown in Figure 4.4 are used to compare the PUs key recovery time of the proposed method with the existing methods. It compares the results obtained from the proposed scheme with existing approaches and it is observed that when the key size is 512 bits, the key recovery time of a user is found to be 5.3ms in the proposed approach, which is better in comparison with the other existing schemes.