EU Competition Law, Regulation and the Internet

Name: EU Competition Law, Regulation and the Internet | The Case of Net Neutrality
Brand: Kluwer Law International
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The Case of Net Neutrality

Katerina Maniadaki(Autor*in)

Kluwer Law International (Verlag)

Erschienen am 27. November 2014

416 Seiten

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Inhalt

Cover
Half Title Page
Editorial Board
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Table of Contents
Preface
Foreword
List of Abbreviations
CHAPTER 1 Introduction
§1.01 NET NEUTRALITY MEETS COMPETITION LAW
§1.02 THE THEME OF THIS BOOK
§1.03 A SOLUTION IN SEARCH OF A PROBLEM?
§1.04 METHODOLOGY AND APPROACH
§1.05 NON-TECHNICAL, TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
[A] The Internet and Its Main Players
[B] The Architecture of the Internet and the "Stupid Network"
[C] Interconnection
[D] Quality-Differentiation Techniques
CHAPTER 2 Net Neutrality: Definition, Principles and Objectives
§2.01 INTRODUCTION
§2.02 THE VARIOUS DEFINITIONS OF NN
[A] No Blocking
[B] No Discrimination in Favour of Vertically Integrated Content Services
[C] Maintaining the "Zero-Price Rule"
[D] No "Undue Discrimination" and "Reasonable Traffic Management"
[1] Network Security and End-User Controlled Restrictions
[2] Congestion
[3] The 2014 FCC Proposals and "Commercial Unreasonableness"
[E] Access and Consumer Tiering
[F] "Walled Gardens" and "Granny Packages"
[G] "Managed" or "Specialized" Services: An Exception?
[H] Minimum QoS Requirements for IASs
§2.03 LOOKING FROM ANOTHER ANGLE: NN AS AN INTERCONNECTION ISSUE
§2.04 BROADER DEFINITIONS OF NN
[A] Open Access
[B] Neutrality across All Levels
[C] Device Neutrality
[D] NN and the Regime for the Liability of Online Intermediaries
§2.05 THE ARGUMENTS OF THE NN DEBATE
[A] Central Economic Concepts
[1] Network Effects
[2] Two-Sided Markets
[3] Price Discrimination
[B] Exclusion, Exploitation and Market Power
[1] The IAP Has Market Power in the Retail Market for IASs
[2] The IAP Faces Competition in the Retail Market for IAS
[C] Welfare Effects
[1] Effects on Static Efficiency
[a] Maintaining the "Zero-Price Rule"
[b] Prohibiting Access-Tiering
[2] Effects on Dynamic Efficiency
[a] Innovation at the Content Level
[i] By Independent CPs or "The Man in the Garage"
[ii] By the Network Operators
[b] Innovation at the Infrastructure Level
[D] The End-to-End Principle
[E] Beyond Competition and Innovation
[1] Common Infrastructure Theories
[2] Freedom of Expression and Pluralism
[3] Participation and User-Generated Content
[F] Congestion
[1] Congestion Pricing
[2] Capacity Expansion
[G] Quality Degradation and the Internet "Dirt Road"
§2.06 CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER 3 Net Neutrality Regulation in the EU
§3.01 INTRODUCTION
§3.02 THE EU REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: A SHORT OVERVIEW
[A] General Provisions: Scope
[B] Separation of Transmission and Content
[1] The History of the Distinction
[2] Implementation of the Distinction
[3] Interactions within the Framework
[4] Classification of Services That Are of Relevance to the NN Debate
[C] The Objectives of the NRAs
[D] The General Authorization Regime
[E] Imposition of Obligations on Operators with Significant Market Power (SMP): The Article 7 Procedure
[1] Relevant Market Definition
[2] Market Review and Imposition of Remedies
[3] Procedure for EU Consultation
[F] Interconnection
[G] Full Harmonization?
[H] Dispute Resolution
[I] Transparency
[J] Minimum QoS
[K] Switching
[L] Blocking of Illegal Content
§3.03 THE BACKGROUND OF THE REVIEW OF THE EU REGULATORY FRAMEWORK WITH RESPECT TO NN
§3.04 SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS
[A] EU Institutions
[1] Commission
[2] Council
[3] Parliament
[B] BEREC
[C] Action by Some Member States
[1] France
[2] UK
[3] Other Member States
[D] The Connected Continent Regulation
§3.05 THE ROLE OF COMPETITION LAW WITHIN THE EU REGULATORY REGIME FOR NN
§3.06 CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER 4 The Inherent Potential and Limitations of Competition Law in Protecting Net Neutrality
§4.01 INTRODUCTION
§4.02 THE OBJECTIVES OF EU COMPETITION LAW VERSUS THE OBJECTIVES OF NN: "OPENESS"
[A] The Objectives of EU Competition Law
[1] The Various Aims of the Rules on Competition
[a] Protecting Competition, Competitors and/or Consumers?
[b] Consumer or Total Welfare?
[c] The Underlying Values of the Rules on Competition
[2] Exclusionary Abuses
[3] Exploitative Abuses
[B] EU Competition Law
[1] The Evolution of the Objectives of EU Competition Law
[2] Per Se Restrictions and Effects Analysis: A Primer
[3] Synthesis: The Applicable Standard for Abuses under EU Competition Law
[a] Tentative Conclusions on the Current State of the Law
[b] Assessment
[C] Comparison with the General Objectives of NN
§4.03 THE OBJECTIVES OF COMPETITION LAW VERSUS THE SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES OF NN: PLURALISM
[A] A Primer on Pluralism
[B] NN and Pluralism
[C] Competition Law and Pluralism
[1] Pluralism as a Public Policy Objective
[2] Diversity as a Hallmark of Consumer Welfare
§4.04 THE OBJECTIVES OF COMPETITION LAW VERSUS THE OBJECTIVES OF NN: INNOVATION
[A] EU Competition Law and Innovation
[1] Case Law with Implications for Dynamic Competition and the 2008 Guidance
[2] Incorporation of Innovation Considerations
[a] Objective Justifications
[b] Burden of Proof of Dynamic Efficiencies
[B] A Tentative Reading of the Case Law and Its Relevance for NN
§4.05 OTHER INHERENT LIMITATIONS OF EU COMPETITION RULES IN SAFEGUARDING NN
§4.06 CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER 5 Relevant Market Definition and Assessment of Market Power
§5.01 INTRODUCTION
§5.02 SETTING THE BACKGROUND
PRIMERS ON MARKET DEFINITION AND MARKET POWER
[A] Relevant Market Definition
[B] Assessment of Market Power
Dominance
§5.03 THE MARKETS FOR CONTENT TERMINATION
[A] Introductory Remarks
[B] Call Termination
[C] Content Termination
[1] Direct Constraints
[2] Indirect Constraints
[a] Ability to Switch
Availability of Alternatives
[b] Switching Costs
[c] Incentive to Switch: Reaction to Restrictive Practices by IAPs
[d] Switching Inertia: On the Role of Transparency
[i] Consumer Sovereignty and Behavioural Theories
[ii] Behavioural Theories and Regulation
[3] Countervailing Power
[D] Conclusions and Extensions
§5.04 THE RETAIL MARKETS FOR INTERNET ACCESS SERVICES
§5.05 THE MARKETS FOR INTERCONNECTION
§5.06 THE MARKETS FOR INTERCONNECTION TO AN IAP'S NETWORK
§5.07 COLLECTIVE DOMINANCE
§5.08 RELEVANT MARKETS AT THE CONTENT LEVEL
§5.09 CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER 6 Net Neutrality Violations as Refusals to Deal
§6.01 INTRODUCTION
§6.02 PRACTICES UNDER EXAMINATION
§6.03 EU CASE LAW ON REFUSALS TO DEAL
[A] The World without Microsoft I
[1] The Case Law of the CoJ
[2] Summary
[3] The Commission's Practice
[4] Summary
[B] Microsoft I
[1] The Commission's Decision and the Judgment of the General Court
[2] Summary
[C] The Commission's 2008 Guidance
§6.04 AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO REFUSALS TO DEAL
[A] Introductory Remarks
[B] Indispensability
[C] Restriction of Effective Competition
[D] Restriction of Effective Competition Is Such as to Harm Consumers
[1] The Tension between the Different Efficiencies Resulting from a Refusal to Deal
[2] Solving the Tension
§6.05 VIOLATIONS OF NN AS REFUSALS TO DEAL
[A] Blocking
[1] Indispensability
[a] Market Power in Content Termination Markets
[b] Market Power at the Retail Internet Access Level
[2] Restriction of Competition and Consumer Harm
[B] Refusal to Interconnect
[C] Refusal to Provide Premium Services
[D] Refusal to Include in a "Granny Package" or "Walled Garden"
[E] Objective Justifications
[1] Congestion Control
[2] Other Justifications
§6.06 CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER 7 Net Neutrality, Discrimination and Unfair Pricing
§7.01 INTRODUCTION
§7.02 DISCRIMINATION
[A] EU Case Law on Article 102(c)
[1] Overview of the Case Law
[a] Shortage of Supplies
[i] BP
[ii] BPB Industries
[b] Discounts and Rebates
[i] Hoffmann-La Roche
[ii] Michelin I
[iii] AKZO
[iv] Soda-ash/Solvay
[v] Irish Sugar
[vi] British Airways
[c] Violations of the Internal Market Principle
[i] United Brands
[ii] Tetra Pak II
[iii] Corsica Ferries
[iv] Portuguese Airports
[v] Deutsche Bahn
[d] Miscellaneous
[i] Deutsche Post
[ii] Clearstream
[iii] Kanal 5
[iv] Post Denmark
[2] Assessment
[a] Harm to Competitors versus Harm to Effective Competition and Consumers
[b] Efficiencies
[c] Other Objective Justifications
[3] Price or Quality Discrimination against Downstream Competitors
Relationship with Article 102(b)
[B] NN Violations as Abusive Discrimination
[1] Price Discrimination
[a] Offering Menus of QoS
[b] Charging Different Prices for the Same Level of QoS
[2] Quality Discrimination
[3] Objective Justification
§7.03 EXCESSIVE PRICING
[A] The Case Law on Excessive Pricing
[B] Implications for NN
§7.04 PRACTICES IMPLEMENTED ON THE CONSUMER SIDE
§7.05 CONCLUSIONS
CHAPTER 8 Extensions and Conclusions
§8.01 EXTENSIONS
[A] The EU Google Investigation
[B] The (New?) Features of Online Competition
[1] Non-price Competition
[2] Information Failures and Behavioural Biases
[3] Network Effects, Economies of Scale and Two-Sided Markets
[4] Innovation
[5] Proof of Discrimination
§8.02 FINAL REMARKS
Bibliography
Decisions of the European Commission under the Competition Rules
Judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union
Judgments of the General Court
Opinions of Advocates General
Comment Letters and Decisions of the European Commission under Article 7 of the Framework Directive
EU Legislation
Notices, Recommendations, Communications, Guidance, Guidelines, White Papers, Reports and Staff Working Documents of the European Commission
Declarations and Reports by EU Institutions
Decisions, Declarations, Reports by BEREC and National Authorities
National Case Law
Speeches/Statements
Index
Back Cover

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