Public Epistemic Authority

Name: Public Epistemic Authority | Normative Institutional Design for EU Law
Brand: Mohr Siebeck
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Normative Institutional Design for EU Law

Johann Moritz Laux(Autor*in)

Mohr Siebeck (Verlag)

1. Auflage

Erschienen am 30. Juni 2022

XVII, 466 Seiten

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978-3-16-160257-3 (ISBN)

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Inhalt

Cover
Title
Preface
Content Overview
Contents
List of Abbreviations
Introduction
Part I: Theory
Chapter One: The Normative Framework of Public Epistemic Authority
1. The Conditions of Uncertainty and Bounded Rationality
a. Uncertainty
b. Bounded Rationality
2. The Benchmark Problems of Normative Institutional Design
a. The Ideal of Public Reason
b. The Methodological Thesis and the Bracketing of Disagreement
c. The Special Benchmark Problem for Judicial Institutions
3. The Difficulty with Judicial Epistemic Deference
a. Intellectual Due Process
b. The Two-Hat Solution for Judicial Competence
4. Towards the Inclusion of Truth
a. The Retreat to Reasonableness
b. Some Rehabilitation for Truth
5. The Fact/Value Dichotomy and Legal Interpretation
6. The Basic Framework
a. Expertise and Public Office
b. Authority's Compensatory Role
c. The Three Tests of Legitimacy
7. Conclusion
Chapter Two: Testing Authority for Legitimacy
1. The Input: Elements of Authority
a. Content-Independence
b. de facto Authority
c. de jure Authority
d. The Law's Authority
e. Epistemic Authority
f. Interim Conclusion
2. The Output: Elements of Legitimacy
a. Substantive and Procedural Accounts
b. Democratic Instrumentalism
3. The Service Conception of Authority
a. The Dependence Thesis
b. The Normal Justification Thesis
c. The Pre-Emption Thesis
d. The Independence Condition
e. Expertise or Coordination?
f. Interim Conclusion
4. The Epistemic Dimension of Consent and Public Reason
a. Consent Theory
b. Public Reason
5. The Epistemic Proceduralist Solution
a. Epistemic Democracy
b. Epistemic Proceduralism
6. Conclusion
Chapter Three: Mechanisms of Collective Wisdom
1. The Concept of Epistemic Reliability
a. The Juror Model
b. Collective Epistemic Competence
2. Statistical Aggregation and the CJT
a. The Law of Large Numbers
b. Condorcet's Competence Assumption
c. Condorcet's Independence Assumption
d. Condorcet's Sincerity Assumption
e. The Results Obtained by the CJT
f. The Miracle of Aggregation
g. Interim Conclusion
3. Limitations and Extensions of the CJT
a. Revisiting the Competence Assumption
b. The Condorcet Paradox
c. The Disjunction Problem
d. The Doctrinal Paradox
e. Revisiting the Independence Assumption
f. The Best Responder Corollary
g. Interim Conclusion
4. Evolutionary Aggregation and Courts of Many Minds
a. Traditionalism and Cosmopolitanism
b. Populism
5. Aggregation and Deliberation
a. The Drawbacks of Deliberation
b. The Benefits of Deliberation
6. Perspectival Aggregation and the DTA
a. The Diversity Trumps Ability Theorem
b. The Diversity Trumps Homogeneity Theorem
c. Applying the Theorems
d. Comparing the DTA and the CJT
e. The Problem with Preference Diversity
f. Revisiting the Applicability of the DTA
g. Interim Conclusion
7. Conclusion
Part II: Application
Chapter Four: The Role of the Court
1. Applying the Conceptual Test of Legitimacy
a. Classifying the Court's Jurisdiction
b. The Continuing Influence of the Initial Institutional Design
c. Interim Conclusion
2. Fact-Checking I: Legal Interpretation
a. 'No Frills' Textualism
b. Originalism and Teleological Reasoning
c. The Court's Reasoning Style
d. The Court's Constitutional Reasoning
e. The Court's Interpretation of Technical Words
f. Interim Conclusion
3. Judicial Problem-Solving: The Proportionality Principle
a. Proportionality as a Problem-Solving Tool
b. The Structure of Balancing
c. Policy Choice under Proportionality
d. Interim Conclusion
4. Fact-Checking II: The Factual Basis of a Case
a. Complexity and the Court as 'Catalyst'
b. Complexity and the Court as a 'Watchdog'
c. Complex Scientific and Economic Assessments
d. Interim Conclusion
5. Conclusion
Chapter Five: The People at the Court
1. Applying the Behavioral Test of Legitimacy
a. Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision-Making
b. Theories of Judicial Behavior
c. The Black Box Problem
d. The Grave Mistakes Approach
2. The Court's Limits of Jurisdiction
a. The View from Legal Scholarship
b. The View from Social Science
3. The Court's Limits of Discretion
a. Variation in the Strictness of the Proportionality Test
b. The Rarity of Experts' Appointments
c. The Lonely Life of the In-House Expert
4. Conclusion
Chapter Six: The Design of the Court
1. Applying the Comparative Test of Legitimacy
a. Judicial Selection and Cognitive Diversity
b. Judicial Chambers and Statistical Aggregation
c. Judicial Dissent and Majority Rule
2. Reallocating Authority
a. The European Institutional Landscape
b. Towards an Epistemic Principle of Deference
3. Institutional Redesign
a. The Influence of the Individualist Paradigm on Recent Reforms
b. Introducing Non-Lawyers to the Bench?
c. Increasing the Recourse to Experts?
4. Conclusion
Part III: Reconciliation
Chapter Seven: Normative Institutional Design for EU Law
1. Calibrating the Intensity of Judicial Review
2. Three Principles for Judicial Reasoning
a. The Epistemic Principle of Democratic Restraint
b. The Epistemic Principle of Technocratic Deference
c. The Epistemic Principle of Judicial Activism
d. Applicability to Member State Institutions
e. Interim Conclusion
3. Defending Epistemic Reliability as a Benchmark
a. The Objection from Epistemology
b. The Identifiability Objection
c. The Objection from Methodology
d. The Objection from Unintended Consequences
4. Conclusion
Conclusion
Bibliography
Table of Cases
Other Documents Cited

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