Governmental Paternalism

1 - Cover [Seite 1]
2 - Governmental Paternalism: Anachronism or Future Model of Enhancing Life? [Seite 9]
3 - Protective Governmental Paternalism: "Data Paternalism" [Seite 15]
3.1 - I. What is Protective Governmental Paternalism? [Seite 18]
3.1.1 - 1. Governmental Paternalism [Seite 18]
3.1.2 - 2. Protective Governmental Paternalism [Seite 22]
3.1.3 - 3. Data Paternalism as an Example of Protective Paternalism [Seite 23]
3.2 - II. Phenomenology of Protective Paternalism in the GDPR and ePD [Seite 26]
3.2.1 - 1. Invasive Paternalism [Seite 26]
3.2.1.1 - a) Prohibition Principle and Need for Formality [Seite 26]
3.2.1.2 - b) "Freely Given" Consent and the Necessity Requirement [Seite 28]
3.2.1.3 - c) Processing of Sensitive Personal Data and "Profiling" [Seite 30]
3.2.2 - 2. Libertarian Paternalism [Seite 32]
3.2.2.1 - a) Privacy by Default [Seite 33]
3.2.2.2 - b) Providing Information [Seite 34]
3.3 - III. Data Paternalism as a Fundamental Rights Problem [Seite 36]
3.3.1 - 1. A Specific Fundamental Right Against Data Paternalism? [Seite 39]
3.3.1.1 - a) Right to Disclose Personal Data [Seite 39]
3.3.1.2 - b) Right to Assess the Disclosure of Personal Data [Seite 39]
3.3.1.3 - d) Conclusion [Seite 45]
3.3.2 - 2. Data Paternalism as Interference with Fundamental Rights [Seite 46]
3.3.2.1 - a) Invasive Paternalism [Seite 47]
3.3.2.1.1 - aa) Formal Consent Requirements [Seite 47]
3.3.2.1.2 - bb) Necessity Requirement [Seite 48]
3.3.2.2 - b) Libertarian Paternalism [Seite 48]
3.3.2.2.1 - aa) Privacy by Default [Seite 48]
3.3.2.2.2 - bb) Providing Information [Seite 49]
3.4 - IV. Justifying Data Paternalism [Seite 51]
3.4.1 - 1. Specific Reasons for Data Paternalism [Seite 51]
3.4.1.1 - a) General Systematic Deficits of Human Decision Making? [Seite 51]
3.4.1.2 - b) Specific and Severe Threats to Personal Autonomy [Seite 54]
3.4.2 - 2. Illuminating the Objective of Data Protection [Seite 55]
3.4.3 - 3. Balancing Personal Autonomy and Data Protection [Seite 58]
3.4.3.1 - a) Citizen-State-Relations [Seite 58]
3.4.3.2 - b) Citizen-Citizen-Relations [Seite 59]
3.5 - V. Conclusion [Seite 62]
4 - Educational Governmental Paternalism: "Buying Social Responsibility" [Seite 65]
4.1 - I. What is Educational Governmental Paternalism? [Seite 68]
4.1.1 - 1. Educational Governmental Paternalism [Seite 68]
4.1.2 - 2. "Buying Social" as an Example of Educational Paternalism [Seite 72]
4.2 - II. Phenomenology of Educational Paternalism in the PPD [Seite 74]
4.2.1 - 1. Strict "Must-Have" Requirements [Seite 75]
4.2.1.1 - a) Social Irresponsibility as a Ground for Exclusion [Seite 75]
4.2.1.2 - b) Social Contract Performance Conditions [Seite 76]
4.2.1.3 - c) Social Requirements in Technical Specifications [Seite 78]
4.2.2 - 2. Softer "Nice-to-Have" Requirements [Seite 79]
4.2.3 - 3. General Limitations of Social Requirements under the PPD [Seite 80]
4.3 - III. "Buying Social" - A Specific Fundamental Rights Problem? [Seite 81]
4.3.1 - 1. Limiting the Tenderer's Freedom of Occupation [Seite 81]
4.3.2 - 2. Specific Protection Against "Expressive" Content of Law? [Seite 84]
4.3.3 - 3. Protection Against Indirect Effects of "Expressive" Law? [Seite 87]
4.3.4 - 4. Education as Justification for Interferences? [Seite 88]
4.3.5 - 5. Two Specific Constitutional Requirements [Seite 93]
4.3.5.1 - a) Relevance of a Broad-Based Consensus [Seite 94]
4.3.5.2 - b) Consistency Principle [Seite 95]
4.4 - IV. Testing the Concept of "Buying Social" [Seite 96]
4.4.1 - 1. More and Less Morality [Seite 96]
4.4.2 - 2. Requirement of a Broad-Based Consensus [Seite 97]
4.4.3 - 3. Consistency of "Buying Social" [Seite 99]
4.5 - V. Conclusion [Seite 102]
5 - Epilogue: The Future of Governmental Paternalism [Seite 105]