Rights and Right-Holding

Name: Rights and Right-Holding | A Philosophical Investigation
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A Philosophical Investigation

Matthew H. Kramer(Autor*in)

OUP eBook (Verlag)

Erschienen am 13. Juli 2024

416 Seiten

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Inhalt

Cover
Rights and Right-Holding
Copyright
Contents
1. Introduction
1.1 The Scope of the Book
1.2 A Note on Formalization
1.3 A Note on Methodology and on the Standards for Success
1.3.1 A Misunderstanding of Appeals to Ordinary Understandings
1.3.2 Tu Quoque
1.3.3 Conjectures from an Armchair
1.3.4 More from Wenar's Armchair
1.3.5 Standards for Success
1.4 Past Publications
2. The Hohfeldian Analysis of Legal and Moral Relationships
2.1 Some Remarks on General Terminology
2.2 Correlativity
2.3 The Diagonals: Duality and Contradictoriness
2.4 Claim-?Rights and Duties
2.4.1 Contents and Conduct
2.4.2 Deontic Conflicts
2.4.3 Contradictions
2.4.4 Unenforcedness and Unenforceability
2.5 Liberties and No-?Rights
2.5.1 Unpaired Liberties and Paired Liberties
2.5.2 The Contents of Liberties
2.5.3 Exercises Protected by Claim-?Rights
2.5.4 Claim-?Rights without Liberties
2.5.5 Quantification over Parties
2.5.5.1 Some Clarification of Disjunctive Universal Quantification
2.5.5.2 Liberties and Distributive Universal Quantification
2.5.6 Limits on Duality
2.5.7 No-?Rights
2.5.7.1 Hohfeld's Misstep
2.5.7.2 The Reality of No-?Rights
2.6 Powers and Liabilities
2.6.1 More on Evaluative Neutrality
2.6.2 Quasi-?Powers and Quasi-?Liabilities
2.6.2.1 Insentient Forces and Entities
2.6.2.2 The Applicability of General Norms
2.6.3 Quantification Afresh
2.6.3.1 Quantification over Sets of Conditions for Changes in Legal Relationships
2.6.3.2 Quantification over Sets of Changes
2.6.3.3 Quantification over Potential Bearers of Liabilities
2.7 Immunities and Disabilities
2.7.1 The Importance of Immunities: Bills of Rights
2.7.1.1 A Qualification: Wrongdoing in Law-?Administration
2.7.1.2 Disabilities Imposed on Lawmakers
2.7.2 The Importance of Immunities: Securing Other Entitlements
3. In Defense of the Correlativity Axiom
3.1 A Glimpse of the Interest Theory of Right-?Holding
3.2 The Axiomaticity of the Correlativity Axiom
3.2.1 Compliance with Legal Requirements
3.2.1.1 Claim-?Rights Held Only by a System of Governance
3.2.1.2 Collectivities as Holders of Claim-?Rights
3.2.1.3 A Counterexample?
3.2.2 Conformity to Moral Requirements
3.3 Justificatory Priorities
3.4 Misrepresentations of the Correlativity Axiom
3.5 Eleemosynary Duties
3.6 More Mistakes by MacCormick
3.7 Generality versus Concreteness
3.8 Claim-?Rights versus Interests
3.9 Stages of Emergence
3.10 No Wrongs without Claim-?Rights
3.10.1 A Preliminary Clarification
3.10.2 A Third-?Party-?Beneficiary Contract
3.10.3 A Cheated Prizewinner
3.10.4 Overhearing a Falsehood
3.10.4.1 Another Misrepresentation of a Legal Judgment
3.10.4.2 Ostensible Concessions and Untenable Assertions
3.10.4.3 The Correlativity Axiom Disowned?
3.10.5 The Palsgraf Problem
3.10.6 Examples from the Bard
3.10.6.1 Much Ado about Nothing
3.10.6.2 Julius Caesar
3.10.6.3 The Killing of a Child by a Drunken Driver
3.10.7 Cornell's General Theoretical Reflections
3.10.7.1 Discreditable Origins?
3.10.7.2 Motivation versus Obligation
3.10.7.3 An Explosive Example
3.10.7.4 The Derivativeness of the Claim-?Rights of Third Parties
3.10.7.4.1 A First Rejoinder
3.10.7.4.2 A Second Rejoinder
3.10.7.4.3 A Third Rejoinder
3.10.7.5 The Interest/?Will Controversy
3.10.8 Conclusion
4. In Praise of the Interest Theory of Right-?Holding
4.1 The Interest Theory of Right-?Holding
4.1.1 Evaluative Tenets in the Interest Theory for the Holding of Legal Claim-?Rights
4.1.1.1 Objectivity versus Subjectivity
4.1.1.2 Legal Claim-?Rights versus Moral Claim-?Rights
4.1.2 The Overexpansiveness of the Interest Theory?
4.1.2.1 Bentham's Test
4.1.2.2 An Illustration of Bentham's Test
4.1.2.3 A Second Illustration: Back to the Third-?Party-?Beneficiary Contract
4.1.3 The Underinclusiveness of the Interest Theory?
4.1.3.1 A Third Illustration of Bentham's Test: Another Vignette from Sreenivasan
4.1.3.2 Bentham's Test and the Personal/?Vicarious Distinction
4.1.4 The Inordinate Flexibility of the Interest Theory?
4.1.4.1 The Misplacing of a Quantifier
4.1.4.2 The Matter of Categorization
4.2 The Interest Theory in Connection with the Holding of Moral Claim-?Rights
4.2.1 An Additional Clause?
4.2.2 An Additional Evaluative Premise
4.2.3 A Misconceived Criterion
4.3 The Interest Theory of Right-?Holding versus the Razian Interest Theory of Rights
4.3.1 On Balance versus Typically
4.3.2 Raz's Commitment to the Justificatory Priority of Victims' Interests
4.3.2.1 Punitive Torture and Monstrous Wrongdoers
4.3.2.2 Purposes of Perpetrators versus Interests of Victims
4.3.2.3 The Inappositeness of Raz's Justificatory Focus
4.4 The Capacious Version of the Interest Theory of Right-?Holding
4.4.1 Wenar's First Worry about the Capacious Version of the Interest Theory
4.4.2 A Second Set of Complaints by Wenar
4.4.3 Conflating Non-?Justificatory Questions with Justificatory Questions
4.4.4 The Discretion of a Parent Redux
4.4.5 Some Further Putative Counter-examples
4.4.6 Arrangements for Marriages
4.4.7 The Message to Be Gathered
4.4.7.1 Rousseau and Marx
4.4.7.2 Jesus of Nazareth
4.4.8 Some Problematic Legal Liberties
4.4.8.1 Paternalistic Legal Prohibitions
4.4.8.1.1 Inconclusiveness at Best
4.4.8.1.2 An Invalid Conclusion
4.4.8.2 Legal Liberties in a Dire Condition
4.4.9 Claim-?Rights and Other Entitlements
4.5 Objections to the Will Theory of Right-?Holding
4.5.1 A First Set of Objections
4.5.1.1 A Claim-?Right Not to Be Murdered or Rendered Comatose
4.5.1.2 No Claim-?Rights of Victims under the Criminal Law
4.5.1.3 Minimum-?Wage Laws
4.5.1.4 The Class of Potential Holders of Claim-?Rights
4.5.1.5 Fundamental Rights
4.5.2 The Near-?Eliminativism of the Will Theory
4.5.2.1 Two Default Rules
4.5.2.2 Two Situations Governed by the First Default Rule
4.5.2.2.1 A Limited Time for a Lawsuit
4.5.2.2.2 Unlimited Time for a Lawsuit
4.5.2.3 Two Situations Governed by Versions of the Second Default Rule
4.5.2.3.1 The Second Default Rule at the Post-?Violation Stage
4.5.2.3.2 A Variant of the Second Default Rule at the Pre-?Violation Stage
4.5.2.3.3 Steiner and the Conflation of Powers and Immunities
4.5.2.3.4 No Begging of the Question
4.5.2.3.5 Some Possible Rejoinders
4.5.3 A Further Critique of the Will Theory
4.6 A Short Summary
5. Potential Holders of Claim-?Rights
5.1 The Need for This Chapter
5.2 An Expansive Conception of Interests
5.2.1 Bowen's Worries about My Account of Interests
5.2.1.1 Bowen's First Substantive Query: The Univocality of a Theory
5.2.1.2 A Second Substantive Objection by Bowen: No Justification
5.2.2 Dworkin on Foetuses and Interests
5.2.2.1 An Excessively Controversial Position
5.2.2.2 Dworkin's First Argument: Begging the Question and Missing the Point
5.2.2.3 Dworkin's Second Argument: Missing the Target
5.2.2.4 Dworkin's Third Argument: Begging the Question and Missing the Target Afresh
5.2.2.5 Dworkin's Final Argument: Familiar Errors
5.3 Distinct Issues
5.4 A Discourse on Value
5.4.1 Instrumental Value
5.4.2 Constitutive Value
5.4.3 Intrinsic Value
5.4.4 Ultimate Value
5.4.4.1 Foreign Wording
5.4.4.2 No Specific Attitudes
5.4.4.3 Some of the Main Exclusions
5.4.4.4 Another Significant Exclusion
5.4.4.5 The Level of Application
5.4.4.6 Human Collectivities and Ultimate Value
5.5 Warranted Self-?Respect and the Class of Potential Holders of Claim-?Rights
5.5.1 A Community without Institutions
5.5.2 Non-?Paradigmatic Members in the Community of Potential Holders of Claim-?Rights
5.5.2.1 Inanimate and Insentient Entities
5.5.2.2 Non-?Human Animals
5.5.2.3 Non-?Human Animals and Ultimate Value
5.5.2.3.1 The Inclusion of Many Animals
5.5.2.3.2 The Exclusion of Certain Animals
5.5.2.3.3 Holding Claim-?Rights and Bearing Duties
5.5.2.4 Infants and People with Mental Incapacities
5.5.2.5 Permanently Comatose People and Anencephalic Infants
5.5.2.6 Foetuses
5.5.2.7 Dead People
5.5.2.7.1 The Overall Trajectory of a Life
5.5.2.7.2 Do Dead People Belong to the Community of Potential Holders of Claim-?Rights?
5.5.2.7.3 How Long?
5.5.2.7.4 Bowen's First Objection
5.5.2.7.5 A Second Line of Attack by Bowen
5.5.2.7.6 A Third Line of Attack by Bowen
5.5.2.7.7 A Query Borrowed from Kurki
5.5.2.7.8 Purposes Mistook and Fall'n on the Inventor's Head
5.5.2.8 Future Generations
5.5.2.8.1 Are Future Generations Assimilable Now to the People They Will Be?
5.5.2.8.2 When Are the Claim-?Rights of Future Generations Held?
5.5.2.8.3 Universal Quantification in the Holding of Claim-?Rights
5.5.2.8.4 The Non-?Identity Conundrum?
5.6 A Laconic Conclusion
References
Index

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