ONE
WHY GLOSTER?
Bushley, Tewkesbury
February 2004
Unable to attract official support, Frank Whittle found enough private backing to set up a company, Power Jets Ltd, in 1936 to build a prototype gas turbine engine - a 'jet'. In April the following year his U-type engine was successfully run for the first time - the first time, indeed, that a jet engine intended for flight had run anywhere in the world.
The Air Ministry, indifferent if not downright sceptical for so long, began cautiously to take notice. Whittle had gone beyond theory, surmounted a host of daunting technical challenges and shown that the thing could work. This was a time when it was commonly and widely believed that the future of air power lay in bombing the enemy's factories, infrastructure and population centres, that there was no effective defence against bombing aircraft en masse and that 'the bomber will always get through'.
When it was realised that Germany was rearming and had secretly developed an air force equipped with modern, high-performance aircraft, Britain looked at every possible way of mitigating the impending disaster which it knew it could not prevent: evacuation, air-raid shelters, gas masks for all, anti-aircraft gun and balloon barrages, fire watchers, early warning (including the Observer Corps and the new secret weapon, radar) and interceptor fighters with the greatest possible speed and rate of climb. What Whittle had pointed out back in 1928 was now more widely realised: there was a maximum speed beyond which it was physically impossible for a propeller-driven aircraft to go.
Maybe Whittle's engine was a possible answer? At least one person thought so where it mattered: Sir Henry Tizard, the far-sighted chairman of the Aeronautical Research Committee and Rector of Imperial College, London. Since 1935 he had chaired a special committee 'to investigate the possibilities of countering air attacks by utilising the recent progress of scientific invention'.
By 1939 Tizard was encouraging the Air Ministry's Director of Scientific Research, David Pye, who had reportedly become 'irritated by Whittle's importunity in urging that an aircraft should be built to test his engine'. Indeed, later in the year, Pye assured Whittle that 'the development of both engine and airframe would continue if war occurred'.
At a time when a huge variety of untried devices were competing for official support and financial backing, maximum resources had to be devoted to projects which were known to be cost-effective. The number of new projects which could be afforded financially, or using scarce materials or manpower, was strictly limited, but this one, Tizard believed, showed enough promise to be worth backing.
So, at last, Whittle received the support he had been denied for so long: the official go-ahead to build an engine for flight. Power Jets began to develop what became known as the W1. It had a centrifugal compressor, like its predecessor, but with ten small combustion chambers ringing the main chamber, unlike the single combustion chamber of the U-type. Hand in hand with the development of the W1 itself, thought was now given to the best way to test the new engine in flight. Adapting an existing airframe as a flying test bed was rejected early on. The next step was to call in all projects within certain parameters from design offices across the aircraft industry to see if any looked suitable. One in particular looked promising, a highly original design by the Gloster Aircraft Company.
With one of the most evocative names in British aviation history, the Gloster Company provided the Royal Air Force with front-line fighters from the 1920s to the 1960s: Grebe and Gamecock, Gauntlet and Gladiator, Meteor and Javelin. Its origins went back to the early years of the First World War, when a Cheltenham firm of specialist high-class woodworkers and architectural craftsmen, H.H. Martyn, began producing aircraft components in 1915. As subcontractors to the Aircraft Manufacturing Company - Airco, as it was known - Martyn soon acquired a reputation for quality, and in 1917 the two companies set up the Gloucestershire Aircraft Company (GAC) as a joint venture. By the end of the war they had built more than 300 Airco DH6 trainers and Bristol F2B fighters. The five founding directors included Hugh Burroughes of Airco, who was to serve as a director of the company until it closed down almost fifty years later, and A.W. Martyn of the Cheltenham firm. Martyn later backed George Dowty when he left Gloster to set up his own business, and became the first chairman of Dowty's new company.
Aircraft production slid rapidly into the doldrums after the Armistice of 1918 and many aircraft companies went under. GAC survived on government orders for Bristol Fighters for another couple of years and the directors bravely decided to continue as planemakers, buying the business from the liquidators when Airco was closed down in 1920. They had started on a contract to build the Nighthawk fighter, a successor to one of the First World War's best and most successful fighters, the Royal Aircraft Factory's SE5A. The Nighthawk would have become Britain's front-line fighter if the war had continued. It was a superb design, let down by the disastrous ABC Dragonfly engine which had been ordered in huge numbers as the main power plant for the RAF of 1919.
When the contract was cancelled, GAC bought the design rights and the completed and uncompleted airframes. Re-engined versions were trialled with the RAF - its first radial-engined fighter - and were built for the Fleet Air Arm, the Royal Hellenic Air Force and in quantity for the Imperial Japanese Navy. GAC also engaged Henry Folland, the designer of the SE5A and the Nighthawk. Folland proceeded to put the fledgling company on the map with a series of racing landplanes and seaplanes derived from his fighter. The Nighthawk led to the Grebe fighter of 1923, followed by the beefier Gamecock of 1925, both ordered in quantity for the RAF.
Foreign orders were coming in, too, and in 1926 the company changed its name to Gloster Aircraft - the word 'Gloucestershire' was too much for many overseas customers to pronounce. The company was riding high, and Folland's beautiful racing seaplanes, the Gloster IV and the Golden Arrow, featured in the thrilling international Schneider Trophy contests. Production of all other types had been transferred by now to Gloster's new factory at Hucclecote and the adjoining Brockworth airfield, just east of Gloucester.
But the trend now was for all-metal construction, and Gloster soon lost out to Armstrong-Whitworth's Siskin, Bristol's Bulldog and Hawker's Fury. A succession of experimental types kept the design department busy, and the manufacture of the all-metal Siskin and steel wings for other non-Gloster aircraft kept the company solvent - just. But the 1930-31 slump followed and between 1930 and 1933 Gloster built only five aircraft - not just types, but individual aircraft - of its own design.
Director Hugh Burroughes was determined to keep the company afloat. Underutilised hangars were sublet for storing charabancs, for an indoor tennis court and even for raising pigs and growing mushrooms. Burroughes was also deputy chairman of the industry's trade association, the Society of British Aircraft Constructors (SBAC), and was in discussion with the Air Ministry, which was taking steps at this time towards reducing the number of companies in the industry. At the same time Hawker was thriving and RAF orders were dominated by its Hart and Fury types. In May 1934 Hawker approached Gloster with a takeover proposal. It was clear to Burroughes that Hawker could provide 'a prolonged period of full employment for all GAC personnel'. The Gloster board accepted this in June and the firm's independence was over - but its workforce had survived. Burroughes continued as a director, while the able Frank McKenna was appointed production manager and later became general manager.
Soon afterwards Gloster's design fortunes were also revived when the company received a production order in 1935 for Folland's Gauntlet fighter. Its successor, the Gladiator, was ordered in even greater numbers and, as the RAF's last biplane fighter, went on to win fame in many theatres of war. The Hawker takeover was also followed by substantial extensions to the factory. Between 1935 and 1939 available floor space rose to almost 1 million square feet, largely thanks to the initiative of group managing director Frank Spencer Spriggs and his chairman, Thomas Sopwith.
After his Gladiator had first flown in 1934, Folland stayed on to design a monoplane fighter to specification F5/34 but no orders were forthcoming. It became clear that Hawker's chief designer, Sydney Camm - lacking Folland's humour and charm, but with a string of successful designs to his credit - was very much in the ascendant. Folland could not bear the lack of autonomy after the Hawker takeover, and felt that the new parent company would favour Camm's designs over his own. When his latest design, the F5/34 monoplane, was unsuccessful in winning orders against R.J. Mitchell's Spitfire and Camm's Hurricane, he decided to set up his own company. His track record was good enough for him to raise funds to purchase British Marine at Hamble. He left Gloster in 1937, accompanied by H.E. Preston, his trusty stressman since Royal Aircraft Factory days more than twenty years before, to set up the Folland Aircraft Company.
Folland was succeeded as chief designer by George Carter, who had been Camm's boss at Hawker in the early 1920s; their relationship seems to have been an uneasy one. Camm took over as chief designer at...
