The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU

Name: The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU
Brand: Hart Publishing
Price: 328.99 EUR
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Robert O'Donoghue KC Jorge Padilla(Autor*in)

Hart Publishing

3. Auflage

Erschienen am 3. September 2020

1368 Seiten

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978-1-5099-4297-8 (ISBN)

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Inhalt

Cover
Half-title
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Foreword to the Third Edition
Foreword to the First Edition
Authors' Preface to the Third Edition
Contents
Table of Cases
Table of Legislation
1. Introduction, Scope of Application, and Basic Framework
1.1. Introduction
1.2. Objectives of Article 102 TFEU
1.3. Scope of Application of Article 102 TFEU
1.3.1. Territorial Scope of Article 102 TFEU
1.3.2. The Defi nition Of An Undertaking
1.3.2.1. Generally
1.3.2.2. Public bodies as undertakings
1.3.2.3. Sporting and cultural activities
1.3.2.4. Two-sided platforms and "free" services as undertakings
1.3.3. State Action Defence
1.3.4. Parent Liability For Subsidiary Actions Under Article 102 TFEU
1.4. Relationship between Article 102 TFEU and Other Legal Instruments
1.4.1. Article 102 TFEU and General Principles Of EU Law
1.4.2. The Relationship Between Articles 101 and 102 TFEU
1.4.3. Article 102 TFEU And Merger Control Laws
1.4.4. Article 102 TFEU And the Rules On State Action
1.4.5. Article 102 TFEU And Regulation
1.4.6. Article 102 TFEU And National Abuse Of Dominance Laws
1.4.7. Article 102 TFEU And Arbitration
2. History, Development, and Reform
2.1. Introduction
2.2. History of Article 102 TFEU
2.3. Development of Article 102 TFEU
2.4. The Reform of Article 102 TFEU
2.4.1. The Road To Reform
2.4.2. The Discussion Paper And Its Antecedents
2.4.3. The Guidance Paper
2.4.4. Criticisms Of "Light Touch" Judicial Review
2.4.5. Criticisms Of Commission Procedure
2.5. The Nascent Post-Reform Period
3. Market Definition
3.1. Introduction
3.2. Product Market Defi nition: Basic Concepts
3.2.1. Demand-Side Substitution
3.2.2. Supply-Side Substitution
3.2.3. Chains of Substitution
3.2.4. Potential Competition
3.3. Relevant Product Markets: From Theory to Practice
3.3.1. Hypothetical Monopolist Test: Overview
3.3.2. Assessing Demand-Side Substitution Under the HMT
3.3.2.1. Quantitative techniques
3.3.2.2. Qualitative evidence
3.3.2.3. Other sources of evidence
3.3.3. Assessing Supply-Side Substitution Under The HMT
3.4. Geographic Market Defi nition
3.4.1. Key Concepts
3.4.2. Defi ning Geographic Markets In Practice
3.5. Selected Issues on Market Defi nition
3.5.1. Impact Of Price Discrimination On Market Defi nition
3.5.2. Market Defi nition In Tying And Bundling Cases
3.5.3. Aftermarkets
3.5.4. Market Defi nition In Multi-Sided Markets
4. Dominance
4.1. Introduction
4.2. Single Firm Dominance
4.2.1. Basic Approach
4.2.2. The Starting Point: Market Shares
4.2.3. Barriers To Entry And Expansion
4.2.3.1. Defi nition of barriers to entry
4.2.3.2. Characteristics inherent in the relevant market
4.2.3.3. Characteristics specifi c to the allegedly dominant firm
4.2.3.4. Conduct of the allegedly dominant firm
4.2.4. Countervailing Buyer Power
4.2.5. Evidence Of Actual Competition On The Relevant Market
4.3. Collective Dominance
4.3.1. Introduction
4.3.2. The Economics Of Collective Dominance
4.3.2.1 Firms have the incentive to avoid competing
4.3.2.2. Reaching and maintaining a tacit agreement is feasible
4.3.2.3. Conclusion
4.3.3. Legal Principles Governing Collective Dominance
4.3.3.1. Evolution
4.3.3.2. Establishing collective dominance under Article 102 TFEU
4.3.4. Selected Issues On Collective Dominance
4.4. Dominant Buyers
4.5. "Superdominance"
4.6. Dominance in Multi-Sided Markets
4.7. Substantial Part of the Common Market
5. The General Concept of An Abuse
5.1. Introduction
5.2. The Economics of Abusive Unilateral Conduct
5.2.1. Evolution of Economic Thinking On Unilateral Conduct
5.2.2. Designing Economically Optimal Rules For Unilateral Conduct
5.2.3. Advances In Defi ning Exclusionary Conduct
5.2.3.1. The profi t sacrifi ce test and its close relations
5.2.3.2. Equally effi cient competitor test
5.2.3.3. Consumer welfare test
5.2.3.4. Acceptance of the above tests under Article 102 TFEU
5.3. The Categories of Abuse under Article 102 TFEU
5.3.1. Exploitative Abuses (Article 102(a))
5.3.2. Exclusionary Abuses (Article 102(b))
5.3.3. Discriminatory Abuses (Article 102(c))
5.3.4. Tying Abuses (Article 102(d))
5.3.5. Leveraging Abuse
5.3.6. List Of Abuses In Article 102 TFEU: Illustrative Or Exhaustive?
5.4. Anticompetitive Effects under Article 102 TFEU
5.4.1. The Need For Causation Between Dominance And The Abuse
5.4.2. The Standard For Anticompetitive Effects Under Article 102 TFEU
5.4.3. Consumer Harm
5.4.4. The Role Of Intent Evidence
5.5. Objective Justification
6. Predatory Pricing
6.1. Introduction
6.2. The Economics of Predatory Pricing
6.2.1. Basic Cost Defi nitions
6.2.2. Strategic Considerations
6.3. The Basic Rules On Below-Cost Price Cutting under Article 102 TFEU
6.3.1. Pricing Below AVC
6.3.2. Pricing Above AVC/AAC But Below ATC
6.3.3. The Relevant Revenues
6.4. Specifi c Issues with Below-Cost Pricing under Article 102 TFEU
6.4.1. Recoupment
6.4.2. Dealing With Joint And Common Costs
6.4.3. Cross-Subsidies
6.4.4. Situations Involving High Fixed And Low Variable Costs
6.4.5. Situations In Which A Product Incurs Inevitable Start-Up Losses
6.5. Exclusionary Above-Cost Price Cuts under Article 102 TFEU
6.6. Objective Justifi cation
6.6.1. Introduction
6.6.2. Meeting Competition
6.6.3. Short-Term Promotional Offers
6.6.4. Market-Expanding Effi ciencies
6.6.5. Loss-Leading and "Follow on" Revenues
6.6.6. Excess Capacity and Loss-Minimising
6.6.7. Miscellaneous Defences
7. Margin Squeeze
7.1. Introduction
7.2. The Economics of Margin Squeeze
7.2.1. Defi nition
7.2.2. Basic Economic Conditions For A Margin Squeeze
7.2.3. Motivation For A Margin Squeeze
7.3. Basic Legal Conditions for a Margin Squeeze
7.3.1. Vertical Integration
7.3.2. Control Over An Important Upstream Input
7.3.3. The Imputation Test(s)
7.3.3.1. The basic legal test
7.3.3.2. "Reasonably effi cient" competitor test
7.3.4. The Relevant Costs In A Margin Squeeze Case
7.3.5. Assessing Profi tability In Margin Squeeze Cases
7.3.6 The Need For Comparable Wholesale And Retail Products
7.3.7 Anticompetitive Effects
7.3.8 Objective Justifi cation
7.4. The Relationship between Margin Squeeze and Other Abuses
7.4.1. Margin Squeeze And Excessive Pricing
7.4.2. Margin Squeeze And "Pure" Predatory Pricing
7.4.3. Margin Squeeze And Refusal To Deal Under Article 102 TFEU
7.4.4. Margin Squeeze And Cross Subsidies
7.5. Diffi culties with Identifying an Anticompetitive Margin Squeeze in Practice
7.6. Confl icts between Regulation and Competition Law in Margin Squeeze Cases
8. Exclusive Dealing and Related Practices
8.1. Introduction
8.2. Economics of Exclusive Dealing
8.2.1. The "Chicago School" View Of Exclusive Dealing
8.2.2. Post-Chicago Theories Of Exclusive Dealing
8.2.3. Evaluating The Competing Theories On Exclusive Dealing
8.3. Evolution of the Approach to Exclusive Dealing under Article 102 TFEU
8.3.1. The Historic Approach: Presumption of Illegality
8.3.2. Towards a Rule-of-Reason: Van den Bergh Foods
8.3.3. Commission Policy/Decisions Favouring a Rule Of Reason Approach
8.4. Assessment of Exclusive Dealing under Article 102 TFEU
8.4.1. The Correct Legal Test
8.4.2. Exclusive And Near-Exclusive Dealing: Defi nition
8.4.3. Anticompetitive Foreclosure And Anticompetitive Effects
8.5. Practices Falling Short of Outright Exclusivity
8.5.1. English Clauses
8.5.2. Slotting Allowances
8.5.3. Equipment Placement
8.5.4. Category Management
8.6. Objective Justification
9. Loyalty Rebates and Related Practice
9.1. Introduction
9.2. Economics of Loyalty Rebates
9.2.1. Procompetitive Reasons For Using Loyalty Rebates
9.2.2. Possible Anticompetitive Effects Of Loyalty Rebates
9.2.3. Conclusion
9.3. Assessment of Loyalty Rebates under Article 102 TFEU
9.3.1. Taxonomy
9.3.2. Rebates Linked to Exclusive or Near-Exclusive Dealing
9.3.2.1. The correct legal test
9.3.2.2. Showing the requisite conditionality in exclusivity cases
9.3.2.3. Assessing anticompetitive foreclosure effects in practice
9.3.3. Individualised All-Unit Rebates
9.3.3.1. Theoretical underpinnings
9.3.3.2. Treatment in the case law
9.3.3.3. The approach in the Guidance Paper
9.3.4. Incremental Rebates
9.3.5. Standardised or Quantity Rebates
9.4. Objective Justification
10. Refusal to Deal
10.1. Introduction
10.2. The Economics of Refusal to Deal
10.2.1. IP Rights
10.2.2. Physical Property
10.3. The Duty to Deal with Competitors
10.3.1. Evolution of the Decisional Practice And Case Law
10.3.2. The Legal Conditions For A Duty To Deal With Rivals Under Article 102 TFEU
10.3.2.1. First contracts or licences
10.3.2.2. How many contracts must be concluded by the dominant firm
10.3.2.3. Terminating a course of dealing
10.3.2.4. Relevance of the source or perceived value of the property right
10.3.2.5. "Regulatory" refusals to deal
10.4. Duty to Deal with Customers under Article 102 TFEU
10.4.1. The Duty to Supply Inputs to Customers
10.4.2. Refusals To Deal Arising at the Level Of Distribution Or Resale
10.4.3. Refusal To Deal And Parallel Trade
11. Tying and Bundling
11.1. Introduction
11.2. The Economics of Tying and Bundling
11.2.1. Effi ciency Motivations
11.2.2. Possible Anticompetitive Motivations
11.2.3. Empirical Evidence
11.2.4. Conclusions
11.3. Tying and Bundling under Article 102 TFEU
11.3.1. Evolution Of the Decisional Practice and Case Law
11.3.2. Legal Conditions For Tying and Bundling
11.4. Tying in Aftermarkets
11.5. Mixed Bundling
11.5.1. Overview
11.5.2. The Legal Treatment Of Mixed Bundling
11.5.3. Suggested Framework
12. Exclusionary Non-Price Abuses
12.1. Introduction
12.2. Examples of Exclusionary Non-Price Abuses
12.2.1. Predatory Design Changes/Product Introduction
12.2.2. Vexatious Civil Litigation
12.2.3. Use And Abuse Of Regulatory Or Government Procedures
12.2.4. Abuses and Pharmaceutical Regulatory Procedures
12.2.4.1. Background
12.2.4.2. Misleading representations to patent offi ces
12.2.4.3. Product substitution/deregistration as an abuse
12.2.4.4. Abuses and divisional patents
12.2.4.5. Settlement agreements and "reverse" payments
12.2.5. Miscellaneous Practices
13. Abusive Conduct and Standards
13.1. Introduction
13.2. The Meaning of Frand Terms
13.2.1. Overview
13.2.2. Economic Theory
13.2.3. Possible Approaches To FRAND
13.2.4. Non-Discrimination And Article 102 TFEU
13.2.5. Global Portfolio Licenses And FRAND
13.2.6. The Level(s) of Licensing
13.2.7. Interface Between Contract Law and Article 102 TFEU
13.3. Injunctive Relief And FRAND Terms
13.3.1. Economic Principles
13.3.2. The Competing Arguments
13.3.3. Possible Legal Approaches
13.3.4. The Court Of Justice Ruling In Huawei v ZTE
13.4. Deception/Misreprestation
13.5. Abusive Acquisition or Accumulation of IPRs
14. Excessive Pricing
14.1. Introduction
14.2. The Economics of Excessive Prices
14.3. The Legal Test(S) for Excessive Prices
14.3.1. Overview
14.3.2. The Basic Legal Test
14.3.3. The Concept Of "Economic Value"
14.3.4. Application Of Benchmarks
14.3.5. Excessive Pricing In Vertical Relationships
14.4. Diffi culties with the Current Approach to Excessive Prices
14.5. Alternative Approaches to Excessive Pricing under Article 102 TFEU
14.6. Conclusion
15. Abusive Discrimination
15.1. Introduction
15.2. The Economics of Price Discrimination
15.2.1. Conditions For Price Discrimination
15.2.2. Welfare Effects Of Price Discrimination
15.2.3. Conclusion
15.3. Legal Conditions for Abusive Discrimination
15.3.1. Equivalent Transactions
15.3.2. Dissimilar Conditions
15.3.3. Competitive Disadvantage
15.3.4. Consumer Harm Under Article 102(c)
15.4. Examples of Abusive Discrimination
15.4.1. Discrimination By a Vertically-Integrated Dominant Firm
15.4.2. Pure Secondary-Line Discrimination
15.4.3. Nationality Or Residence Discrimination
15.4.4. Discrimination Intended To Partition National Markets
15.4.5. Most-Favoured Company Clauses
15.4.6. Discriminatory Supplies In Times Of Shortage
15.5. Objective Justification
16. Other Exploitative Abuses
16.1. Introduction
16.2. Abuse of Monopsony Purchasing Power
16.2.1. Basic Economics Of Monopsony Power
16.2.2. Conditions For A Possible Abuse
16.3. Unfair and Exploitative Contract Terms
16.3.1. Reasons For A Limited Case Law
16.3.2. Legal Test For Abusive And Unfair Contract Terms
16.3.3. Conclusion
17. Abuses in Digital Platform Markets
17.1. Introduction
17.2. The Wider Context
17.3. The Economics of Multi-Sided Platforms
17.3.1. Basic Economic Characteristics/Effects
17.3.2. Pricing In Multi-Sided Markets
17.3.3. Market Structure And Tipping Risk
17.3.4. Platform Strategies
17.4. Exclusionary Abuses
17.4.1. Overview
17.4.2. Shopping
17.4.3. Android
17.4.4. AdSense
17.4.5. Non-Infringement Cases
17.5. Exploitative Abuses
17.6. Unresolved Issues and Areas of Controversy
17.7. Conclusion
18. Effect on Trade
18.1. Introduction
18.2. Basic Legal Conditions for Effect on Trade
18.3. Specific Applications of the Effect on Trade Concept
18.3.1. Abuses Covering Several Member States
18.3.2. Abuses Covering A Single Member State
18.3.3. Abuses Covering Only A Part Of A Member State
18.3.4. Abuses Concerning Trade Outside The EU
19. Remedies
19.1. Introduction
19.2. General Principles Governing Remedies
19.2.1. Objectives of Remedies
19.2.2. Remedies Must Be Effective
19.2.3. Remedies Must Be Proportionate
19.3. Principal Types of Administrative Decisions
19.3.1. Interim Measures
19.3.2. Commitment Decisions
19.3.2.1. Overview
19.3.2.2. Commitment decision procedure
19.3.2.3. Legal effect of commitment decisions
19.3.3. Non-Applicability Decisions
19.3.4. Undertakings
19.3.5. Guidance Letters
19.3.6. Final Infringement Decisions
19.4. Principal Types of Remedies
19.4.1. Fines
19.4.2. Behavioural Remedies
19.4.2.1. Exclusionary pricing abuses
19.4.2.2. Remedies for excessive pricing
19.4.2.3. Remedies in discrimination cases
19.4.2.4. Compulsory dealing remedies
19.4.2.5. Remedies in tying cases
19.4.3. Structural Remedies
19.4.3.1. Introduction and overview
19.4.3.2. Conditions for ordering a structural remedy
19.4.3.3. Case studies
19.4.4. Effect of Article 102 TFEU On Contractual Validity
19.5. Private Litigation and Remedies
19.5.1. Introduction
19.5.2. Goals Of Private Enforcement
19.5.3. Legal Basis For Private Enforcement
19.5.4. Key Legal Issues In The Development Of Private Enforcement
19.5.5. Quantifi cation of Damages in Article 102 TFEU Cases
19.5.5.1. Overview
19.5.5.2. Commission Guidance
19.5.5.3. Decisional practice
19.5.5.3. A suggested conceptual framework
19.5.6. Procedural Issues
Index

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