National identity, crises of legitimacy and penetration of social networks

The main features of Middle Eastern and North African societies still evident to some extent are their traditional customs, strong tribal ties and religious attitudes. The emergence of mass and social media in these countries has threatened the historical ties holding communities together and many traditional social norms have been fading away among the youth. Accurate studies are needed to shed more light on national identity as the outcome of the interaction between individuals and communities and the mass media, and its position in the era of Internet-based media. It is in the nature of the people of the Middle East to develop deep connections with other groups of people. This remains evident, even in the social media, and is is probably one of the main reasons for the increased adoption and use of social networks in the region. In fact, the young people of these countries try to keep in contact with each other using modern methods rather than lose touch. This chapter will present how important a tie religion is within the community. As more emphasis is placed on the importance of religion, we will keep in mind that the Middle East and North Africa are the geographic origins and homes of some of the greatest religions in the world. We therefore aim to find a logical relationship between the socialisation process, social media, national identity and religion and social movements.

Keywords

legitimacy crisis; national identity; religious attitudes; socialisation

Socialisation and national identity

Imagine an infant. You know, that infant will need to go through the process of socialisation by way of interacting with the real world and the surrounding community. In the past, family and peers had the main role in this process. Nowadays, however, the mass media, with their permanent infusion of messages, play an undeniable role in the process as well, with many researchers believing the intensity of this role shapes the personal and social identity of individuals. However, things are different when the mass media are transformed into social media and personal identity is affected by these transformations. A study of 253 Iranians (between the ages of 18 and 32) who were not members of any social networks and 308 individuals who use social networks frequently presented interesting results. Simple statistical analysis of the participants showed significant differences in national identity scores in that the first group scored 4.37 and the second group scored 3.32 (out of 7). In this regard, social networks act in two ways. First, encountering different ideas and beliefs and the gradual process of developing group attitudes attenuates the sense of national identity. Second, we may assume that individuals with weaker ties to their national identity will have a stronger tendency to join virtual social networks and consume mass media. A test was devised for this hypothesis, which showed that there were no significant differences between participants with a strong sense of national identity and those with a weak sense of national identity who had never joined an online social network, regarding their desire to join such a network.1 To obtain more accurate results another test was conducted over a nine-month period. The national identity scores of 35 females and males who were not members of a social network were measured. The participants were asked to sign up to Facebook and spend at least three hours per week on the website. (That the participants met the minimum online time requirement was checked by the author.) The national identity scores of the participants was measured again after nine months. Except for a normal increase in three cases and nine cases where there was no change, there was significant decrease in the other participants' scores. In general, statistical analysis showed a significant change in national identity scores before and after use of the social networks. One probable explanation is that the author's sample faced a huge range of new ideas and opinions that affected the overall results. However, some national identity indices remained unchanged even among those showing a decreased score. Time restrictions prevented the conducting of further studies to see whether these indices would remain unchanged over a longer period, bearing in mind that the extent of variation of the indices depends on other factors, such as the period of membership of the social network. In the case of the Iranian members of social networks, for instance, one probable factor is that they might encounter a new sense of freedom, in contrast with members of more liberal societies where a social network may be taken for granted and not appear to be much of an extra freedom.

More studies are required for cases like Iran. Our results, for cases like Iran, arouse new concerns for government officials. They might ponder their dilemma: imposing limits on access to social networks raises worries about freedoms, democracy and human rights on one hand, while free access to social networks threatens national identity and widens the gap between the government and the nation, which may give rise to popular public movements in the long term. Different states adopt different policies when faced with such a dilemma. As mentioned briefly in the last chapter, there are other factors, such as a crisis of legitimacy, that may result in public movements. States that impose limitations on access to social networks must keep in mind that their priority should be meeting the expectations and needs of their people. It is clear, when one delves into the triggering factors of the recent Arabic revolutions, for example in the case of Egypt, that achieving national development, fighting corrupt administrative systems and seeking justice and welfare for all social classes are the most important motivators for social movements (Serag, 2011). These factors may increase a legitimacy crisis. Let us go further and assume that if Mohammad Bouazizi in Tunisia (the young man who set himself on fire) knew about the power of social networks, would he have made the same decision and sacrificed his own life? There are examples where social media, along with government corruption, may topple the regime.

What was interesting in that situation was that the mass media and journalists tried not to cover the news about the self-immolation of Mohammed Buazizi and even YouTube was filtered by the Tunisian government. Nevertheless, Facebook was the most important medium to inform the public in Tunisia and other countries (Comninos, 2011). This shows that protesters always find a way to express themselves in spite of all the precautions taken by the ruling power to control the situation. One of the main factors under consideration that could be the trigger for a legitimacy crisis is placing limitations on free political and social participation. Figure 2.1 illustrates the status of six countries regarding two questions: 'To what extent do you believe that lack of social and political participation increased your activities on social media?' The average is based on a seven-point scale (1 very low and 7 very high).

The term 'social participation' refers to individuals' concerns and engagement regarding social and personal responsibilities. It has been pointed out by many researchers that a falling rate of social participation may annihilate a regime or render a social life lacking in motivation. These are people who feel no control over their lives. Analysis of survey results in the five countries under consideration in the Middle East showed above average effectiveness of this factor. However, in the cases of Yemen and Jordan, the score obtained was far lower than those obtained in the other countries; in general, the scores obtained showed that social networks are a place to experience more social participation. On this platform, people who could not elect those in authority were entering virtual groups with which they shared common beliefs. They created their own group, managed it and felt responsible for other members within the group. They were free to share ideas and felt support, for example through the number of 'likes' they received via the social network Facebook. In the absence of any social participation in the real society, protesting virtually against the ruling power is not the only reason to join social networks, for there are feelings such as being effective to take into consideration. A brief comparison between the countries under study and the USA clarifies the results further. Prohibition of participation in social and political activities cannot be the reason for the tendency to use social networks in America. There are two possible explanations then: either the social and political participation of Americans in real society is higher than in the countries studied, or there must be a missing factor that explains this lower rate of participation (and the resulting effect of social and political participation on activities in the social media) among Americans.

The data from the next part of the questionnaire were used to examine the current level of political and social participation in real society. To see the results reverse Figure 2.1. The level of political and social participation among American individuals is in the range 3.54 to 3.91 compared with 2.05 to 2.8 for the five Arab countries. Although the position of the USA in the scale is not significantly high, it is acceptable. Thus the absence of individual participation in...