Beyond Physicalism

Name: Beyond Physicalism
Brand: John Benjamins Publishing Company
Price: 88.49 EUR
Availability: OnlineOnly

Daniel D. Hutto(Autor*in)

John Benjamins Publishing Company

1. Auflage

Erschienen am 15. Mai 2000

XVI, 306 Seiten

E-Book

PDF mit Adobe-DRM

Systemvoraussetzungen

978-90-272-8343-6 (ISBN)

88,49 €inkl. 7% MwSt.

Systemvoraussetzungen

für PDF mit Adobe-DRM

E-Book Einzellizenz

Als Download verfügbar

Beschreibung

Weitere Details

Weitere Ausgaben

Person

Inhalt

BEYOND PHYSICALISM
Editorial page
Title page
Copyright page
Dedication page
Table of contents
List of Figures
Acknowledgements
INTRODUCTION
1. The Phenomenology Problem
2. The Metaphysical Problem
3. The Need to Go Beyond
CHAPTER ONE Nonconceptual Experience
1. Introduction
2. A Preliminary Case for Nonconceptual Experience
2.1. The Ancient Pedigree of Nonconceptualism
2.2. Some Reasons to Think Experience is Nonconceptual
2.2.1. Perceptual Illusions and Noticing Aspects
2.2.2. The Imagery Debate
2.2.3. The Fine-grainedness of Experience
3. Experience, Conceptual Description and Theory
3.1. The Conceptual Expression of Experience
3.2. The Role of Experience in Interpretation
3.3. On Simulation and Basic Communalit
3.3.1. The Off-Line Processing Proposal
3.2.2. The Introspective Modelling Proposal
3.3. The Nonsensicality of Behavioural Meaning
4. Conclusion
CHAPTER TWO. From a Sensational Point of View
1. Introduction
2. Is Experience Theory-Resistant?
2.1. The Verstehen Version of the What-it-is-Like Argument
2.2. The Failings of the Knowledge Argument
2.2.1. Know how = Experience and Ability
2.3. The Virtues of the Knowledge Argument
3. Rejecting the Strong Representationalist Thesis
3.1. The Rejection of Standard Representational Theories
3.1.1. The Best of Intentionality
3.2. The Subject and Subjectivity
3.3. The Representationalist Dilemma
3.3.1. Changing the Subject
3.3.2. Avoiding the Subject
4. Conclusion
CHAPTER THREE. The Failure of Explanatory Physicalism
1. Introduction
2. Functionalism and the Why-Question
2.1. Abstract Functionalism
2.1.1. Standard Objections to Abstract Functionalism
2.2. Homuncular Teleofunctionalism
2.3. From Functionalism to Physicalism
3. What's the Matter with Explanatory Physicalism?
3.1. Reductive Physicalism
3.1.1. The Criterion Objection
3.1.2. The Multiple Realizability Objection
3.1.3. The Intelligibility Objection
3.2. Eliminativist Physicalism
3.3. Non-Reductive Physicalism: The Soft Option
3.3.1. Emergentism
3.3.2. Non-Constructive Naturalism
4. Conclusion
CHAPTER FOUR. Intelligibility and Conceptual Limits
1. Introduction
2. Problems in Defining the Physical
2.1. A Reply to Crane and Mellor
2.2. Interpretation and Quantum Physics
3. Experience and the Object-based Schema
3.1. Stuff and Nonsense
3.2. Two Rejections of the Reified Mind
3.2.1. Heterophenomenology and the Lack of Interpretation
3.2.2. Wittgenstein's Expressivist Account
4. Referring to Modes of Presentation
4.1. Questioning the Standard
5. Conclusion
CHAPTER FIVE. Pluralistic Naturalism and Absolute Idealism
1. Introduction
2. Two Metaphysical Approaches
2.1. Ontological Pluralism and Substance Dualism
2.2. Minimal Physicalism
2.2.1. Supervenience, Covariance and Strict Implica
2.2.1.1. Objections to Supervenience and Strict Implicat
2.2.2. The Token Identity Thesis
2.3. The Advantages of Monism
3. The Return of Absolute Idealism
3.1. Two Absolute Idealist Accounts of Reality
3.1.1. Is Reality Spiritual in Nature?
3.2. The Superior Metaphysics of Absolute Idealism
3.2.1. Aesthetic Considerations
3.3. Dissolving the Metaphysical Problem
4. Conclusion
CHAPTER SIX. Defending Absolute Idealism
1. Introduction
2. Hasn't Absolute Idealism Already Been Refuted?
3. A Tale of Two Philosophies
3.1. The Epistemology and Metaphysics of Analytic Philosophy
3.2. Bradley's Absolute and Relative Truths
4. Bradley's Philosophy of Science
4.1. Does Science Seek Unity?
4.2. The Case for A Disunified Science
4.3. Bradleyian Conclusions
5. A Reply to McHenry
6. Conclusion
CHAPTER SEVEN. Truth and the Whole Truth
1. Introduction
2. The Discursive Picture of Reality
2.1. Correspondence Theories of Truth
2.1.1. The Very Idea of Total Correspondence
2.1.2. Naturalised Correspondence Theories
3. Modest Realism and Correspondence
3.1. The Mind-Independence of the World
4. The Return of The Absolute
4.1. Truth as and Independent Norm
4.2. What Explains Scientific Progress?
5. Conclusion
Notes
Chapter One
Chapter Two
Chapter Three
Chapter Four
Chapter Five
Chapter Six
Chapter Seven
References
Index

Systemvoraussetzungen

Als PDF speichern Als Link merken