The Role of Economic Analysis in EU Competition Law: The European School

Name: The Role of Economic Analysis in EU Competition Law: The European School | The European School
Brand: Kluwer Law International
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The European School

Doris Hildebrand(Autor*in)

Kluwer Law International (Verlag)

4. Auflage

Erschienen am 18. Mai 2016

586 Seiten

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Beschreibung

Almost two decades after the arrival of the 'more economics based approach' to EU competition law, this economic school of thought, the European School, has been properly defined and is now in general used among competition law practitioners and their government counterparts. This genuine European economic approach, studied by Doris Hildebrand since the first edition of this now-classic work, implements the European cornerstones of the social market economy concept such as freedom of contract, social fairness, and the equality principle. Now, in the book's revised and updated fourth edition, the author explores the full spectrum of this development in detail, uncovering its multiple rationales as it has gradually formulated the legal principles of 'competition economics' that have come to underlie all matters related to Article 101 (1), Article 101 (3), Article 102, the Merger Regulation, and the State Aid provisions.

As in previous editions, the book's interdisciplinary approach integrates law and economics in such a way that economics in competition proceedings becomes easier to understand for lawyers not trained in economic theory or economic school of thoughts. It offers an in-depth description of 'European School' theories and applications, particularly with respect to vertical and horizontal agreements. In addition, the book provides solid guidance on the definition of the relevant antitrust markets, with a detailed description of the hypothetical monopolist test.

Among the fundamental elements discussed are the following:

- - application of economics in the competition test as developed by the EU Courts;

- - concrete economic analysis companies need to perform in order to qualify for an exemption;

- - test procedures to assess whether a certain behaviour constitutes an abuse under Article 102;

- - various methodologies to define markets;

- - contrasting the European and Chicago schools;

- - practical implementation of the EU social market economy objective in EU competition law;

- - use of evidence in market definition practice;

- - State Aid provisions; and

- - empirical techniques used to evaluate a merger.

All significant cases contributory to the development of European competition economics are discussed and analysed in detail. A new first chapter on 'The Frame' clearly demonstrates all the ways in which EU competition policy represents an essential foundation of the EU. Moreover 'The Frame' elaborates that the social market economy objective as defined in the Lisbon Treaty is from the economic perspective the appropriate benchmark in any EU competition law assessment. This benchmark requires a holistic approach by taking into account 'utilities' of EU citizens instead of focusing on price elements only.
This new updated and revised edition has been anticipated, and will be widely welcomed. Competition lawyers, corporate in-house counsel, competition authorities, and courts will appreciate the book's clear, understandable discussion of the relevant European competition theory, authoritative guidance on the application of economic analysis, and practical insight in dealing with these subjects in real-world cases.

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Inhalt

Cover
Half Title Page
Editorial Board
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
Foreword
List of Figures
List of Tables
CHAPTER 1 The Frame
1.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE FRAME
1.1.1 The Equality Principle in EU Competition Law
1.1.2 More Economics Based Approach/European School
1.1.3 Other Schools of Thought in Competition Law
1.1.4 Tensions between Different Schools of Thought?
1.1.5 The Confusion
1.1.6 Differences between the European Approach and Chicago Scholars
1.1.7 Aim of This Book
1.1.8 Guidance
1.2 DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN SCHOOL FRAME
1.2.1 Drafting the EU Competition Provisions
1.2.1.1 World War II Period
1.2.1.2 Treaty of Paris 1951
1.2.1.3 Spaak Report 1956
1.2.1.4 From the Spaak Report to the Treaty of Rome 1957
1.2.2 Modernisation Process
1.3 THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
1.4 THE ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK
1.4.1 Orientation
1.4.1.1 Strategic Level
1.4.1.2 Operational Level
1.4.1.3 Tactical Level
1.4.2 Chicago School
1.4.2.1 The 'Consumer Welfare' Story
1.4.2.2 Marshallian Concept of Total Surplus
1.4.2.3 Williamson's Trade-Off Model
1.4.2.4 The 'Chicago Trap'
1.4.2.5 Wealth Distribution in the Chicago School
1.4.2.6 Chicago School in US Case Law
1.4.2.7 Conclusion
1.4.3 European School
1.4.3.1 Emergence of the European School
1.4.3.2 Core Concepts
1.4.3.3 Ordoliberal Thinking
1.4.3.4 Social Market Economies
1.4.3.5 The Frame of the European School
1.4.3.6 Implementation of the European School into EU Competition Law
1.4.3.6.1 Article 101 TFEU
1.4.3.6.2 Article 102 TFEU
1.5 CONTRASTING THE SCHOOLS
1.5.1 Merger Case
1.5.1.1 The Case
1.5.1.2 The Transaction
1.5.1.3 Chicago School
1.5.1.4 European School
1.5.2 Horizontal Agreement with a Price Element
1.5.2.1 The Case
1.5.2.2 Chicago School
1.5.2.3 European School
1.5.3 Vertical Restraints
1.5.3.1 The Case
1.5.3.2 Chicago School
1.5.3.3 European School
1.5.4 Abusive Behaviour
1.5.4.1 The Case
1.5.4.2 Chicago School
1.5.4.3 European School
1.5.5 Lessons Learned
CHAPTER 2 EU Competition Policy and EU Institutions
2.1 INTRODUCTION
2.2 COMPETITION CONCEPT IN THE LISBON TREATY
2.2.1 Concept of a Social Market Economy
2.2.2 Diffusion of Economic Power and Protection of Freedom
2.2.3 Internal Market Objective
2.2.4 Social Market Economy Objective
2.3 EU INSTITUTIONS
2.3.1 European Commission
2.3.2 Court of Justice of the EU
2.4 ARTICLE 101 TFEU
2.4.1 Article 101(1) TFEU
2.4.1.1 Agreement, Decision and Concerted Practice
2.4.1.2 Appreciability
2.4.1.3 Object and Effect
2.4.2 Article 101(3) TFEU
2.5 ARTICLE 102 TFEU
2.5.1 General Principles
2.5.2 Dominance
2.5.3 Abuse
2.5.3.1 Imposition of Unfair Purchase or Selling Prices or Conditions (Article 102(a))
2.5.3.2 Limiting Production, Markets or Technical Development to the Prejudice of Consumers (Article 102(b))
2.5.3.3 Applying Dissimilar Conditions to Equivalent Transactions (Article 102(c))
2.5.3.4 Tying Practices (Article 102(d))
2.5.3.5 Exclusionary Abuses Not Directly Covered by the Examples in Article 102(a)-(d)
2.5.3.6 Refusal to Supply
2.5.3.7 Predatory Pricing
2.5.3.8 Exclusionary Rebate Schemes
2.6 EU MERGER CONTROL
2.6.1 The Evolution of Concentration Control in Europe
2.6.2 Merger Regulation 139/2004
CHAPTER 3 Competition Theory
3.1 SCHOOL OF THOUGHTS IN COMPETITION THEORY
3.1.1 Objectives Assigned to Competition Policy
3.1.1.1 United States (US)
3.1.1.2 European Union
3.1.2 School of Thoughts in Competition Theory
3.1.2.1 Role of Economics
3.1.2.2 Mainstream Economics
3.1.2.3 Appropriate School of Thought?
3.2 ORIGINS OF MODERN COMPETITION THEORIES
3.2.1 Classical Theory
3.2.2 Neoclassical Theory
3.2.2.1 Perfect Competition
3.2.2.2 Monopoly
3.2.2.3 Imperfect Competition
3.3 DEVELOPMENTS IN MODERN COMPETITION THEORIES
3.3.1 Workable Competition
3.3.1.1 John Maurice Clark (1940)
3.3.1.2 Erhard Kantzenbach
3.3.2 Effective Competition
3.3.2.1 John Maurice Clark (1961)
3.3.2.2 Joseph A. Schumpeter
3.3.3 Harvard School of Thought
3.3.3.1 Edward S. Mason
3.3.3.2 Industrial Organisation Theory
3.3.3.3 Contestable Markets Theory
3.3.3.4 Game Theory
3.3.4 Chicago School of Thought
3.3.4.1 Attack on the Harvard's School Concentration Doctrine
3.3.4.2 The Efficiency Doctrine
3.3.4.3 Policy Implications of the Chicago School
3.3.4.4 The Post-Chicago School
3.3.5 Concept of Freedom of Competition
3.3.5.1 The Austrian School
3.3.5.2 The Neo-Austrians
3.3.6 Development towards the European School of Thought
3.3.6.1 Role of the State
3.3.6.2 Need for a Constitutional Framework
3.3.6.3 Free Competition
3.3.6.4 Role of Competition Law
3.3.6.5 Influence of Ordoliberalism in the Early Years of the European Commission's Work
3.3.6.6 Critics on the Ordoliberal Concept
3.4 APPENDIX: BASIC ECONOMICS
CHAPTER 4 Competition Practice
4.1 CHANGES IN THE ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM
4.1.1 The 2000 Proposal
4.1.2 Legislative Process
4.1.3 Regulation 1/2003
4.1.4 German Clause in Regulation 1/2003
4.1.5 Revision Regulation 1/2003
4.2 MARKET DEFINITIONS
4.2.1 Necessity for Market Definitions
4.2.2 Market Definition Principles
4.2.3 Market Definition Tools
4.2.3.1 Price Tests
4.2.3.2 Hypothetical Monopolist Test
4.2.3.2.1 US Approach
4.2.3.2.2 European Approach
4.2.3.2.3 Initial Price Analysis
4.2.3.2.4 Modelling Customer Choice with Conjoint Analysis
4.2.3.2.5 Estimation of the Utility Functions
4.2.3.2.6 Preference Function
4.2.3.3 Other Empirical Tests
4.2.4 Relevant Product Market
4.2.4.1 Basic Assumptions
4.2.4.2 Market Definition Practice
4.2.4.2.1 Type of Evidence
4.2.4.2.2 Practice of the Commission
4.2.5 Relevant Geographic Market
4.2.5.1 Basic Assumptions
4.2.5.2 Market Definition Practice
4.2.5.2.1 Type of Evidence
4.2.5.2.2 Practice of the Commission
4.3 MARKET ANALYSIS
4.3.1 Analysis of Market Shares
4.3.2 Evaluation of the Market Position
4.3.3 Analysing Buyer Power
4.3.4 Analysis of Resources
4.3.5 Analysis of Access to Supply and Sales Markets
4.3.6 Competition from (Imperfect) Substitutes
4.3.7 Assessment Barriers to Market Entry/Potential Competition
4.3.8 Market Phase, Level of Trade and Nature of the Product
4.3.9 Bidding Analysis
4.3.9.1 Economics in Bidding Markets
4.3.9.2 Independent Customer Surveys
4.3.9.3 Analysis of Customer Surveys
4.3.9.4 Encounter Ratio between the Merging Parties
4.3.9.5 Encounter Ratio between Two Other Bidders
4.3.9.6 Size of Other Bidders
4.3.9.7 Runner-Up
4.3.9.8 Price Difference
4.3.9.9 Further Analyses
4.4 EUROPEAN ECONOMIC APPROACH IN ARTICLE 101
4.4.1 Object and Effect
4.4.2 Ancillary Restrictions
4.4.3 Effect on Trade between Member States
4.4.3.1 Developments in the Effect on Trade Concept
4.4.3.2 Guidelines on the Effect on Trade Concept
4.4.3.2.1 Trade between Member States
4.4.3.2.2 Appreciability of Affecting Trade between Member States
4.4.4 Appreciability Test of the Agreement/'De Minimis'
4.4.4.1 Developments in the Appreciability Test
4.4.4.2 De Minimis Notice
4.4.5 Economic Analysis in Article 101(1)
4.4.5.1 Vertical Agreements
4.4.5.1.1 Vertical Exclusive Dealings
4.4.5.1.2 Vertical Absolute Territorial Protection
4.4.5.1.3 Vertical Selective Distribution
4.4.5.1.4 Vertical Licensing
4.4.5.1.5 Vertical Franchising
4.4.5.1.6 Vertical Exclusive Purchasing
4.4.5.1.7 Conclusion
4.4.5.2 Horizontal Agreements
4.4.5.2.1 Horizontal Cooperation Agreements
4.4.5.2.2 Horizontal Price-Fixing Agreements
4.4.5.2.3 Horizontal Concerted Practices
4.4.5.2.4 Conclusion
4.4.6 Economic Analysis in Article 101(3)
4.4.6.1 First Condition of Article 101(3)
4.4.6.1.1 Cost Efficiencies
4.4.6.1.2 Qualitative Efficiencies
4.4.6.2 Second Condition of Article 101(3)
4.4.6.3 Third Condition of Article 101(3)
4.4.6.4 Fourth Condition of Article 101(3)
4.4.7 EU Competition Rules for Distribution
4.4.7.1 Types of Vertical Restraints
4.4.7.1.1 Exclusive Distribution Group
4.4.7.1.2 Single Branding Group
4.4.7.1.3 Resale Price Maintenance Group
4.4.7.1.4 Market Partitioning Group
4.4.7.1.5 Combinations of Vertical Restraints
4.4.7.2 Economics of Vertical Restraints
4.4.7.2.1 Beneficial Effects of Vertical Restraints
4.4.7.2.2 Anti-Competitive Effects of Vertical Restraints
4.4.7.2.3 Different Schools of Thought
4.4.7.2.4 EU Policy Conclusions on Vertical Restraints
4.4.7.2.5 Block Exemption Regulation 330/2010
4.4.7.2.6 EU Guidelines on Vertical Restraints
4.4.8 EU Competition Rules for Cooperation
4.4.8.1 Block Exemption Regulations
4.4.8.2. EU Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation Agreements
4.5 EUROPEAN ECONOMIC APPROACH IN ARTICLE 102
4.5.1 Market Definitions in Article 102
4.5.1.1 Product Market Definitions
4.5.1.2 Geographic Market Definitions
4.5.1.3 The Time Factor
4.5.1.4 Substantial Part of the Common Market
4.5.2 Economic Analysis in Article 102
4.5.2.1 Market shares
4.5.2.2 Barriers of Entry
4.5.2.3 Assessing Single Dominance
4.5.2.4 Assessing Collective Dominance
4.5.2.5 Commission's Rules on Article 102
4.5.2.6 More Economics Based Approach
4.5.2.6.1 Economics of Exclusionary Conduct
4.5.2.6.2 As-Efficient-Competitor Test
4.5.2.6.3 Possible Defences
4.5.2.6.4 Predatory Pricing
4.5.2.6.5 Rebate Systems
4.5.2.6.6 Tying and Bundling
4.5.2.7 Economic Analysis in Cases on Rebates
4.5.2.7.1 Michelin II
4.5.2.7.2 British Airways
4.5.2.7.3 Tomra
4.5.2.7.4 Intel
4.5.2.7.5 Post Denmark II
4.5.2.8 Economic Analysis in Other Article 102 Cases
4.5.2.8.1 Tetra Pak II
4.5.2.8.2 AstraZeneca
4.5.2.8.3 Microsoft
4.6 EUROPEAN ECONOMIC APPROACH IN MERGERS
4.6.1 Role of Economic Analysis in EU Merger Control
4.6.2 Guidance by the Court of Justice of the EU
4.6.2.1 GE/Honeywell
4.6.2.1.1 Theory of Harm/Competition Concerns
4.6.2.1.2 The Judgment
4.6.2.2 Schneider/Legrand
4.6.2.2.1 Theory of Harm/Competition Concerns
4.6.2.2.2 The Judgment
4.6.2.3 Tetra Laval/Sidel
4.6.2.3.1 Theory of Harm/Competition Concerns
4.6.2.3.2 The Judgment
4.6.2.4 Impala
4.6.2.5 Ryanair
4.6.2.5.1 Theory of Harm/Competition Concerns
4.6.2.5.2 The Judgment
4.6.3 EU Merger Guidelines
4.6.3.1 Horizontal Merger Guidelines
4.6.3.1.1 Purpose of the Guidelines
4.6.3.1.2 Market Entry
4.6.3.1.3 Efficiency
4.6.3.2 Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines
4.6.3.2.1 Purpose of the Guidelines
4.6.3.2.2 Analysis of Tying and Bundling
4.6.3.2.3 Analysis of Input and Customer Foreclosure
4.6.3.2.4 Actual and Potential Competition
4.6.4 Collective Dominance
4.6.4.1 Developments in the Case Law
4.6.4.1.1 The 'Checklist'
4.6.4.1.2 Development of the Collective Dominance Doctrine
4.6.4.2 Assessment of Coordinated Effects in the Merger Guidelines
4.6.4.2.1 Reaching Terms of Coordination
4.6.4.2.2 Monitoring Deviations
4.6.4.2.3 Deterrent Mechanisms
4.6.5 Merger Simulation Models
4.6.5.1 The Specification Stage
4.6.5.1.1 Model Selection
4.6.5.1.2 Auction Models
4.6.5.2 The Estimation Stage
4.6.5.2.1 Linear and Log-Linear Demand System
4.6.5.2.2 Logit and Nested Logit Demand Systems
4.6.5.2.3 Almost Ideal Demand System
4.6.5.2.4 Proportionally Calibrated AIDS
4.6.5.3 The Simulation Stage
4.6.6 Commission's Use of Merger Simulation Models
4.6.6.1 Linear Demand Model
4.6.6.1.1 The Case
4.6.6.1.2 Merger Simulation Model
4.6.6.2 Nested Logit Models
4.6.6.2.1 Scania/Volvo
4.6.6.2.2 Lagardère/Natexis/VUP
4.6.6.2.3 Unilever/Sara Lee
4.6.6.2.4 Kraft Foods/Cadbury
4.6.6.2.5 Tomtom/Tele Atlas
4.6.6.3 Use of Auction Models
4.6.6.3.1 Sydkraft/Graninge
4.6.6.3.2 Oracle/Peoplesoft
4.6.6.3.3 Vattenfall/Elsam and E2 Assets
4.6.6.3.4 Thales/Finmeccanica/Alcatel Alenia Space/Telespazio
4.7 STATE AID PROVISIONS
4.7.1 Economics in the EU State Aid Rules
4.7.2 Balancing Test in Article 107(3)
4.7.3 State Aid Modernisation
4.7.3.1 EU Guidelines
4.7.3.1.1 Rescue and Restructuring Aid
4.7.3.1.2 Regional Aid
4.7.3.1.3 State Aid for Research and Development and Innovation (R&D&I)
4.7.3.1.4 State Aid in Agriculture, Forestry and Rural Areas
4.7.3.1.5 Environmental and Energy Aid
4.7.3.1.6 State Aid to Promote Important Projects of Common European Interest
4.7.3.1.7 Risk Finance
4.7.3.1.8 Broadband
4.7.3.1.9 Aviation Guidelines
4.7.3.2 EU Regulations
4.7.3.2.1 General Block Exemption Regulation
4.7.3.2.2 De Minimis Regulation
4.7.3.2.3 Procedural Regulation
4.7.3.3 Notion of State Aid
4.7.3.4 Ex Post Evaluations
4.7.3.4.1 Linear Regression
4.7.3.4.2 Matching Techniques
4.7.3.4.3 Difference-in-Difference
4.7.3.4.4 Instrumental Variables
4.7.3.4.5 Regression Discontinuity Design
Bibliography
Index
Back Cover

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