This work is a systematic investigation of a range of solutions offered today for the philosophical problem of mental causation. The premises constituting the problem are analyzed before a survey is developed of the most popular theories on mental causation. It is demonstrated in detail why most of these canonical solutions must be considered deficient. In a third part, the 'new compatibilist's' approach to mental causation is explored, which is characterized by assertion of a non-identity-but-non-distinctness principle. The last part aims to offer an alternative solution to the problem. On the basis of a certain set of counterfactual conditionals, which are jointly taken to provide a definition of 'causal proportionality' that improves the existing definitions, it is shown that a specific, and hitherto widely neglected, version of causal overdeterminationism must be considered the most successful solution to the problem of mental causation.
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Sprache
Verlagsort
Zielgruppe
Für Beruf und Forschung
US School Grade: College Graduate Student
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Dateigröße
ISBN-13
978-3-11-032484-6 (9783110324846)
Schweitzer Klassifikation
1 - Table of contents [Seite 5]
2 - Acknowledgements [Seite 6]
3 - Introduction [Seite 7]
4 - Chapter 1The Problem of Mental Causation: premises andcentral principles [Seite 13]
4.1 - 1.1 Formulations of the Problem [Seite 16]
4.2 - 1.2 Supervenience [Seite 50]
4.3 - 1.3 Multiple realization and functional states [Seite 68]
4.4 - 1.4 Epiphenomena and the Eleatic Principle [Seite 81]
4.5 - 1.5 Theoretical economy and explanatory strength [Seite 83]
4.6 - 1.6 The neutrality of the Problem [Seite 85]
5 - Chapter 2Canonical solutions to the Problem [Seite 103]
5.1 - 2.1 Dualism [Seite 103]
5.2 - 2.2 Physicalism [Seite 113]
5.3 - 2.3 Special cases [Seite 156]
5.4 - 2.4 Summary and conclusion [Seite 160]
6 - Chapter 3New compatibilism and mental causation [Seite 163]
6.1 - 3.1 The "constitutionalist" approach [Seite 167]
6.2 - 3.2 The "determinationist" approach [Seite 175]
6.3 - 3.3 Theories inspired by the "determinationist" approach [Seite 211]
6.4 - 3.4 Critique [Seite 225]
6.5 - 3.5 Summary and conclusion [Seite 249]
7 - Chapter 4Open solutions [Seite 251]
7.1 - 4.1 Introductory remarks [Seite 252]
7.2 - 4.2 Reviewing the solutions [Seite 279]
7.3 - 4.3 Overdeterminationism Lite pursued [Seite 313]
7.4 - 4.4 Plural Determinism pursued [Seite 346]
7.5 - 4.5 Overdeterminationism Lite vs. Plural Determinism [Seite 406]
7.6 - 4.6 Summary and Conclusion [Seite 408]
8 - Bibliography [Seite 409]
