Information Exchange Between Competitors in EU Competition Law

Name: Information Exchange Between Competitors in EU Competition Law
Brand: Kluwer Law International
Price: 122.99 EUR
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Martin Gassler(Autor*in)

Kluwer Law International (Verlag)

Erschienen am 12. Februar 2021

296 Seiten

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Beschreibung

Information Exchange Between Competitors in EU Competition Law Martin Gassler Competing firms often exchange information in order to make more informed market decisions which can help to overcome market inefficiencies. However, an abundance of legal and economic research as well as case law has shown that information exchange may also enable firms to engage in collusion more readily and sustain it longer. This book is the first to concentrate on this challenging topic of EU competition law in such depth. It focuses on ';pure' information exchanges exchanges that are not ancillary to a wider pro-competitive or anticompetitive conduct and thoroughly explains the characteristics of such information exchanges, their pro-competitive and anticompetitive effects and discusses all the relevant legal aspects for their assessment. The author provides a robust analytical framework for assessing information exchanges under Article 101 TFEU, focusing on the risk of collusive outcomes and what types of information exchange are particularly harmful. With detailed attention to the leading cases on information exchange, the analysis examines the most important aspects for assessing information exchange between competitors, in particular: the concept of a concerted practice; the concepts of a restriction by object and effect, including their similarities and differences; the importance of evidentiary issues; the issue of signalling via advance public announcements; factors that facilitate collusion; efficiencies of information exchange, including market transparency; the legal challenges of tackling mere parallel conduct; facilitative practices in the Commission Guidelines, including the Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines; and safe harbours for certain types of information exchange. The book offers clear guidance on how to identify and thus distinguish information exchange that restricts competition by its object and information exchange that restricts competition (only) by its effects. It offers practical solutions to some of the perceived issues when assessing information exchanges. With its wealth of analysis not available from other sources, this concise yet comprehensive review of a much-debated topic in competition law offers clear guidance for practitioners in assessing the issues surrounding information exchange. The book will also be welcomed by competition law academics, competition lawyers and competition authority officials throughout Europe.

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Inhalt

Intro
Half-Title Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Dedication
Table of Contents
List of Abbreviations
Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 2 The Conceptual Framework
2.1 Types of Information Exchange
2.1.1 Based on the Ancillarity to Other Conduct
2.1.1.a Ancillary Information Exchanges
2.1.1.b Pure Information Exchanges
2.1.2 Based on the Stage of the Concertation
2.1.3 Based on the Anti-competitive Subject Matter of the Information
2.1.4 Based on the Primary Flow of Information
2.1.4.a Horizontal Exchanges
2.1.4.b Vertical Exchanges (With Indirect Horizontal Effects)
2.2 Characteristics of the Information Exchange
2.2.1 The Inner Layer
2.2.1.a Public Availability (Public vs Private Data)
2.2.1.b Commercial Sensitivity (Strategic vs Non-strategic Private Data)
2.2.1.c Level of Detail (Aggregated vs Disaggregated Data)
2.2.1.d Age (Historic Data vs Recent Data vs Future Intentions)
2.2.2 The Outer Layer
2.2.2.a Frequency
2.2.2.b Public Availability
2.2.2.c Market Coverage
Chapter 3 The Economic Framework
3.1 Efficiencies
3.1.1 Benefits for Suppliers (Horizontal Market Transparency)
3.1.2 Benefits for Customers (Vertical Market Transparency)
3.1.3 The Shortcomings of Static Models
3.1.4 The Stronger Weight of Vertical Transparency for Competition Policy
3.2 Foreclosure: A Negligible Concern
3.3 Collusion: The Main Concern
3.3.1 The Theory of Collusion
3.3.1.a Meaning
3.3.1.b Forms
3.3.1.c Conditions for Collusion
3.3.1.d Factors That Facilitate Collusion
3.3.1.d.1 Introduction
3.3.1.d.2 Factors Where the Effects on Collusion Is Clear
3.3.1.d.3 Factors Where the Effects on Collusion Is More Ambiguous
3.3.1.d.4 The Desirable Analytical Approach
3.3.2 The Theory of Tacit Collusion
3.3.2.a Meaning
3.3.2.b Terminology
3.3.2.c Situations in Which Tacit Collusion Can Occur
3.3.3 The Concept of 'Facilitative Practices'
3.3.3.a Meaning
3.3.3.b Forms
3.3.3.c Information Exchange as a Facilitative Practice
3.3.3.d Current Shortcomings
3.3.4 The Role of Market Transparency for Collusion: It Is Mainly About Past Data
3.3.4.a The Notion of Market Transparency
3.3.4.b The Ways in Which Market Transparency Facilitates Collusion
3.3.4.c The Requirement of Causal Attribution
3.3.4.d The Balancing of Pro- and Anti-competitive Effect: Circumstances Matter
3.3.5 The Role of Communication for Collusion: It Is Mainly About Future Intentions
3.3.5.a The Notion of Communication
3.3.5.b The Ways in Which Communication Facilitates Collusion
3.3.5.c The Importance of Communication for Competition Policy
3.3.6 The Risk Classification of Information Exchanges
3.3.6.a The Theoretical Level: The Effect of Each Factor on Collusion
3.3.6.b The Practical Level: Identifying the Most Harmful Factors for Collusion
3.3.6.c The Policy Level: The Principle of Indispensability
Chapter 4 The Legal Framework of Art. 101 TFEU
4.1 The Structure of Art. 101 TFEU
4.1.1 Prohibition
4.1.2 Exemption
4.1.3 Consequences of an Infringement
4.2 The Concept of a 'Concerted Practice'
4.2.1 Guidance by the EU Courts
4.2.1.a Demarcation from the Concept of an 'Agreement'
4.2.1.a.1 The Concept of 'Agreement'
4.2.1.a.2 The Concept of a 'Concerted Practice' as a Residual Clause
4.2.1.a.3 The Fluid Boundaries Between Both Concepts
4.2.1.b The Element of a 'Concertation'
4.2.1.b.1 Dyestuffs (First Definition)
4.2.1.b.2 Suiker Unie (Independence Doctrine)
4.2.1.b.3 Cimenteries and Subsequent Case Law (Element of Reciprocity)
4.2.1.b.4 Eturas (Importance of Evidentiary Issues)
4.2.1.c The Element of 'Practice'
4.2.1.c.1 Dyestuffs (First Vague Indication of a Second Element)
4.2.1.c.2 Anic and Hüls (Requirement of Subsequent and Casual Conduct on the Market)
4.2.1.c.3 T-Mobile (Single Meeting Is Sufficient for Presumption)
4.2.2 Guidance by the Literature
4.2.2.a The Jurisprudential Literature
4.2.2.a.1 The Importance of the Element of 'Concertation'
4.2.2.a.2 The Sources of Concertation
4.2.2.a.3 The Lack of Consensus on the Conceptual Meaning
4.2.2.a.4 The Two Strands of the Conceptual Meaning
4.2.2.b The Analytical Philosophical Literature
4.2.2.b.1 Black: Communication Should Matter
4.2.2.b.2 Del Mar: Conduct Analysis vs Economic Analysis
4.2.3 Evidentiary Issues
4.2.3.a Burden of Proof
4.2.3.b Standard of Proof
4.2.3.b.1 Meaning
4.2.3.b.2 The Ambiguous Case Law on the Exact Test
4.2.3.b.3 The Concept of 'Effort Probatoire'
4.2.3.c Types of Evidence
4.3 The Classification as a Restriction of Competition by Object or Effect
4.3.1 The Object/Effect Dichotomy
4.3.1.a Preliminary Observations
4.3.1.a.1 Distinct Concepts
4.3.1.a.2 Linguistic Considerations
4.3.1.a.3 Normative Justifications for the Dichotomy
4.3.1.b Analytical Similarities
4.3.1.b.1 Restriction of Competition vs Restriction in the Freedom of Action
4.3.1.b.2 Relevance of the Counterfactual
4.3.1.b.3 Relevance of Pro-competitive Effects
4.3.1.b.4 Context-Specific Assessment
4.3.1.c Analytical Differences
4.3.1.c.1 Nature of the Analysis: Plausibility vs Likelihood of Anti-competitive Effects
4.3.1.c.2 Burden of Proof
4.3.1.c.3 Appreciability on Competition (De Minimis Doctrine)
4.3.1.c.4 Likelihood of Exemption
4.3.2 Identifying Restrictions by Object
4.3.2.a The Case Law in the Past: Emphasis on 'Category-Building' and Abstract Legal Formulas
4.3.2.a.1 Category-Building and the Steady Shift Away from It
4.3.2.a.2 The Long-Lasting Struggle to Settle on an Abstract Legal Formula
4.3.2.a.3 The Challenges of Employing an Abstract Legal Formula
4.3.2.b The Current Case Law: The Importance of Context and Experience
4.3.2.b.1 Contextual Approach: The Context Is Everything
4.3.2.b.2 Cautious Approach: The Importance of Sufficient Experience (or in Dubio Pro Effectu)
4.3.2.c The Theoretical Perspective
4.3.2.c.1 The Plausible Efficiency Theory (Positive Theory)
4.3.2.c.2 The Intended Ends Theory (Normative Theory)
4.3.2.c.3 The Risk Offence Theory (Normative Theory)
Chapter 5 The Importance of Information Exchanges for the Implementation of Economic Collusion Theories in Art. 101 TFEU
5.1 Parallel Conduct and Circumstantial Evidence
5.1.1 The Legal Challenges of Tackling Mere Parallel Conduct
5.1.1.a The Legal Challenge of Solely Relying on Circumstantial Evidence
5.1.1.b The Differences Between the Legal and Economic Analysis
5.1.2 The Leading Cases: A Lost Fight to Tackle Parallel Conduct under Art. 101 TFEU?
5.1.2.a The Early Days: 1950s and 1960s
5.1.2.b The Dyestuffs Case
5.1.2.c The Suiker Unie Case
5.1.2.d The Zinc Producer Group Decision vs the Cartonboard Decision
5.1.2.e The Compagnie Royale Asturienne Des Mines Case
5.1.2.f The Woodpulp II Case
5.1.2.g The BPB Case
5.1.2.h The CISAC Case
5.1.3 Concluding Remarks
5.1.3.a The Descriptive Perspective: Parallel Conduct Is Merely Weak Circumstantial Evidence
5.1.3.b The Normative Perspective: Is the Strict Stance When Solely Relying on Circumstantial Evidence Justified?
5.1.3.c The Prescriptive Perspective: The Implications for Competition Policy
5.2 Facilitative Practices in the Commission Guidelines
5.2.1 Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines
5.2.1.a R&D Agreements
5.2.1.b Production Agreements
5.2.1.c Joint Purchasing Agreements
5.2.1.d Joint Commercialisation Agreements
5.2.1.e Standardisation Agreements
5.2.1.f Other Types of Horizontal Cooperation Agreements
5.2.1.g Conclusion
5.2.2 Vertical Guidelines
5.2.2.a Definition and Scope
5.2.2.b Agency Agreements
5.2.2.c Single Branding Agreements
5.2.2.d Exclusive (Territorial) Distribution Agreements
5.2.2.e Exclusive Customer Allocation Agreements
5.2.2.f Selective Distribution Agreements
5.2.2.g Upfront Access Payments
5.2.2.h Category Management Agreements
5.2.2.i Resale Price Restrictions
5.2.2.j Conclusion
5.2.3 Technology Transfer Guidelines
5.2.3.a Definition and Scope
5.2.3.b Licensing Agreements
5.2.3.c Technology Pools
5.2.3.d Conclusion
5.2.4 Concluding Remarks Regarding Information Exchanges
5.2.4.a Information Exchange Is the Most Relevant and Universal Manifestation of a Facilitative Practice
5.2.4.b The Scope and Nature of Ancillary Information Exchange
Chapter 6 Pure Information Exchange
6.1 The Commission's View
6.1.1 Early Policy Statements
6.1.1.a 1968 Notice
6.1.1.b 1977 Report
6.1.1.c 2001 Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines
6.1.1.d 2008 Maritime Guidelines
6.1.2 Early Decisional Practice
6.1.3 2011 Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines
6.1.3.a Introduction
6.1.3.b Analytical Framework
6.1.3.c Collusion Concerns
6.1.3.d Conclusion
6.2 Restrictions by Effect Cases
6.2.1 Case Law and Decisional Practice
6.2.1.a The John Deere Case
6.2.1.b The Eudim Decision
6.2.1.c The CEPI-Cartonboard Decision
6.2.1.d The Wirtschaftsvereinigung Stahl Decision
6.2.1.e The Thyssen Stahl Case
6.2.1.f The EATA Decision (Borderline Case)
6.2.1.g The Asnef-Equifax Case
6.2.2 Descriptive Perspective: Identifying Some Common Themes
6.2.2.a The Issue of Disaggregation
6.2.2.b The Importance of the Market Structure Analysis
6.2.2.c The Lack of Using of Art. 101(3) TFEU
6.2.3 Normative Perspective: Are Safe Harbours Desirable?
6.2.3.a Safe Harbours Based on Market Shares
6.2.3.b Safe Harbours for Certain Types of Information Exchange
6.2.3.c 'Safe Zones'
6.2.3.d Conclusion
6.3 Restrictions by Object Cases
6.3.1 Case Law and Decisional Practice
6.3.1.a The Fatty Acid Decision (Borderline Case)
6.3.1.b The Tate & Lyle Case
6.3.1.c The T-Mobile Case
6.3.1.d The Two Bananas Cases
6.3.1.e The E-Book Commitment Decision
6.3.1.f Foreign Exchange Spot Trading Cartels (Forex Cartels)
6.3.2 Descriptive Perspective: Identifying Common Themes
6.3.2.a The Market Context Matters
6.3.2.b The Lack of Plausible Efficiencies
6.3.2.c The Practical Importance of the Concept of a Concerted Practice
6.3.2.d The Temporal Perspective: Future Intentions Are Problematic
6.3.2.e The Means of Communication: Private Communication Is Problematic
6.3.3 Normative Perspective: What Should Be the Scope of the Object Box?
6.3.3.a Is the Dispute Between the Case Law and the Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines Justified?
6.3.3.b Is the Exclusion of the Exchange of Disaggregated Data from the Object Box Justified?
6.4 Public Announcements Cases
6.4.1 Economic Perspective
6.4.1.a The Pro-competitive Aspect of Public Announcements
6.4.1.b The Anti-competitive Aspect of Public Announcements
6.4.2 Case Law and Decisional Practice
6.4.2.a The Dyestuffs Case
6.4.2.b The Woodpulp II Case
6.4.2.c The Container Shipping Commitment Decision
6.4.3 Descriptive Perspective: Identifying the Problematic Features
6.4.3.a The OECD Paper on Unilateral Announcements
6.4.3.b The Container Shipping Commitment Decision
6.4.3.c The Literature: Contingent Announcements Are Problematic
6.4.4 Normative Perspective: Classification as a Restriction by Object or Effect?
6.4.4.a Is There Scope for Classification as a Restriction by Object?
6.4.4.b The Role of Circumstantial Evidence
6.5 The Proposal for a More Coherent Analytical Framework
6.5.1 The Object Box: A Proposal for Identifying Restrictions by Object
6.5.1.a The Issue
6.5.1.b The Need to Go Beyond an Abstract Legal Formula
6.5.1.c Step 1: Context Analysis
6.5.1.c.1 General Analytical Considerations
6.5.1.c.2 Application to Pure Information Exchanges
6.5.1.d Step 2: Objectified Plausibility Analysis for Claimed Efficiencies
6.5.1.d.1 General Analytical Considerations
6.5.1.d.2 Application to Pure Information Exchanges
6.5.1.d.3 A Concerted Practice That Restricts Competition by Object: What Else!
6.5.2 The Effect Box: A Proposal to Assess Restrictive Pure Information Exchanges
6.5.2.a The Issue
6.5.2.b The Need to Further Developed the Concept of a Facilitative Practice
6.5.2.c Step 1: Context Analysis
6.5.2.d Step 2: Building a Robust Theory of (Tacit) Collusion
6.5.2.e Step 3: Efficiencies
6.5.2.f Step 4: Weighting Collusion Concerns Against Efficiencies (and the Importance of Less Restrictive Alternatives)
Chapter 7 Conclusion
Bibliography
Table of Cases
Table of Legislation, Guidelines and Treaties
Index
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