Evolutionary Games in Natural, Social, and Virtual Worlds

PART I: BASICS 1. Population Dynamics 1.1 Fitness 1.2 Tradeoffs and Fitness Dependence 1.3 Dependence on environment, density and frequency 1.4 State space geometry 1.5 Memes and Genes 1.6 Finite populations and randomness 1.7 Replicator dynamics in discrete time 1.8 Replicator dynamics in continuous time 1.9 Steady states and stability 1.10 Sexual dynamics 1.11 Discussion 1.12 Appendix A: Derivation of the Fisher equation 1.13 Appendix B. Replicator dynamics, mean fitness, and entropy 1.14 Exercises 1.15 Endnotes 1.16 Bibliography 2. Simple Frequency Dependence 2.1 The Hawk-Dove game 2.2 H-D parameters and dynamics 2.3 The three kinds of 2x2 games . 2.4 Dilemmas played by viruses and eBay sellers 2.5 Nonlinear frequency dependence 2.6 RPS and the simplex 2.7 Replicator dynamics for RPS 2.8 Discussion 2.9 Appendix A. Payoff differences in 3x3 games 2.10 Exercises 2.11 Endnotes 2.12 Bibliography 3. Dynamics in n-dimensional Games 3.1 Sectoring the 2-d simplex 3.2 Estimating 3x3 payoff matrices 3.3 More strategies 3.4 Nonlinear frequency dependence 3.5 Two population games: the square 3.6 Hawk-Dove with two populations 3.7 Own population effects 3.8 Higher dimensional games 3.9 Alternative dynamics 3.10 Discussion 3.11 Appendix: Estimating 3x3 payoff matrices 3.12 Exercises 3.13 Notes 3.14 Bibliography 4. Equilibrium 4.1 Equilibrium in 1 dimension 4.2 Nash equilibrium with n strategies 4.3 ESS with n strategies 4.4 Equilibrium in multi-population games 4.5 Fisherian runaway equilibrium 4.6 Discussion 4.7 Appendix A: Techniques to Assess Stability 4.8 Exercises 4.9 Notes 4.10 Bibilography 5. Social games 5.1 Assortative matching 5.2 Social Twists 5.3 Inheritance from two parents 5.4 The standard Price equation 5.5 Group-structured Price equation and cooperation 5.6 Group Structure and Assortativity in Lizards 5.7 Price Equation in Continuous Time 5.8 Discussion 5.9 Appendix: Equilibrium in the Kirkpatrick (1982) model 5.10 Exercises 5.11 Notes 5.12 Bibliography 6. Cellular Automaton Games 6.1 Specifying a CA 6.2 Prisoner's Dilemma 6.3 Snowdrift 6.4 Public goods games with two strategies 6.5 Spatial rock-paper-scissors dynamic 6.6 Application to bacterial strains 6.7 Buyer-seller game as a two population CA 6.8 Exercises 6.9 Notes 6.10 Bibliography PART II: APPLICATIONS 7. Rock-Paper-Scissors Everywhere 7.1 Some RPS Theory 7.2 Humans Play RPS in the Lab 7.3 RPS Mating Systems 7.4 Predators Learn 7.5 A coevolutionary model of Predators and Prey 7.6 Discussion 7.7 Appendix 7.8 Exercises 7.9 Notes 7.10 Bibliography 8. Learning in Games 8.1 Perspectives on learning and evolution 8.2 An empirical example 8.3 Learning rules 8.4 Decision rules 8.5 Estimating a model 8.6 Results 8.7 Learning in Continuous Time . 8.8 Other Models of Learning 8.9 Open Frontiers 8.10 Appendix: Towards Models of Learning in Continuous Time 8.11 Exercises 8.12 Notes 8.13 Bibliography 9. Contingent Life Cycle Strategies 9.1 Hawks, Doves and Plasticity 9.2 Costly Plasticity 9.3 Classic Life Cycle Analysis 9.4 Strategic Life Cycle Analysis: Two Periods 9.5 Strategic Life Cycle Analysis: More general cases 9.6 Application: male elephant seals 9.7 Discussion 9.8 Appendix 9.9 Exercises 9.10 Notes 9.11 Bibliography 10. The Blessing and the Curse of the Multiplicative Updates (Contributed by Manfred K. Warmuth) 10.1 Demonstrating the blessing and the curse 10.2 Dispelling the curse 10.3 Discussion 10.4 Notes 10.5 Bibliography 11. Traffic Games (contributed by John Musacchio) 11.1 Simple Non-Atomic Traffic Games 11.2 Braess's Paradox 11.3 The Price of Anarchy with Nonlinear Latency Functions 11.4 Pigovian Taxes 11.5 Selfish Pricing 11.6 Circuit Analogy 11.7 Discussion 11.8 Exercises 11.9 Endnotes 11.10 Bibliography 12. International Trade and the Environment (contributed by Matthew McGinty) 12.1 Economics and evolutionary game theory 12.2 Static Cournot model 12.3 Green technology diffusion 12.4 International trade 12.5 International Trade and Pollution Taxation 12.6 Other Economic Applications 12.7 Exercises 12.8 Notes 12.9 Bibliography 13. Evolution of Cooperation 13.1 Coordination, cooperation and social dilemmas 13.2 Solution K: Kin Selection 13.3 Solution R: Bilateral reciprocity 13.4 Social preferences: a problematic solution 13.5 Early Human Niches 13.6 Solution M: Moral memes 13.7 Illustrative models 13.8 Prehistoric and historic moral codes 13.9 Discussion 13.10 Exercises 13.11 Notes 13.12 Bibliography 14. Speciation 14.1 Long run evolution 14.2 Adaptive Dynamics 14.3 Morph loss in RPS 14.4 Emergent Boundary Layers in Cellular Automata 14.5 Speciation in Social and Virtual Worlds 14.6 Discussion 14.7 Exercises 14.8 Endnotes 14.9 Bibliography Glossaries