Smart Money.

Name: Smart Money. | Influence of Venture Capitalists on High Potential Companies.
Brand: Verlag Wissenschaft & Praxis
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Influence of Venture Capitalists on High Potential Companies.

Christian Fingerle(Autor*in)

Verlag Wissenschaft & Praxis

1. Auflage

Erschienen am 28. August 2020

XXII, 323 Seiten

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Inhalt

Intro
Foreword
Acknowledgments
Table of Contents
Table of Figures
Table of Abbreviations
Table of Interview Partners
1 Introduction
1.1 Relevance of Smart Money
1.2 Aims of Analysis
1.3 Research Approach and Dataset
1.4 Structure of Analysis
2 Characteristics of High Potential Companies
2.1 Introductory Remarks
2.2 Fundamentals of the Resource-based View
2.2.1 Resources in Strategic Management Research
2.2.2 Resources and Competitive Advantage
2.2.3 A Comprehensive Resource-based View
2.3 Resource Profile of High Potential Companies
2.3.1 Resource Needs in Stage Models
2.3.2 Resource Categorization
2.3.3 Technological Resources
2.3.4 Financial Resources
2.3.5 Managerial Resources
2.3.6 Personnel Resources
2.3.7 Physical Resources
2.3.8 Organizational Resources
2.3.9 Reputational Resources
2.3.10 Social Resources
2.4 Mechanisms to Fill the Resource Gap
2.5 Return and Risks of Investments in High PotentialCompanies
2.5.1 Investment Decision Trade-Off
2.5.2 High Expected Return
2.5.3 High Risks
2.5.3.1 Liability of Newness
2.5.3.2 Liability of Smallness
2.5.3.3 Uncertainty of Supply
2.5.3.4 Uncertainty of Demand
2.5.3.5 Competitive Uncertainty
2.5.3.6 Dependency on Founders
3 Business Model of Venture Capital Firms
3.1 Introductory Remarks
3.2 Definition of Business Model Concept
3.3 Customers of Venture Capital Firms
3.4 Value Creation Architecture of Venture Capital Firms
3.4.1 Organizational Structure
3.4.2 Personnel Structure
3.4.3 Refinancing Process
3.4.3.1 Overview
3.4.3.2 Fundraising Process
3.4.3.3 Investor Relations Process
3.4.3.4 Distribution of Returns Process
3.4.4 Investment Process
3.4.4.1 Overview
3.4.4.2 Investment Origination
3.4.4.3 Investment Due Diligence
3.4.4.4 Investment Structuring
3.4.4.5 Investment Development
3.4.4.6 Investment Exit
3.5 Customer Value Proposition of Venture Capital Firms
3.5.1 Enhancement of Performance of Portfolio Companies
3.5.2 Enhancement of Asset Allocation of Investors
3.6 Profit Model of Venture Capital Firms
3.6.1 Management Fee
3.6.2 Participation in Value Creation
4 Venture Capitalists' Influence through Contractual Agreements
4.1 Introductory Remarks
4.2 Deal-specific Risks for Venture Capital Firms
4.2.1 Risk of False Investment Decision
4.2.2 Risk of Managerial Opportunism
4.2.3 Risk of Competitive Opportunism
4.2.4 Risk of Unfavorable Decision-Taking
4.2.5 Risk of Exit Obstruction
4.3 Influence through Contractual Provisions
4.3.1 Information Rights
4.3.2 Conversion Rights
4.3.3 Control Rights
4.3.3.1 Voting Rights
4.3.3.2 Veto Rights
4.3.3.3 Supervisory Board Representation Right
4.3.4 Management Covenants
4.3.4.1 Affirmative Covenants
4.3.4.2 Non-Compete Clause
4.3.4.3 Vesting
4.3.4.4 Representations and Warranties
4.3.5 Milestone Agreements
4.3.5.1 Milestones
4.3.5.2 Earn-out
4.3.5.3 Ratchets
4.3.5.4 Management Dismissal
4.3.5.5 Staging
4.3.6 Cash Flow Rights
4.3.6.1 Dividend Preference
4.3.6.2 Liquidation Preference
4.3.6.3 Anti-Dilution Protection
4.3.7 Preemptive Rights
4.3.7.1 Right of First Refusal
4.3.7.2 Right of First Offer
4.3.8 Disinvestment Rights
4.3.8.1 Tag-Along Right
4.3.8.2 Drag-Along Right
4.3.8.3 Redemption Right
4.3.8.4 Registration Rights
4.3.8.5 Cancellation Right
4.3.9 Summary
4.4 Loss of Formal Autonomy through Venture Capital Firms
5 Venture Capitalists' Influence through Provision of Resources
5.1 Introductory Remarks
5.2 Content of Resource Provision
5.2.1 Activities of Venture Capital Firms
5.2.2 Certification through Venture Capital Firms
5.2.3 Resource-Based View on Activities of Venture Capital Firms
5.2.3.1 Redefining Activities as Resources
5.2.3.2 Direct vs. Indirect Resource Provision
5.3 Determinants of Resource Provision
5.3.1 Differences in Intensity of Resource Provision
5.3.2 Size of Investment
5.3.3 Performance of Portfolio Company
5.3.4 Stage of Portfolio Company
5.3.5 Technology Intensity of Portfolio Company
5.3.6 Venture Capitalists' Incentives for Resource Provision
5.3.7 Syndication
5.4 Loss of Real Autonomy through Venture Capital Firms
5.4.1 Sources of Venture Capital Firm's Power
5.4.2 Loss of Real Autonomy by Levels of Management
5.4.3 Loss of Real Autonomy by Levels of Decision-taking
5.4.4 Benefit of a Loss of Autonomy
6 Case Study Bullith Batteries AG
6.1 Case Description
6.1.1 Preliminary Remark
6.1.2 Development before First Round Financing
6.1.3 First Round Financing
6.1.4 Further Development until Second Round Financing
6.1.5 Second Round Financing
6.1.6 Further Development
6.2 Case Analysis
6.2.1 Gi Ventures' Influence through Contracting
6.2.1.1 Investment Agreement Structure
6.2.1.2 Influence on Deal-specific Risks
6.2.1.3 Influence on Management's Formal Autonomy
6.2.2 Gi Ventures' Influence through Resource Provision
6.2.2.1 Influence on Resource Pool
6.2.2.2 Influence on Management's Real Autonomy
7 Case Study GPC Biotech AG
7.1 Case Description
7.1.1 Development before First Round Financing
7.1.2 First Round Financing
7.1.3 Development until Second Round Financing
7.1.4 Second Round Financing
7.1.5 Further Development and MPM Capital's and TVM's Exit
7.2 Case Analysis
7.2.1 MPM Capital's and TVM's Influence through Contracting
7.2.1.1 Preliminary Remark
7.2.1.2 Investment Agreement Structure
7.2.1.3 Influence on Deal-specific Risks
7.2.1.4 Influence on Management's Formal Autonomy
7.2.2 MPM Capital's and TVM's Influence through Resource Provision
7.2.2.1 Influence on Resource Pool
7.2.2.2 Influence on Management's Real Autonomy
8 Case Study varetis AG
8.1 Case Description
8.1.1 Development before First Round Financing
8.1.2 First Round Financing
8.1.3 Development until Second Round Financing
8.1.4 Second Round Financing
8.1.5 Further Development and BayBG's Exit
8.2 Case Analysis
8.2.1 BayBG's Influence through Contracting
8.2.1.1 Investment Agreement Structure
8.2.1.2 Influence on Deal-specific Risks
8.2.1.3 Influence on Management's Formal Autonomy
8.2.2 BayBG's Influence through Resource Provision
8.2.2.1 Influence on Resource Pool
8.2.2.2 Influence on Management's Real Autonomy
9 Comparative Case Study Analysis
9.1 Venture Capitalists' Influence through ContractualAgreements
9.1.1 Contracting Negotiations
9.1.2 Content of Investment Agreements
9.1.3 Portfolio Companies' Loss of Formal Autonomy
9.2 Venture Capitalists' Influence through Resource Provision
9.2.1 Direct Resource Provision
9.2.2 Indirect Resource Provision
9.2.3 Dynamic Aspects of Resource Provision
9.2.4 Venture Capitalists' Influence on Competitive Advantage
9.2.5 Portfolio Companies' Loss of Real Autonomy
10 Conclusion and Further Implications
10.1 Conclusion
10.2 Implications for Researchers and Practitioners
11 References

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