THE EVOLUTION OF ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL ERA

The pieces in this volume draw on the lessons of the past to set out how competition rules might deal with this new set of concerns, in various jurisdictions around the world. Each one draws on general themes, yet nevertheless addresses specific aspects of the contemporary debate. Much of today's antitrust discussion concerns the businesses run by large companies such as Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft. Each has significant share in a given industry, and derives its revenues from what are described as "platforms." But how are such platforms different from the incumbent businesses of the past? The answer to this is not clear. Yet queries surrounding the platforms' alleged dominance, and whether their conduct amounts to an infringement of competition rules, have been a source of controversy for over a decade. The pieces in this volume address this dilemma head-on. At a fundamental level, there is the definitional threshold of what a "platform" even is, and what rules should apply to such a business. Then there is the question of whether "platforms" have a "special responsibility" towards downstream operators that rely on them to reach customers. In other words, can platform operators favor their own businesses in those related markets? Or do competition laws require them to treat all firms in the same way? What are the risks to competition if platforms are given free rein? In antitrust parlance, these questions are assessed under the rubric of "self-preferencing," which has dominated recent headlines.