Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2023 International Workshops

Name: Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2023 International Workshops | Voting, CoDecFin, DeFi, WTSC, Bol, Brac, Croatia, May 5, 2023, Revised Selected Papers
Brand: Springer
Price: 85.59 EUR
Availability: OnlineOnly

Voting, CoDecFin, DeFi, WTSC, Bol, Brac, Croatia, May 5, 2023, Revised Selected Papers

Aleksander Essex Shin'ichiro Matsuo Oksana Kulyk Lewis Gudgeon Ariah Klages-Mundt Daniel Perez Sam Werner Andrea Bracciali Geoff Goodell(Herausgeber*in)

Springer (Verlag)

Erschienen am 4. Dezember 2023

XXIII, 504 Seiten

E-Book

PDF mit Wasserzeichen-DRM

Systemvoraussetzungen

978-3-031-48806-1 (ISBN)

85,59 €inkl. 7% MwSt.

Systemvoraussetzungen

für PDF mit Wasserzeichen-DRM

E-Book Einzellizenz

Als Download verfügbar

Beschreibung

Weitere Details

Weitere Ausgaben

Inhalt

Intro
VOTING 2023 Preface
VOTING 2023 Organization
CoDecFin 2023 4th Workshop on Coordination of Decentralized Finance
CoDecFin 2023 Organization
DeFi 2023 Preface
DeFi 2023 Organization
WTSC 2023 7th International Workshop on Trusted Smart Contracts
WTSC 2023 Organization
Contents
Voting
Belenios with Cast as Intended
1 Introduction
2 Protocol Description
2.1 Participants and Setup
2.2 Voting Phase
2.3 Tally Phase
2.4 Usability Considerations
3 Security Analysis
3.1 ProVerif
3.2 How to Overcome ProVerif's Limitations?
3.3 Security Analysis and Result
4 Efficiency Considerations
References
On the Auditability of the Estonian IVXV System
1 Introduction
1.1 E-Voting in Estonia
1.2 The IVXV System
2 Scope, Methodology, and Contributions
3 Flaw in Individual Verifiability
3.1 Attack 1: Discarding a Vote
3.2 Attack 2: Changing a Vote with Knowledge of the Private Key
3.3 Attack 3: Changing a Vote Without Knowledge of the Private Key
3.4 Computational Condition for Precision Attacks
3.5 Solution
3.6 Why wasn't This Already Noted?
4 Analysis with Regards to Haines and Roenne 2021
5 Conclusion
References
Coercion-Resistant Cast-as-Intended Verifiability for Computationally Limited Voters
1 Introduction
1.1 On the Limitations of the Coercion and of Voters' Capabilities
1.2 Related Work
1.3 Contributions and Organization of the Paper
2 Definitions
2.1 Cast-as-Intended Verifiability
2.2 Coercion-Resistance
3 A Construction for Limited Voters
3.1 The Protocol (for ElGamal Ciphertexts)
3.2 Cast-as-Intended Verifiability of the Proposed Protocol
3.3 Coercion-Resistance of the Proposed Protocol
4 Discussion and Conclusions
4.1 Practical Considerations
4.2 Comparison with Bingo Voting: On the Necessity of OED
References
Private Internet Voting on Untrusted Voting Devices
1 Introduction
1.1 Election Model and Voting Procedure
1.2 Contribution and Overview
2 Cryptographic Background
2.1 ElGamal Encryptions
2.2 BLS Signatures
2.3 Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs
2.4 Verifiable Mix-Nets
3 Protocol Description
3.1 Election Parameters
3.2 Protocol Parties and Communication
3.3 General Protocol Idea
3.4 Pre-election Phase
3.5 Election Phase
3.6 Post-election Phase
4 Security Discussion
5 Conclusion
References
Overstatement-Net-Equivalent Risk-Limiting Audit: ONEAudit
1 Introduction: Efficient Risk-Limiting Audits
2 Testing Net Overstatement Does Not Require CVRs Linked to Ballot Cards
2.1 Warmup: 2-Candidate Plurality Contest
2.2 Numerical Example
2.3 The General Case
3 Auditing Using Batch Subtotals
3.1 Numerical Case Studies
4 Auditing Heterogenous Voting Systems
5 Sample Sizes for Contest-Level ONE CLCA Vs. BPA
5.1 Theory
5.2 Numerical Comparison
6 Conclusions
References
Risk-Limiting Audits for Condorcet Elections
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Instant-Runoff Voting (IRV)
3 Risk-Limiting Audits for Condorcet Winners
4 Risk-Limiting Audits for Ranked Pairs Elections
4.1 Assertions and Assorters for Transitive Inferences
4.2 Correctness of Audit Assertions
5 RLAs for Minimax Elections
6 Smith
7 Kemeny-Young
8 Other Condorcet Methods
9 Results
9.1 IRV vs Ranked Pairs
9.2 Elections Without a Condorcet Winner
10 Conclusion
References
COBRA: Comparison-Optimal Betting for Risk-Limiting Audits
1 Introduction
2 Notation
2.1 Population and Parameters
2.2 Audit Data
2.3 Risk Measurement via Betting Supermartingales
3 Oracle Betting
3.1 Error-Free CVRs
3.2 Betting with CVR Error
3.3 Relation to ALPHA
4 Betting in Practice
4.1 Fixed Betting
4.2 Adaptive Betting
4.3 Diversified Betting
5 Numerical Evaluations
5.1 Oracle Simulations
5.2 Practical Simulations
6 Extensions
6.1 Betting While Sampling Without Replacement
6.2 Other Social Choice Functions
6.3 Batch-Level Comparison Audits
7 Conclusions
References
CoDecFin
Shaping Cryptocurrency Gatekeepers with a Regulatory ``Trial and Error''
1 Introduction
2 Background
2.1 Exchanges as Gatekeepers of Illicit Financial Proceeds
2.2 The Current Risks of Terrorist Financing
3 Regulation Beyond the ``Wait and See'' Approach
3.1 The Inconsistency in Terms and Definitions
3.2 International and European Approaches to AML/CFT
4 Repercussions of the Ongoing ``Trial and Error'' Phase
4.1 The Lack of Consensus and Legal Uniformity
4.2 Enforcement Issues with Texts and Actual Compliance
4.3 The Sunrise Issue
4.4 The Burden of Compliance on Small/Medium Exchanges
5 The Future of Policymaking
5.1 Common Regulatory Practices in Need of Change
5.2 The Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation
5.3 The Transfer of Funds Regulation
5.4 The Role of Law Enforcement
6 Conclusion
References
A First Dive into OFAC in DeFi Space
1 Introduction
2 Scope of Jurisdiction
2.1 Towards Chain
2.2 Towards Cryptocurrency
2.3 Towards DApp
3 Discussion
References
Proposal of Principles of DeFi Disclosure and Regulation
1 Introduction
2 Benefits, Advantages, and Possibilities of DeFi
3 Challenges, Risks, and Questions Related to DeFi
3.1 Lack of AML/KYC
3.2 Hacking
3.3 Is It Really ``Decentralized''?
3.4 Is It Really ``Traceable''?, Is It ``Accessible to All''?
3.5 Market Manipulation and Difficulties in Investigation
3.6 Does It Really Contribute to ``Financial Inclusion''?
3.7 Operational Risk in DeFi
3.8 Characteristics of Procyclicality and the Potential for Systemic Risk Associated with It
3.9 Lack of Ability to Address Risks Associated with Information Asymmetry
4 Implications for Regulatory Consideration
4.1 Innovation Trilemma
4.2 Perspectives on Whether Financial Regulations Should Be Applied
4.3 Need for Regulation for Providers of Financial Functions
4.4 How to Ensure AML/CFT
5 Proposal of Principles of DeFi Disclosure and Regulation
6 Conclusion
References
The Hidden Shortcomings of (D)AOs - An Empirical Study of On-Chain Governance
1 Introduction
2 Related Work
3 Methodology and Dataset
3.1 Data Collection
3.2 Dataset
4 Distribution of Voting Power
5 Structure of Voting Power Delegation
6 Governance Participation
7 Pointless Governance Transactions
8 Monetary Price of Governance
8.1 Price of Governance Transactions
8.2 Price of Transfer Overhead
9 Conclusion
A Short Description of Analyzed DAOs
B Computing the Cost of Governance
C Computing the Overhead Cost of Governance
References
An Intrinsic Mechanism Deciding Hash Rates from Bitcoin Price
1 Introduction
2 Rational Choice of Hash Rates
2.1 Model of Blockchain Network
2.2 Single-Period Mining
2.3 Multi-period Mining and Dynamic Programming
2.4 Myopic Decision of Hash Rates with Isoelastic Utility Functions
2.5 Mean-Variance Approximation and Miners' Hash Rates
2.6 Rational Network Hash Rate in Blockchain Network
3 Conclusion
References
Stablecoins: Past, Present, and Future
1 Introduction
2 Where They Came from and Why
3 Current State of Stablecoins
4 Stablecoin Classification
5 The Collapse of Luna
6 Future Directions
7 Conclusion
FTX Collapse: A Ponzi Story
1 Introduction
2 What is Ponzi?
3 The FTX Collapse
4 Future Directions
5 Concluding Remarks
References
Policy Design of Retail Central Bank Digital Currencies: Embedding AML/CFT Compliance
1 Introduction
2 Proposed CBDC Model Structure and Associated AML/CFT Limitations
3 Total Cost Structure of CBDC
4 Current AML/CFT Mechanism
4.1 Stakeholders
4.2 Process
4.3 Cost Structures and Incentives
4.4 Professional Resources in AML/CFT Measures
5 AML/CFT Mechanisms in Retail CBDC Projects
6 Feasibility of the AML/CFT System Associated with CBDC
6.1 Tiered System Based on the Level of Assurance
6.2 Collective Customer Due Diligence
6.3 Automated Analysis and Evaluation
6.4 Judgment and Reporting
7 Conclusion
Appendix A. Generalized AML/CFT Process
Appendix B. High Performing FIU (Israel, Italy, and Spain)
Appendix C. Compliance Cost of the Financial Institutions
Appendix D. Compliance Cost of the Financial Institutions
Appendix E. Number of Certified Anti-money Laundering Specialists Graduate List (Top 15 Countries/Regions)
Appendix F. Current AML/CFT Measures in Two-Tiered Retail CBDC
References
DeFi
Uniswap Liquidity Provision: An Online Learning Approach
1 Introduction
2 Uniswap Overview
2.1 Uniswap v3 - Concentrated Liquidity
3 Online Learning Model
3.1 Reward Function
4 Static Strategies
4.1 n=
4.2 n &
5 Adaptive Strategy
6 Conclusions
A Reward Function Derivation
A.1 Trading Fees
A.2 Change in Value
A.3 Total Reward
B Proofs for Section4
B.1 Lemma 1
B.2 Lemma 2
B.3 Theorem 1
C Analysis of Algorithm 1
References
Extended Abstract: The Effect of Trading Fees on Arbitrage Profits in Automated Market Makers
1 Introduction
2 Model
3 Results
4 Conclusion
References
Concave Pro-rata Games
1 The Concave Pro-rata Game
1.1 Symmetric Pure Strict Equilibrium
1.2 Uniqueness of Equilibrium
1.3 Equilibrium Payoff
2 Batched Decentralized Exchanges
2.1 Arbitrage
3 Conclusion
A Numerics
B Additional Numerics
C Relaxing Strict Concavity
D Rosen Condition
References
Electronic Cash with Open-Source Observers
1 Introduction
1.1 Previous Works and Challenges
1.2 Our Contribution
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Security Notions
2.2 Attested Execution Secure Processors
2.3 Blind Indirect Attestation
3 Construction
3.1 Overview
3.2 Open-Cash Protocols
4 Security
5 Conclusion
A Definition of Blind Direct Attestation
A.1 Non-Blind Indirect Attestation
A.2 Blind Indirect Attestation
B Protocol Details
B.1 Setup System
B.2 Opening Protocol
B.3 Withdrawal Protocol
B.4 Spend Protocol
B.5 Deposit Protocol
C Security Proof
C.1 Anonymity
C.2 One-More Unforgeability
C.3 Double-Spending Protection
References
Inefficiency of CFMs: Hedging Perspective and Agent-Based Simulations
1 Introduction
1.1 Literature Review
1.2 Organisation of the Paper
2 Liquidity Provision in Constant Function Markets
2.1 Connection with Perpetual Options
2.2 Model and Assumptions
3 An Agent-Based Model
3.1 Model Description
3.2 High Fee and Low Fee 1-
3.3 Impact of Noise Trader Arrival Rate
4 Conclusion and Future Work
A Appendix
A.1 An Overview of CFMs
References
DeFi Auditing: Mechanisms, Effectiveness, and User Perceptions
1 Introduction
2 Data Collection
2.1 DeFi Attacks
2.2 DeFi Auditing Firms and DeFi Applications
2.3 DeFi Vulnerabilities and Taxonomy
3 DeFi Auditing Mechanisms
3.1 DeFi Auditing Workflow
4 Effectiveness of DeFi Auditing
4.1 Audited vs Non-audited Projects - Vulnerabilities and Attacks
5 DeFi Auditing: User Perceptions
A DeFi Vulnerability
A.1 Smart Contract Layer Vulnerabilities
A.2 Protocol Layer Vulnerabilities
A.3 Third-Party Layer Vulnerabilities
B Data Collection
C Auditing Mechanism Findings
D Auditing Effectiveness Findings
References
Short Squeeze in DeFi Lending Market: Decentralization in Jeopardy?
1 Introduction
2 Background
3 Related Work
4 Data Collection
5 Avi Eisenberg's Attack
6 Aftermath
7 Discussion
8 Conclusion
A Borrowing Rates
B Latency of Price Oracle
C Curve Founder's Position on Aave
D Attack Proposed by Avi Eisenberg
References
WTSC
Efficient Rollup Batch Posting Strategy on Base Layer
1 Introduction
2 Model
3 Bellman Equation/Q-Learning
3.1 Implementation
3.2 Observations
4 Back-Testing Results
4.1 Current Arbitrum Algorithm
4.2 Q-Learning Algorithm
4.3 Price Minimizing Algorithm
4.4 Trivial Algorithm
4.5 Tips
5 Dynamic Programming with Fixed Prices
6 Conclusions
References
Unlinkability and Interoperability in Account-Based Universal Payment Channels
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries and Building Blocks
3 Universal Payment Channels (UPC)
4 Privacy-Preserving AUPC
5 Implementation and Evaluation
5.1 Accumulators
5.2 UPC Smart Contract Implementation
6 Discussion
6.1 Security
6.2 Tradeoffs Between UPC and AUPC
6.3 Related Work
7 Conclusion and Future Work
References
Cassiopeia: Practical On-Chain Witness Encryption
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Symmetric Encryption
2.2 Secret Sharing
2.3 Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing (PVSS)
2.4 Zero-Knowledge Succinct Non-Interactive Argument of Knowledge (zkSNARK)
2.5 Witness Encryption
2.6 Risk-Free Rate
3 Construction
4 Incentives
5 Analysis
5.1 Security Analysis of Non-incentivized Construction
5.2 Security Analysis of Incentivized Construction
6 Implementation
7 Conclusion
8 Appendix A: Proof of Correctness for Non-incentivized Construction
9 Appendix B: Proof of Security for Non-incentivized Construction
References
FlexiPCN: Flexible Payment Channel Network
1 Introduction
2 Background
3 System and Adversary Model
3.1 System Model
3.2 Adversary Model
3.3 Ideal World Model
4 The Proposed Protocol: FlexiPCN
4.1 Overview
4.2 FlexiPCN Operations
4.3 FlexiPCN Operational Details
5 Security Analysis
6 Conclusion
References
Publicly Verifiable Auctions with Privacy
1 Introduction
1.1 Auction Model
1.2 Related Work
1.3 Our Contributions and Techniques
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Public Key Encryption
2.2 Commitments
2.3 Zero-Knowledge Proofs
3 Description of Our Scheme
3.1 Setup Phase
3.2 Bidding Phase
3.3 Result Phase
3.4 Public Verification
4 Reducing the Number of Comparison Proofs
A Bypassing the Comparison Proof of ch27FCW:GalYou18
References
Consolidation of Ground Truth Sets for Weakness Detection in Smart Contracts
1 Introduction
2 Definition of Terms
3 Benchmark Sets with Ground Truth Data
3.1 Selection of GT Sets
3.2 Structure of the Included Sets
3.3 Summary of Assessments in the Included Sets
4 Unified Ground Truth
4.1 Extracting Data from the Original Sets
4.2 Completing the Data
4.3 Variability in the Unified GT Set
5 Consolidated Ground Truth
5.1 Matching Contracts
5.2 Assessments Excluded from the Consolidated Set
5.3 Mapping of Individual Assessments to a Common Taxonomy
5.4 Overlaps
5.5 Disagreements and Errors
6 Discussion
6.1 Data Quality
6.2 Related Work
6.3 Challenges in Identifying Weaknesses
6.4 Reservations About Majority Voting
7 Conclusion
References
The Principal-Agent Problem in Liquid Staking
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries
3 Representation
4 The Principal-Agent Problem
5 Attack
6 Exempt Delegations
References
Detecting Privileged Parties on Ethereum
1 Introduction
2 Motivating Example
3 Proposed Method
3.1 Dead End: Heuristic Pattern Matching
3.2 Symbolic Execution
4 Validation
5 Discussion
5.1 Applications
5.2 Limitations
6 Related Work
7 Conclusion
A Validation Data
References
Breaking Blockchain Rationality with Out-of-Band Collusion
1 Introduction
2 Assumptions Underlying the Attack
3 Rational Attack on Rationality
4 Game Theoretic Analysis
4.1 Game 0: Without Collusion
4.2 Game 1: Magnate-Coordinated Collusion
5 Sketch to Break Real-World Blockchain Systems
5.1 Double-Spending as Malicious Protocol
5.2 Breaking the Longest-Chain Rule in Bitcoin
5.3 Breaking the Deposit-Slashing Protocol in Ethereum
6 Discussion
7 Related Work
8 Conclusion
References
Author Index

Systemvoraussetzungen

Als PDF speichern Als Link merken