Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice
Economic Approaches in Political Science
1. Auflage
Erschienen am 3. Juni 2014
300 Seiten
978-1-317-86722-7 (ISBN)
Beschreibung
First published in 1991. This book initially offers a critique of some key rational public choice models, to show that they were internally inconsistent and ideologically slanted. Then due to the authors' research the ideas are restructured around a particular kind of institutional public choice method, recognizing the value of instrumental models as a mode of thinking clearly about the manifold complexities of political life.
Weitere Details
Sprache
Englisch
Verlagsort
London
Großbritannien
Verlagsgruppe
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Zielgruppe
Für Beruf und Forschung
Produkt-Hinweis
Reflowable
Dateigröße
4,68 MB
ISBN-13
978-1-317-86722-7 (9781317867227)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
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05/2016
1. Auflage
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Buch
04/1991
1. Auflage
Longman
94,10 €
Artikel leider nicht bestellbar
Person
Professor Patrick Dunleavy (Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science.)
Inhalt
Introduction: Institutional Public Choice Theory and Political Analysis
DEMOCRACY
Interest Groups and Collective Action
Reconstructing the Theory of Groups
Economic Explanations of Voting Behaviour
Party Competition - The Preference-Shaping Model
BUREAUCRACY
Existing Public Choice Models of Bureaucracy
The Bureau-Shaping Model
Comparing Budget - Maximizing and Bureau-Shaping Models
Conclusion - Economic Explanations in Political Science
DEMOCRACY
Interest Groups and Collective Action
Reconstructing the Theory of Groups
Economic Explanations of Voting Behaviour
Party Competition - The Preference-Shaping Model
BUREAUCRACY
Existing Public Choice Models of Bureaucracy
The Bureau-Shaping Model
Comparing Budget - Maximizing and Bureau-Shaping Models
Conclusion - Economic Explanations in Political Science
