Financial Cryptography and Data Security

Name: Financial Cryptography and Data Security | FC 2016 International Workshops, BITCOIN, VOTING, and WAHC, Christ Church, Barbados, February 26, 2016, Revised Selected Papers
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FC 2016 International Workshops, BITCOIN, VOTING, and WAHC, Christ Church, Barbados, February 26, 2016, Revised Selected Papers

Jeremy Clark Sarah Meiklejohn Peter Y.A. Ryan Dan Wallach Michael Brenner Kurt Rohloff(Herausgeber*in)

Springer (Verlag)

Erschienen am 30. August 2016

XII, 343 Seiten

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Inhalt

Intro
BITCOIN 2016: Third Workshop on Bitcoin and Blockchain Research
VOTING 2016: First Workshop on Advances in Secure Electronic Voting Schemes
WAHC 2016: 4th Workshop on Encrypted Computing and Applied Homomorphic Cryptography
Contents
Third Workshop on Bitcoin and Blockchain Research, BITCOIN 2016
Stressing Out: Bitcoin ``Stress Testing''
1 Introduction
2 Background
2.1 DoS Targets Inherent in Bitcoin
3 Data Collection
4 Spam Clustering
4.1 Methodology
4.2 Results and Motifs
4.3 Validation
5 Impact on Bitcoin
6 Discussion
7 Related Work
8 Conclusion
References
Why Buy When You Can Rent?
1 Introduction
2 Renting Mining Capacity
2.1 Out-of-Band Payment
2.2 Negative-Fee Mining Pool
2.3 In-Band Payment via Forking
3 Bribery Attacks
3.1 Counter-Bribing by Miners
4 Analysis of Mitigating Factors
4.1 Miners May Be Too Simplistic to Recognize or Accept Bribes
4.2 The Attack Requires Significant Capital and Risk-Tolerance
4.3 Profit from Double-Spends May Not Be Frictionless or Boundless
4.4 Extra Confirmations for Large Transactions
4.5 Counter-Bribing by the Intended Victim
4.6 Miners May Refuse to Help an Attack Against Bitcoin
5 Concluding Remarks
References
Automated Verification of Electrum Wallet
1 Context
2 Electrum Wallet
3 Modeling BIP32
4 ASLan++ Wallet Model
4.1 Attacker Model and Assumptions
4.2 Security Properties
4.3 User Role
4.4 Client Role
4.5 Server Registration Role
4.6 Server Confirmation Role
4.7 Server Signature Role
5 Results
5.1 Executability Checking
5.2 Attack by Confirmation Replay
5.3 Security Analysis
6 Conclusion
References
Blindly Signed Contracts: Anonymous On-Blockchain and Off-Blockchain Bitcoin Transactions
1 Introduction
1.1 Related Work
2 Overview and Security Properties
2.1 Anonymity Properties
2.2 Security Properties
3 Implementing Fair Exchange via Scripts and Blind Signatures
4 On-Blockchain Anonymous Protocols
4.1 Anonymous Fee Vouchers
4.2 Anonymity Analysis
5 Off-Blockchain Anonymous Payments over Micropayment Channel Networks
5.1 Micropayment Channel Networks
5.2 Anonymizing Micropayment Channel Networks
5.3 Anonymity Analysis
6 Security Analysis
7 Conclusion
References
Proofs of Proofs of Work with Sublinear Complexity
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries
3 Interconnected Blockchains
3.1 Description of the Interlink-Update Algorithm
4 Proving Proof of Work with Sublinear Complexity
4.1 Description of the Prover
4.2 Description of the Lite Verifier
5 Efficiency Analysis
5.1 Space Complexity
5.2 Communication and Time Complexity
6 Security Analysis
References
Step by Step Towards Creating a Safe Smart Contract: Lessons and Insights from a Cryptocurrency Lab
1 Introduction
2 Background
2.1 Background on Decentralized Cryptocurrencies
2.2 Background on Smart Contracts
2.3 A Taste of Smart Contract Design
3 A Recount of Our Smart Contract Programming Lab
4 Pitfalls of Smart Contract Programming
4.1 Errors in Encoding State Machines
4.2 Failing to Use Cryptography
4.3 Misaligned Incentives
4.4 Ethereum-Specific Mistakes
4.5 Complete, Fixed Contract
5 Conclusion
5.1 Open-Source Course and Lab Materials
5.2 Cryptocurrency and Smart Contracts as a Cybersecurity Pedagogical Platform
5.3 The ``Build, Break, and Amend Your Own Programs'' Approach to Cybersecurity Education
5.4 Subsequent Pedagogical Efforts and Research
References
EthIKS: Using Ethereum to Audit a CONIKS Key Transparency Log
1 Introduction
2 CONIKS Overview
3 Ethereum Overview
4 EthIKS
5 Implementation and Costs
6 Concluding Discussion
References
On Scaling Decentralized Blockchains
1 Introduction
2 Bitcoin Scalability Today: A Reality Check
3 Scaling by Parameter Tuning and Fundamental Limits
3.1 Measurement Study
3.2 Limits of Scalability by Reparametrization
3.3 Bottleneck Analysis
4 Rethinking the Design of a Scalable Blockchain
4.1 Network Plane
4.2 Consensus Plane
4.3 Storage Plane
4.4 View Plane
4.5 Side Plane
5 Conclusion
A BFT Experiments (Consortium Consensus)
B Use of SNARKs for Outsourcing View Computation
References
Bitcoin Covenants
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries
3 Covenants
3.1 Basic Covenants
3.2 Recursive Covenants
3.3 Distinguished Coins
3.4 Overhead
3.5 Discussion
4 Vault Transactions
4.1 Overview
4.2 Architecture
4.3 Script Programs
5 Bitcoin-NG Overlay
5.1 Preliminaries: Bitcoin-NG Operation
5.2 Overlaying Bitcoin-NG on Top of Bitcoin
5.3 Poison Transactions
6 Related Work
7 Conclusions
References
Cryptocurrencies Without Proof of Work
1 Introduction
2 Pure Proof of Stake
2.1 The PPCoin System
2.2 The CoA Pure Proof of Stake System
2.3 The Dense-CoA Pure Proof of Stake Variant
3 Solidification of the Ledger History
4 Conclusion
References
First Workshop on Secure Voting Systems, VOTING 2016
Coercion-Resistant Internet Voting with Everlasting Privacy
1 Introduction
1.1 Related Work
1.2 Contribution
1.3 Paper Overview
2 Coercion-Resistant Internet Voting with Everlasting Privacy
2.1 Adversary Model and Trust Assumptions
2.2 Protocol Overview
2.3 Discussion of Coercion-Resistance
3 Detailed Cryptographic Protocol
3.1 Cryptographic Preliminaries
3.2 Protocol Description
3.3 Security Properties
4 Conclusion
References
Selene: Voting with Transparent Verifiability and Coercion-Mitigation
1 Introduction
2 Background
3 Cryptographic Primitives
4 Related Work
5 The Set-Up Phase
5.1 Distributed Generation of the Tracker Number Commitments
5.2 Voting
5.3 Mixing and Decryption
5.4 Notification of Tracker Numbers
6 The Voter Experience
6.1 The Core Ceremony
6.2 The Ceremony in the Event of Coercion
6.3 Selene as an Add-On
7 Analysis
7.1 Verifiability and Verification
7.2 Ballot Privacy
7.3 Receipt-Freeness
7.4 Coercion: Threats and Mitigation
7.5 Dispute Resolution
8 Alternative Selene Scheme
9 Conclusions
References
On the Possibility of Non-interactive E-Voting in the Public-Key Setting
1 Introduction
1.1 Multiple Non-interactive Elections in the PK Setting
1.2 Relation to Secure Computation
1.3 Our Results in a Nutshell
2 Definitions
2.1 Non-interactive Voting Scheme in the PK Setting
2.2 Bilinear Maps
2.3 NIZK in the RO
3 NIVS for YES/NO Elections
3.1 Properties and Security of the Scheme
4 Future Directions
References
Efficiency Comparison of Various Approaches in E-Voting Protocols
1 Introduction
2 Methodology
2.1 Election Phases
2.2 Time Estimations
3 Individual Calculations
3.1 Mix Net
3.2 Homomorphic Tallying
3.3 Distributed Decryption
4 Prototype Evaluation Tool
4.1 Relevant Parameters
4.2 Software
5 Evaluation of Example Settings
5.1 Description of Example Settings
5.2 Results and Discussion
6 Conclusion
References
Remote Electronic Voting Can Be Efficient, Verifiable and Coercion-Resistant
1 Introduction
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Classical Tools
2.2 Algebraic MACs
2.3 Our Sequential Aggregate MAC Scheme
3 A MAC Based Coercion Resistant Voting Scheme
3.1 An Overview of the Scheme
3.2 Our Novel Coercion-Resistant Voting Scheme
4 Conclusion
References
Universal Cast-as-Intended Verifiability
1 Introduction
1.1 Our Contributions
1.2 Related Work
1.3 Structure of the Paper
2 Electronic Voting Definitions
2.1 Syntactical Definition
2.2 Security Definitions
3 Building Blocks
4 Core Voting Protocol
4.1 Overview
4.2 2-cnf-Proof of Knowledge
4.3 Detailed Protocol
5 Security of the Protocol
6 A Possible Instantiation
7 Towards Designing Usable UCIV Systems
8 Future Work
References
4th Workshop on Encrypted Computing and Applied Homomorphic Cryptography, WAHC 2016
Hiding Access Patterns in Range Queries Using Private Information Retrieval and ORAM
1 Introduction
2 Background
2.1 Privacy Preserving Range Queries Using Bucketization
2.2 Lipmaa's BddCPIR Protocol for PIR
2.3 Path ORAM
3 Privacy Preserving Range Query Using PIR and ORAM
3.1 CPIR for Privacy Preserving Range Queries
3.2 Path ORAM for Privacy Preserving Range Queries
4 Analysis of Security in Privacy Preserving Range Queries
4.1 Security Analysis of CPIR
4.2 Security Analysis of Path ORAM
5 A Quantitative Analysis of Path ORAM and CPIR
5.1 Communication Complexity Analysis
5.2 Computational Complexity Analysis
6 Experiments
6.1 Single-Node Experiments
6.2 Multi-node Experiments
7 Conclusion
References
Optimizing MPC for Robust and Scalable Integer and Floating-Point Arithmetic
1 Introduction
2 Background
3 Improvements in Protocol Design
3.1 Efficient Polynomial Evaluation
3.2 Additional Improvements to Floating-Point Protocols
3.3 New Floating-Point Protocols
4 Optimization Techniques
4.1 Shared Random Number Generators
4.2 Symmetric Protocols
4.3 Speedup over Previous Results
5 Large-Scale Performance Evaluation
6 Conclusions
References
On-the-fly Homomorphic Batching/Unbatching
1 Introduction
2 Motivation
3 FHE Background
4 NTT Background
4.1 Fourier Transform
4.2 Number Theoretic Transform
5 Homomorphic NTT
5.1 Homomorphic Batching/Unbatching
5.2 Homomorphic NTT Using Parallel Batching
6 Complexity Analysis
7 Implementation Results
8 Conclusion
References
Using Intel Software Guard Extensions for Efficient Two-Party Secure Function Evaluation
1 Introduction
2 Technical Background
2.1 Garbled Circuits for Two-Party, Secure Function Evaluation
2.2 Intel's Software Guard Extensions Module
2.3 Towards Using Secure Hardware for Garbled-Circuit Protocols
3 Why Simple ``Solutions'' Do Not Quite Work
3.1 A Simple 2P-SFE Protocol Implemented with SGX
3.2 Problems with Simple SGX-Supported 2P-SFE
4 Using SGX for 2P-SFE Computations
4.1 Using SGX for 2P-SFE: Problems and Solutions
4.2 Half and Half
4.3 Outsourcing
4.4 Improving the Security of 2P-SFE Protocols Using SGX
4.5 Universal Programs (Circuits)
4.6 Novel Use Cases for SGX
5 Previous Work on Secure-Execution Environments
6 Conclusion
References
CallForFire: A Mission-Critical Cloud-Based Application Built Using the Nomad Framework
1 Introduction
2 Nomad Framework Overview
2.1 Client Management and Storage Services
2.2 Nomad Operational Overview
3 Application: Call For Fire
4 Implementation and Experiments
5 Conclusion
References
Cryptographic Solutions for Genomic Privacy
1 Kin Genomic Privacy
2 Solutions for Genomic Privacy
2.1 Private Use of Genomic Data in Personalized Medicine
2.2 Coping with Weak Passwords for the Protection of Genomic Data
3 Conclusions
References
Author Index

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