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Nations have long sought to use technology as a power-multiplier for their own ambitions. In the twenty-first century, at a time of unprecedented innovation, the United States and China are in a race to achieve technological superiority. But how will this affect long-standing trade ties and the international landscape?
Techno-nationalism holds that a nation's economic strength and its national security - even its social stability- are linked to the technological prowess of its institutions and enterprises. From artificial intelligence and biotechnology to semiconductors and quantum science, nations that fall behind in the technology race risk becoming permanent losers, with potentially catastrophic consequences. After decades of trade liberalization and free-flowing investment into China, a paradigm shift amongst a bloc of like-minded, mostly Western countries, has set in motion epic change. Techno-nationalism is reorganizing the global economy.
Alex Capri, who spent decades as a trade and supply chain professional in China and throughout the world, lays out the dynamics of this change and its underlying themes, from the paradox facing U.S.-China commercial linkages to the grey zones in which states and firms must now try to coexist. He provides a realist's perspective of both the challenges and opportunities facing international actors.
Regarding the elements of techno-nationalism, Capri paints a masterful picture of the strategic decoupling of supply chains and the re-shoring of key manufacturing ecosystems such as semiconductors. He provides an illuminating account of the geopolitics of data, and the fragmentation of the digital landscape, as well as the bifurcation of financial markets, academia, and R&D around Chinese and American spheres of influence.
These themes carry through to Capri's fascinating accounts of the modern-day space-race, and space-based Internet, undersea cables, hypersonic warfare, the AI arms race, drones, and robotics. The book's clear explanations of semiconductors and their importance is highly useful.
TECHNO-Nationalism is a must-read for business and government leaders, investors and strategists, academics, journalists, NGOs, or anyone who wants to experience a thoroughly entertaining and educational account of one the most important issues of our time.
ALEX CAPRI is an American writer, based in Singapore, where he teaches business and public policy at the National University of Singapore.
List of Illustrations & Diagrams xvii
List of Images xix
Part I The Elements of Techno-Nationalism 1
Introduction: My China Lessons 3
Three Important Lessons 5
The Origins of This Book 9
Chapter 1 Techno-Nationalism 11
The Power of the State 14
The Great Reorganisation 17
The Great Bifurcation 19
Paradoxes and Contradictions 21
A Steady Shift Towards Decoupling 22
States and Firms in a Grey Zone 24
The Big Questions 27
Overview of Sections and Chapters 29
Chapter 2 The Technology Feedback Loop 31
Early International Talent Wars 32
Early British Export Controls 33
History's Technology Feedback Loop 34
The Dutch Seafaring Technologies 39
Techno-Nationalism and the Four Industrial Revolutions 41
Physics and Chemistry Wars 42
Computers, Atomic Bombs and a Space Race 44
The Manhattan Project 46
The Third Industrial Revolution (3IR) 47
China's 4IR Feedback Loop 49
Chapter 3 Paradigm Shift and Paradox 51
Paradigm Shift Becomes Policy 52
CEOs versus Techno-Nationalists 56
The Wicked Paradox 59
Chapter 4 The In-China-for-China Grey Zone 63
Welcome to the Grey Zone 63
The Traditional 'In-China-for-China' Model 67
China's Tech Subsidies: From TVs to EVs 67
China's Anti-Espionage Laws 70
Chapter 5 De-Risking and Decoupling 75
Stratified Global Value Chains 77
States versus Firms 79
The Ukraine War, De-Risking and Decoupling 80
Decoupling from Russia 81
De-risking and Decoupling from China 82
China's De-Americanisation Long Game 84
Chapter 6 Export Controls 85
Export Controls in the Modern Era 87
Blacklisted Entities 90
Extraterritoriality 91
Workarounds, Loopholes and Backdoors 94
High Approval Rates, Long Grace Periods and Binge-Buying 95
Cloud Access, Third-Party Backdoors and Black Markets 97
A Revamped, Multilateral Export Control Regime 99
Chapter 7 Semiconductor Ground Zero 103
Chip-Centric Geopolitics 104
What are Semiconductors? 105
Semiconductor Global Value Chains 107
Moore's Law 108
Chip-Manufacturing Choke Points 111
Packaging 117
Rationalised Supply Chains 118
Chapter 8 China's Semiconductor Problem 121
Trailing-Edge Chips 123
Leading-Edge Chips 125
China's False-Positive Chip Test 127
The Road Behind and Ahead 129
Chapter 9 Re shoring Chip Manufacturing to America 133
The CHIPS and Science Act 134
CHIPS and the Trailing-Edge Revolution 138
Challenges, Scepticism and Assumptions 140
Part II Undercurrents and Power-Multipliers 145
Chapter 10 The War Against Huawei 147
The Three Points of Reference 150
The Supermicro Antecedent 150
America's Historic Telecoms-Espionage Monopoly 151
Senate Investigations into U.S. Telecoms and Spy Agencies 152
China's Brand of Economic-Techno-Nationalism 154
State-Backed Cheap Credit for Emerging Markets 156
Huawei and China's Digital Belt and Road Initiative 157
How the Neoliberal Model Backfired with Huawei 159
Huawei and the Quest for Chip Self-Sufficiency 160
Chapter 11 Tradecraft, Stealth and Technology 165
The Distractions of the U.S. War on Terror 166
The Technology that found Bin Laden 168
The Technology that Killed Bin Laden 170
Chinese Tradecraft and Helicopter Stealth Technology 171
Operation 'Byzantine Hades' 172
Fifth-Generation Fighter Jets 174
Skunkworks Legacy Feedback Loop Meets China Tradecraft 176
A New 'Stealth' Innovation Race Driven by AI 178
The Rise of the Drones 179
Chapter 12 Data, Biotech and Geopolitics 181
The Elements of Data Geopolitics 183
What is Data and Why is it Important? 185
Techno-Authoritarianism and Surveillance Capitalism 185
Genetic Data and National Security 186
The Biosecurity-Genome Technology Feedback Loop 187
Pharmacogenomics and Techno-Nationalism 188
Data Capitalism in the Digital Commons 190
User-Generated Content 190
Original Data Suppliers 191
The Human Genome and Data Capitalism 192
American Sci-Tech Data Hegemony 193
Data Intermediaries 194
The Different Regulatory Landscapes Around the World 195
Data Geopolitics, Soft Power and Information Wars 196
The Cambridge Analytica Milestone 196
How Data Analytics Shape the Geopolitical Landscape 197
Russian Influence Campaigns in Social Media 198
The Spread of Information Wars 199
Social Media Influencers and Bloggers 200
Platform Diplomacy 201
Intelligence Agencies Relying on Private Companies 202
Government Demands for Data Access 203
Chapter 13 The AI Arms Race 205
AI Designs a Breakthrough Drug 207
AI and the Weapons of War 208
AI and Cyberwarfare 210
AI Superpowers: The U.S. versus China 212
AI Misinformation, Deepfakes and Narrative Wars 215
AI and Chip Wars 216
Chapter 14 Quantum Technologies 219
What is Quantum Computing and Why does it Matter? 221
Quantum Supremacy and Limitations 223
Quantum Technologies and Techno-Nationalism 225
Potential Sectors and Practical Applications of Quantum Computing 226
Reinventing Public Key Cryptography 228
Patent Filings as a Benchmark 230
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) 230
The Race Between Companies 231
Techno-Nationalism and the Future of Quantum Technologies 232
Export Controls and Ring-fencing of Strategic Ecosystems 233
Techno-Diplomacy and Quantum Technology 234
Quantum Ethics, Standards and Rules 234
Chapter 15 Hypersonic Speed 237
China's Hypersonic Technology Snapshot 238
'Carrier Killer' Missiles 240
The Role of AI 242
The DARPA Answer 244
Chapter 16 The Great Undersea Cable Decoupling 247
Geopolitics, Data and Undersea Cables 248
The Technology and Competitors 252
Techno-Diplomacy and Undersea Cables 253
The SEA-ME-WE-6 254
States and Firms in the Grey Zone 255
Cable Sabotage and Warfare 256
Chapter 17 Space-Based Internet 259
Trends in Satellite Technology and Space-Geopolitics 260
Low Earth Orbit Satellites 261
A Revolution in Smallsat Technology and Manufacturing 262
SpaceX and the Rocket Revolution 263
The Militarisation of Space-Based Internet 264
The Grey Zone: Blurring the Line between Defence and Commerce 265
Export Controls, Sanctions and Bifurcated Global Value Chains 266
Starlink Internet and the Russia-Ukraine War 267
Lethal Eyes, Ears and the Drone Revolution 269
Open-Sourced War in the Digital Global Commons 269
The Grey Zone: State versus Firms 270
The Rise of Space Monopolies 272
A Multilateral Rules Framework for Space? 272
Chapter 18 The Twenty-First-Century Space Race 275
The Commercialisation of Space 277
The New Space Markets 278
Emerging Space Industries 279
Space Robots 281
The Rise and Rise of SpaceX 282
Semiconductors and the Twenty-First-Century Space Race 286
Neolibs versus Techno-Nationalists 288
Tech Start-Ups 290
The Militarisation of Space 292
The Bifurcation of Space Research 294
De-Risking Aerospace Global Supply Chains 295
Re-Shoring 297
Space Blocs 298
Chapter 19 Drones, Robots and Autonomous Weapons 301
The Rise of the Machines 302
Inflection Points 303
The Russia-Ukraine War 304
Turkish and Iranian Drones 304
Kamikaze in a Backpack 306
The Shift to Lethal Autonomous Weapons 307
The Ethical Dilemma of Lethal Autonomous Systems 311
Part III Climate, Cleantech and Agritech 313
Chapter 20 Climate Change and Geopolitics 315
The Geopolitics of Energy Infrastructure 317
The Cleantech Arena 318
Climate Competition in Emerging Markets 318
China's Infrastructure-For-Resources Deals 320
Values-Driven Infrastructure Projects 321
Multilateral Infrastructure Alliances 322
The Digital Infrastructure Nexus 324
China's Island-Building Diplomacy 326
Chapter 21 The Geopolitics of Electric Vehicles 329
The Core Areas of EV Techno-Nationalism 330
Twenty-First-Century Electrification of the Automotive Industry 331
New Regulations and Funding 332
The EV Ecosystem and Composition of EVs 333
The Simplicity of Electric Motors 334
China: EV Techno-Nationalist Ground-Zero 335
China's Dominance of Rare Earth Materials 336
Accelerated Decoupling in Rare Earths Supply Chains 337
The Re-shoring and Ring-fencing of Rare Earths 338
China's Dominance of Lithium-ion Batteries and Related Supply Chains 339
Critical Components and Minerals 340
The Geographic Ring-fencing of Li-ion Battery Production 340
A Story of China's EV Battery Techno-Nationalism 341
Forced Reliance on Chinese Suppliers 342
America and Europe's EV Subsidies, Initiatives and Techno-Nationalist Road Map 343
U.S. EV Techno-Diplomacy 343
Emerging EV Fragmentation and Clusters 344
Chapter 22 Semiconductors and Electric Vehicle Wars 347
The Blurring of Automotive and Technology Companies 348
The Challenges of 'Dual-use' EV Technologies 349
Cross-Border Microchip Innovation 350
Foreign Venture Capital in a Geopolitical Context 351
An EV Software and Hardware Open Platform 352
Silicon Carbide and Gallium Nitrogen Chips 353
Connected Cars and National Security Risks 354
Subsidies for the EV-Semiconductor Nexus 355
The Road Ahead 356
Chapter 23 Food Security and Techno-Nationalism 357
Food Protectionism on the Rise 358
The 'Friend-shoring' of Food Supply Chains 359
Technology and Food Security 360
Precision Agriculture 362
Vertical Farming 363
Laboratory-grown Protein 364
Agritech and Industrial Espionage 364
Water Scarcity and Technology 366
The Geopolitics of Water Scarcity 366
Part IV Innovation, Academia, Alliances and Diplomacy 369
Chapter 24 Techno-Nationalism on Campus 371
The Changing Academic Landscape 373
Academic Ring-Fencing 374
Middle-Country Universities 375
Student Nationalities 376
China's Thousand Talents Programme and Academic Espionage 377
Rule Frameworks and Research Security 379
Screening the Sources of Funding 380
The Military and Academia 382
Chapter 25 Chip Schools 385
Purdue's Silicon Moment 386
The Rise of the National Chip Hubs 388
Chip School West: Arizona State University 389
Academic Cross Border Friend-Shoring 391
Taiwan's Global Talent Development Strategy 393
A Worldwide Shortage of Talent 394
Chapter 26 The Innovation Horse Race 397
Government Activism: Why it Matters 399
Public-Private Partnerships 400
R&D and the Paradigm Shift 402
Milestones of Chinese Techno-Nationalism 404
A Brief Reflection on the Benefits of Industrial Policy 405
Japan 406
Taiwan 407
Germany 408
The Origins of America's Chip Policies 410
Chapter 27 India Rising? 413
India's Fertile Economy and Technology Landscape 415
Accelerated Decoupling from China 416
India's Digital Landscape 417
Software and Engineering Research & Development (ER&D) 419
The Pain-of-Doing-Business in India 420
Smartphones and Geopolitical Influence 422
Building World-class Clusters with Local Manufacturers 423
Printed Circuit Board Assembly and Semiconductors 424
Chapter 28 Fragmented Finance 427
Central Bank-backed Digital Currencies 427
Ideology and Digital Currency: A Clash of Civilisations 430
Digital Dystopia 431
New Accounting Standards Aimed at Chinese Companies 433
The U.S. Outbound Investment Transparency Act 434
International Banks Caught between Beijing and Washington 435
China Punishes HSBC 436
Techno-Nationalism and FinTech Decoupling 438
Sovereign Wealth Funds and Geopolitics 439
Chapter 29 Techno-Diplomacy and the Road Ahead 441
From FTAs to Mini-Lateral Arrangements 443
The Chip 4 Alliance (Fact or Fiction) 445
The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework 447
The AUKUS Trilateral Security Agreement 448
The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) 450
Bilateral Techno-Diplomacy 451
AI Ethics and The Promise of Open-Sourced Platforms 452
The Great Reorganisation will Go On 455
Notes 457
Acknowledgements 505
Index 509
Since the opening of China to foreign commerce in the late 1970s, Beijing's central planners have presided over the largest and most rapid transfer of wealth in human history. It was primarily Western companies that made this possible, as a decades-long torrent of money and technology flowed into China's state-centric economic system.
The numbers are staggering. If we count official foreign direct investment (FDI) figures along with estimates of unofficial capital flows via offshore financial centres-such as Hong Kong, the Cayman Islands and the British Virgin Islands-at least US$6 trillion flowed into China over a 30-year time frame.1,2
That is a conservative estimate. If we factor in forced technology transfer and stolen intellectual property just from American private and public entities, the number comes to at least US$10 trillion, or more than half the value of China's entire gross domestic product (GDP) in 2023.
The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) has estimated that China's forced technology-transfer practices cost the U.S. economy hundreds of billions of dollars more per year, while agencies such as the National Bureau of Economic Research claim that China's ongoing cyberattacks on U.S. companies drain off billions more.
These vast transfers of wealth were feasible because of the spread of powerful and affordable new technologies, combined with the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) iron-willed and methodical pursuit of its modernisation goals.
I would come to learn all these things first hand, as my professional career landed me right in the middle of this historical inflection point. I arrived in Hong Kong in 2003 as an American expat, two years after China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). I would eventually become a partner at KPMG, the global accounting and consultancy firm, and would take over as the regional head of its Asia Trade and Customs Practice.
In my work, I provided multinational companies with advice on their global operations, which often meant that, for economic and practical reasons, their supply chains would pass through China. There were foreign trade zones to manage and a host of cross-border transactions to monitor. There were customs duties, indirect taxes and trade agreements to optimise.
After China's successful accession to the WTO, companies ramped up their investments and began directing higher-valued activities into China. By 2017, according to PWC, the global consultancy, about 80% of the corporate R&D money spent in China came from foreign multinationals, most of them American and European.
During my tenure in Hong Kong, global trade hit a historic high. Except for the year following the global financial crisis, in 2009, seven out of my first eight years on the job yielded double-digit growth rates in the value of world trade. And between the U.S. and China, the annual value of bilateral trade in goods and services had crossed the US$ half-trillion threshold.
By the mid-2000s, incredibly, Walmart, the world's largest retailer, was importing so much from China that it accounted for more than 11% of China's annual exports, according to the Brookings Institution.3
Meanwhile, as foreign money and technology continued to pour into China, so did international talent. The professional services industry, composed of management consultants, accountants, tax planners, head-hunters, academics and lawyers, quickly soaked up the economic opportunities. Large consulting firms such as Accenture, KPMG, PWC and McKinsey became fixtures in China's business landscape.
Scholars have yet to fully gauge the magnitude of influence that consultancies had in accelerating the growth of China. In just over four decades, firms like mine served up a menu of mostly neoliberal economic advice to thousands of companies-and to Chinese government entities-as foreign money saturated Beijing's centrally planned landscape, funding greenfield sites, joint ventures and technology transfers. This transformed China into the world's largest manufacturing and supplier base and made it the world's top exporter.
I did not fully understand it at the time, but in my position, I was simultaneously enabling history's most remarkable period of trade and globalisation and, unwittingly, contributing to the eventual upending of the Western-led rules-based order.
Soon after settling into life in Hong Kong, my worldview became conflicted. I arrived as a true internationalist: As the son of a U.S. diplomat, I had grown up in eight countries on three continents, studied international relations in college and my first job had been with U.S. Customs at one of the world's busiest trading ports-Los Angeles.
From my desk in LA, as a trade specialist, I watched the phenomenon of globalisation unfold, from the late 1980s until the late 1990s, when I left the government for the enterprising world of consulting.
From Hong Kong, I began to witness, close up, the incongruities (incompatibilities, actually) between China Inc.'s nonmarket economy and Western laissez-faire capitalism.
Over time, three lessons emerged from what I will call 'my China classroom'.
The first lesson was that most foreign business executives naively construed geopolitics and business as separate issues. Most Western CEOs had no understanding (and still do not) of the resoluteness of China's five-year plans and the CCP's longstanding quest to achieve Chinese self-sufficiency.
The truth was, Beijing had been pre-emptively decoupling from its chief benefactors, playing the 'long game', as Rush Doshi would call it, by shrewdly calculating what it could extract from others and how to prevent them from taking from the Middle Kingdom.
My second lesson taught me how deeply nationalism had permeated the business landscape. Most of my Chinese colleagues and friends (regardless of whether they had been educated in the West) quietly harboured a deep-rooted sense of national pride and grievance.
I learned about the 'Century of Humiliation' narrative, which posits that for eight centuries, from the Han dynasty to the early modern period in the nineteenth century, China had been the world's largest, wealthiest and most sophisticated world power. It was the European colonial empires and China's next-door neighbour and long-time tormentor, Imperial Japan, that brought its global prominence to an end.
The Century of Humiliation, from 1849 until 1949, as it is widely taught to school children, ushered in a series of catastrophes, including the Opium Wars with Britain and the ravages of the Sino-Japanese Wars. Seven decades after the ascension of Mao and the CCP in 1949, these themes continue to influence China's policymaking.
Other similarly influential views had seeped into the national narrative. Not surprisingly, one was the unapologetic call for 'China's Return to Greatness', with the underlying theme that China was reclaiming its rightful place again at the top of the world order.
Parallel to this were increasing references to the 'decline of America and the West'. When the global financial crisis hit in 2007-2008, it emboldened China's technocrats even further. With the meltdown of financial markets and the symbolic collapse of Lehman Brothers, the 158-year-old Wall Street investment bank, the Western economic model came under further disregard.
These themes are harnessed by the modern-day communist party to stoke righteous indignation and invigorate nationalist policies. This has been a decades-long campaign, starting in the classroom and buttressed by a barrage of carefully crafted and censored narratives across the Internet, on millions of blogs, and on influencer platforms. Present day Western business executives are shocked to learn that China's 'Millennial' generation (born 1981-1994) and 'Generation Z' (1995-2010) are far more nationalistic than their parents.
Foreigners who have not worked and lived in China simply do not understand the extent to which nationalism fuels the 'return-to-greatness narrative' and, in turn, how it is driving modern policies around economic nationalism and China's quest towards self-reliance.
Here, intellectually, is where I committed a common mistake made by Westerners. I tried to dismiss these narratives as sentimentalist and assumed they would fade away as China integrated with the West.
How could they not? To experience China as a foreigner in the early 2000s was to be an ambassador for all the good things that free trade and cross-border exchange could offer. Surely a rising tide would lift all ships, as John F. Kennedy had said.
I did not fully realise it at the time, but to witness the beginnings of great power competition during my early years in China changed me from an avowed internationalist to a practical realist. Meanwhile, the paradox of the Free World's economic entanglement with China would grow more complicated and more challenging with the passage of time.
I can trace my realisation of this paradox to a single defining moment, late one night in Shanghai, in 2004, when I strolled down an almost empty Nanjing Road West, under razor-edged high rise buildings and towering electric billboards. The immense scale of it was exhilarating, but I knew I was living dangerously;...
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