The Oxford Handbook of Moral Realism

Introduction Paul Bloomfield and David Copp I. ABOUT MORAL REALISM AND ITS VARIETIES 1. Defining Moral Realism Jennifer Foster and Mark Schroeder 2. Metaphysical Structure for Moral Realists Tristram McPherson 3. Moral Realism and Objectivity Sigrún Svavarsdóttir 4. Epistemology for Realists Sarah McGrath 5. The Bearing of Moral Rationalism on Moral Realism Michael Smith 6. Does Anything We Care About Distinguish the Non-Natural from the Natural? Mark van Roojen 7. Ethical Naturalism, Non-Naturalism, and In Between Ralph Wedgwood 8. Can a Moral Judgment be Moorean? William Lycan 9. Real Ethics Simon Blackburn II. NATURALISM 10. Ethical Naturalism: Problems and Prospects Louise Antony and Ernesto Garcia 11. Ethical Realism and Robust Normativity David Copp 12. Moral Functionalism Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit 13. Function, Fitness, Flourishing Paul Bloomfield 14. Realism about the Good-For Human Beings L. Nandi Theunissen III. NON-NATURALISM 15. Moral Conceptual Truths John Bengson, Terence Cuneo, and Russ Shafer-Landau 16. Five Kinds of Epistemic Arguments against Robust Moral Realism Joshua Schecter 17. The Explanatory Roles of Moral Facts and the Case for Moral Realism Robert Audi 18. Derek Parfit's Non-Naturalist Cognitivism Roger Crisp 19. Ardent Moral Realism and the Value-Laden World William J. FitzPatrick 20. Oh, All the Wrongs I Could Have Performed! David Enoch and Itamar Weinshtock-Saadon IV. NEITHER NATURALISM NOR NON-NATURALISM 21. Response-Dependent Realism Mark LeBar 22. Deflationary Meta-ethics Paul Horwich 23. On the Properties of Quietism and Robustness Matthew H. Kramer 24. Prospects for a Quietist Moral Realism Mark D. Warren and Amie L. Thomasson 25. Moral Anti-Exceptionalism Timothy Williamson