Over the last seven decades, some states successfully leveraged the threat of acquiring atomic weapons to compel concessions from superpowers. For many others, however, this coercive gambit failed to work. When does nuclear latency--the technical capacity to build the bomb--enable states to pursue effective coercion?
In Leveraging Latency, Tristan A. Volpe argues that having greater capacity to build weaponry doesn't translate to greater coercive advantage. Volpe finds that there is a trade-off between threatening proliferation and promising nuclear restraint. States need just enough bomb-making capacity to threaten proliferation, but not so much that it becomes too difficult for them to offer nonproliferation assurances. The boundaries of this sweet spot align with the capacity to produce the fissile material at the heart of an atomic weapon.
To test this argument, Volpe includes comparative case studies of four countries that leveraged latency against superpowers: Japan, West Germany, North Korea, and Iran. In doing so, Volpe identifies a generalizable mechanism--the threat-assurance trade-off--that explains why more power often makes compellence less likely to work. This framework illuminates how technology shapes broader bargaining dynamics and helps to refine policy options for inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons. As nuclear technology continues to cast a shadow over the global landscape, Leveraging Latency provides a systematic assessment of its coercive utility.
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This creative and well-researched book convincingly shows that relatively weak states can coerce stronger superpowers by threatening to build nuclear weapons. It teaches us that having the mere capacity to make nuclear weapons-known as 'nuclear latency'-can shape international relations. Volpe's book is essential reading for anyone interested in nuclear proliferation, coercion, or crisis bargaining. * Matthew Fuhrmann, Professor of Political Science and Presidential Impact Fellow, Texas A&M University * Tristan Volpe has written a fascinating book exploring how states use the potential to acquire nuclear weapons, known as nuclear latency, to gain influence in international politics. He theorizes the existence of a Goldilocks Zone where states with just enough nuclear latency can both issue threats and make assurances, and tests his theory across a wide range of case studies, from Japan to Iran. The in-depth cases are interesting, well-written, and strongly support his argument. I highly recommend this to those interested in international politics, and especially in issues surrounding nuclear proliferation and nuclear weapons. * Michael C. Horowitz, Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania * Leveraging Latency reminds us that even hypothetical military capabilities can be used as bargaining power. But as Volpe elegantly explains, countries must perform a delicate balancing act to extract real concessions from military potential. His rich case studies illuminate the strategic logic of nuclear latency, revealing the hidden dilemmas and tradeoffs of bargaining over nuclear programs. Students of coercive diplomacy and nuclear proliferation will find this book indispensable. * Todd S. Sechser, Pamela Feinour Edmonds and Franklin S. Edmonds, Jr. Discovery Professor of Politics and Public Policy, University of Virginia *
Reihe
Sprache
Verlagsort
Zielgruppe
Maße
Höhe: 164 mm
Breite: 242 mm
Dicke: 28 mm
Gewicht
ISBN-13
978-0-19-766953-2 (9780197669532)
Copyright in bibliographic data and cover images is held by Nielsen Book Services Limited or by the publishers or by their respective licensors: all rights reserved.
Schweitzer Klassifikation
Tristan A. Volpe is Assistant Professor in the Defense Analysis Department of the Naval Postgraduate School. He is also a Nonresident Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Autor*in
Assistant Professor of Defense AnalysisAssistant Professor of Defense Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School
Chapter 1: Introduction
Chapter 2: A Theory of Compellence with Nuclear Latency
Chapter 3: Japan
Chapter 4: West Germany
Chapter 5: North Korea
Chapter 6: Iran
Chapter 7: Conclusion
Notes
References
Index
