Content - 6[-]1. Introduction - 14[-]Part 1: Theory - 34[-]2. The social problem and the optimalsolution: Why enforcement is needed - 36[-]3. Introduction to public law enforcement:detection and sanctions - 62[-]4. Continuing compliance and enduringenforcement - time constraints - 88[-]5. Partial compliance and targetingenforcement - resource constraints - 100[-]6. Flexible compliance and cooperativeenforcement - information constraints - 118[-]7. Voluntary compliance and persuadingenforcement - informal constraints - 130[-]8. Economic explanations of compliancestrategies - 136[-]9. Discretion, credibility and objectives of theenforcement authority - 154[-]10. The optimal structure of law enforcement - 168[-]Part 2: Empirical Analysis - 192[-]11. Fire safety regulation in horecaestablishments and policy developments - 194[-]12. Analyzing current municipal enforcementpolicies: Which strategy is effective? - 210[-]13. Cost-benefit analysis of enforcementfollowing the Volendam disaster - 254[-]14. Settlement of liability claims following theVolendam disaster - 272[-]15. Efficient enforcement in a representative municipality - 290[-]16. Conclusion - 332[-]Appendix 1: Interviews and interviewees - 356[-]Samenvatting - 364[-]References - 380[-]Index - 392[-]Curriculum vitae - 394
