Contents: Volume I: Motives and Methods: Microeconomic systems as an experimental science, Vernon L. Smith; Will economics become an experimental science?, Charles R. Plott; Economics and ecology: a comparison of experimental methodologies and philosophies, Jason F. Shogren and Clifford Nowell ; Lets keep the con out of experimental econ.: a methodological note, Alvin E. Roth; Progress in behavioral game theory, Colin F. Camerer. Environmental Risk: Measuring utility by a single-response sequential method, Gordon M. Becker, Morris H. DeGroot and Jacob Marschak; Economic theory of choice and the preference reversal phenomenon, David M. Grether and Charles R. Plott; Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky; The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman; Do biases in probability judgement matter in markets? experimental evidence, Colin F. Camere; Risk, ambiguity and insurance, Robin M. Hogarth and Howard Kunreuther; The impact of self-protection and self-insurance on individual response to risk, Jason F. Shogren; The endowment effect, loss aversion, and status quo bias, Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler; Insurance for low probability hazards: a bimodal response to unlikely events, Gary H. McClelland, William D. Schulze and Don L. Coursey; Investigating generalizations of expected utility theory using experimental data, John D. Hey and Chris Orme. Environmental Conflict: An empirical approach to the prisoners' dilemma game, Lester B. Lave Probabilistic destruction of common-pool resources: experimental evidence, James M. Walker and Roy Gardner; Communication in coordination games, Russell Cooper, Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe and Thomas W. Ross; An experimental study of the centipede game, Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas R. Palfrey); Repeated play, cooperation and coordination: an experimental study, Thomas R. Palfrey and Howard Rosenthal; The role of communication in resolving commons dilemmas: experimental evidence with heterogeneous appropriators, Steven Hackett, Edella Schlager and James Walker; Mitigating the tragedy of the commons through cooperation: an experimental evaluation, Charles F. Mason and Owen R. Phillips; Endogenous timing in a gaming tournament, Kyung Hwan Baik, Todd L. Cherry, Stephan Kroll and Jason F. Shogren; Name index. Volume II: Environmental Cooperation: The Coase theorem: some experimental tests, Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew L. Spitzer; Experimental evaluation of the Coase theorem, Glenn W. Harrison and Michael McKee; Coasian solutions to the externality problem in experimental markets, Glenn W. Harrison, Elizabeth Hoffman, E.E. RutstrA?m and Matthew L. Spitzer; An experimental study of sequential bargaining, Jack Ochs and Alvin E. Roth; Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics, Matthew Rabin; Coasean bargaining with symmetric delay costs, Jason F. Shogren. Environmental Control: Externalities and corrective policies in experimental markets, Charles R. Plott ; Emission trading with shares and coupons: a laboratory experiment, R. Andrew Muller and Stuart Mestelman ; Emission trading with shares and coupons: a laboratory experiment, R. Andrew Muller and Stuart Mestelman; Group size and the voluntary provision of public goods: experimental evidence utilizing large groups, James M. Walker and Arlington W. Williams ; An experimental investigation of the seller incentives in the EPA's emission trading auction, Timothy N. Cason; The Groves-Ledyard mechanism: an experimental study of institutional design, Yan Chen and Charles R. Plott;Nash as an organizing principle in the voluntary provision of public goods: experimental evidence, R. Mark Isaac and James M. Walker; Voluntary revelation of the demand for public goods using a provision point mechanism, Daniel Rondeau, William D. Schulze and Gregory L. Poe; Emission quota trade among the few: laboratory evidence of joint implementation among committed countries, Peter Bohm and BjA?rn Carlen. Environmental Valuation: Estimating demand for public goods: an experiment, Peter Bohm ; Strategic behaviour: some experimental evidence, J.W. Bennett; The disparity between willingness to accept and willingness to pay measures of value, Don L. Coursey, John L. Hovis and William D. Schulze; Measuring the value of a public good: an empirical comparison of elicitation procedures, David S. Brookshire and Don L. Coursey; Experimental tests of the endowment effect and the Coase theorem, Daniel Kahneman , Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler; An experimental examination of intrinsic values as a source of the WTA-WTP disparity, Rebecca R. Boyce, Thomas C. Brown, Gary H. McClelland, George L. Peterson and William D. Schulze; Resolving differences in willingness to pay and willingness to accept, Jason F, Shogren, Seung Y. Shin, Dermot J. Hayes and James B. Kliebenstein; Hypothetical surveys and real economic commitments, Helen R. Neill, Ro
