Wittgenstein on Language

The idea of meaning as a relation between word and thing is an idea which come naturally to us, but one which appears to let us down with many forms of expression. For language at large, Wittgenstein's alternative of meaning and use looks indisputably superior: use does not have to confront the seemingly insuperable problem of finding a second term for the supposed relation; it connects with intention, with the notion of a speech act, with languuage as human practice, and is clearly central to meaning. Use does, however, meet with other problems: with time, place and frequency of use. The qualifications required to bring the use conception back into line often resurrect the failings of the word and object conception. The development of this debate is the central theme of this book, which also explores other aspects of Wittgenstein's philosophy of language. Among the issues considered are ostensive definition, explanations of meaning, the family resemblance account of concepts, intention, belief, and a cluster of topics in which truth is central. These include: the possibility of a uniform account of the meaning of linguistic forms, and the involvement of meaning with verification.
On many points the argument goes against Wittgenstein but the aim throughout is to dispel confusions, to give an account of language as it and to think of language, meaning and use without the preconceptions of current logical theory.