Part 1 Doing something as a rule: a rule is one thing, a habit is another; reflections on old societies; a social rule as a matter of consciousness; habits; conclusions on the necessity of the distinction; the change in modern society; habitual adoption of reasons. Part 2 Linguistic jurisprudence and "descriptive sociology": the epistemological background of linguistic jurisprudence; words and things; "a rule is not a habit" in this context; introduction to the complexity of the concrete; the social reality; a preliminary conclusion; the argument from the central cases; communication; the social group. Part 3 Linguistic jurisprudence as philosophy: an epistmelogical ground for conceptual questions - clarifications on our change of viewpoint, nominalism, our language and its rules, what does linguistic jurisprudence believe in?, different languages, different concepts, linguistic jurisprudence is a conceptualism, concepts, the indeterminacy of concepts, family resemblances and old fashioned conceptualism, the paradoxes of linguistic jurisprudence, a summary comparison of linguistic jurisprudence with old fashioned conceptualism; intermission - re-targeting; the method of the attention to language and its problems - the search into language and the distruct of abstraction, the search into ordinary language and my favourite understanding of linguistic jurisprudence, about the accusation of conservatism, about the diversity of semantic structures, introduction to the problem of awareness, rules of language, rules of logic, the lack of awareness.
